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 Abstract 
 
This research investigated whether the formation of audit committees and their 
characteristics are associated with improved financial reporting quality. Modified 
versions of the models developed by Jones (1991) and Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
provided three measures of earnings quality, which were used to proxy for financial 
reporting quality. The audit committee characteristics investigated were: 
independence, expertise, activity, size and tenure.  
Several contributions to knowledge are made by this research. First, this 
research examined the association between audit committee formation and financial 
reporting quality. This could not be done in many of the prior studies that used data 
on companies in the United States (Klein 2002a; Xie, Davidson and DaDalt 2003a; 
Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau 2004; Vafeas 2005; Yang and Krishnan 2005; 
Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi 2006), where audit committees have been mandatory 
for companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange since 1978. A large number of 
public and private sector groups have recommended mandatory audit committee 
establishment for all Australian listed companies. However, there has been a lack of 
empirical support for these recommendations and this research provides evidence 
regarding this association. 
Second, audit committees are more heavily regulated in the United States than 
Australia. Given the relative lack of audit committee regulation for Australian 
companies, Australia represented a richer empirical setting for the examination of the 
association between audit committee characteristics and financial reporting quality. 
The use of Australian company data for the selected time period, avoided the 
confounding effect of regulation on this association.  
Third, this research used both a modified version of the traditional Jones 
(1991) discretionary accruals model and the more recently developed accrual 
estimation error model from Dechow and Dichev (2002) to estimate proxies for 
financial reporting quality. Most of the prior studies predominantly used the Jones 
(1991) model, which has been subject to criticism in the literature. Therefore, the use 
of multiple models provides more powerful tests of the association between audit 
committees and financial reporting quality. Finally, this research included changes 
tests in addition to cross-sectional tests to reduce the likelihood of problems with 
omitted variables.   
 Several conclusions can be drawn from the results. First, there was some 
evidence that earnings quality measured using the modified Jones (1991) model 
significantly reduced in the year following audit committee formation, thus providing 
some support for the notion that the formation of audit committees improves financial 
reporting quality. However, a comparison of these results with those of tests using 
earnings quality measures based on Dechow and Dichev (2002) indicates that audit 
committees appear more effective at reducing opportunistic earnings management, 
rather than total accrual estimation errors. Second, there was little evidence of a 
significant association between the characteristics of audit committees and improved 
financial reporting quality. Consequently, it can be suggested that, once audit 
committees are established, variations in their characteristics do not significantly 
affect financial reporting quality.  
These conclusions provide support for the mandatory audit committee 
requirement under the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) listing rules, which became 
effective from 1 January 2003. However, there are doubts over the usefulness of 
several aspects of the ASX Corporate Governance Council's recommendations 
concerning the composition and size of audit committees. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this research was to investigate the association between audit 
committees and financial reporting quality. Improving the quality of financial 
reporting practices has been widely proposed as one of the major benefits of 
companies establishing audit committees (Blue Ribbon Committee 1999; AARF, 
IIAA and AICD 2001; Ramsay 2001). However, despite the apparent widespread 
support for the benefits of audit committees, there has been very limited empirical 
research into the impact of their formation on financial reporting quality. Therefore, 
the first research question investigated in this research was: 
 
Is the formation of audit committees associated with improved 
financial reporting quality? 
 
Various review committees have recommended that a number of 
characteristics are important for an audit committee to effectively accomplish its 
objectives. These characteristics include: the overall independence and expertise of 
the audit committee; the level of its activity and its size. However, there are 
inconsistent results in the research literature on the association between these 
characteristics and financial reporting quality. Therefore, the second research question 
investigated in this research was:  
 
Are certain audit committee characteristics associated with improved 
financial reporting quality? 
 
1.2 Contributions 
This research makes a number of key contributions to the literature on audit 
committees and financial reporting quality. First, this research examined the influence 
of the formation of audit committees on financial reporting quality using Australian 
company data. The impact of audit committee formation could not be investigated in 
many of the prior studies because of the use of data on companies from the United 
States (Klein 2002a; Xie, Davidson and DaDalt 2003a; Bedard, Chtourou and 
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Courteau 2004; Vafeas 2005; Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi 2006). The mandatory 
audit committee requirement for NYSE listed companies has existed since 1978, for 
NASDAQ listed companies since 1989 and for companies listed on the American 
Stock Exchange since 1992 (McMullen 1996).  
Wild (1994) and Jeon, Choi and Park (2004) are the only known published 
studies that examined the association between audit committee formation and 
financial reporting quality. Wild (1994) used data on a sample of US companies 
between 1966 and 1980. This study found a significant increase in the reaction of the 
market to earnings reports released after audit committee formation. For their sample 
of Korean companies in 2000 and 2001, Jeon, Choi and Park (2004) found no 
significant decrease in earnings management between the periods before and after 
audit committee formation. Given the apparent inconsistent results on the association 
between audit committee formation and financial reporting quality between these two 
studies, the examination of audit committee formation in this research provides 
further evidence on the ability of audit committees to improve financial reporting 
quality. 
Second, the United States has had far more stringent audit committee 
regulations than Australia. Therefore, there is likely to be greater variation in audit 
committee characteristics among Australian companies than US companies. This 
research investigated the following audit committee characteristics: independence, 
expertise, activity, size and tenure. Based on surveys of annual report disclosures of 
Australia’s top 250 companies in 2001, the Horwath 2002 Corporate Governance 
Report (Psaros and Seamer 2002, p. 21) concluded: 
Clearly there is a wide range of governance practices occurring in corporate Australia. Some 
of the practices are outstanding; some are very poor. 
Consequently, Australia represents a richer empirical setting for research into the 
association between audit committee characteristics and financial reporting quality. 
Research on this association using Australian company data is limited. The study by 
Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2005) is the only known published Australian 
study that has investigated this association.  
Third, most prior studies used the Jones (1991) discretionary accruals model 
and some of its variations to develop proxy measures of earnings management and, 
inversely, earnings quality. However, as noted in section 3.5.2 of Chapter 3, this 
model has been the subject of considerable criticism (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 
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1995; Bernard and Skinner 1996; Guay, Kothari and Watts 1996; Hansen 1999; 
Larcker and Richardson 2004). Therefore, this research used both a version of the 
Jones (1991) model and the more recently developed accrual estimation error model 
by Dechow and Dichev (2002) to estimate three proxies for financial reporting 
quality. Accrual estimation errors arise when there is a difference between the accrual 
transaction and the associated cashflow. The higher the errors, the lower is the quality 
of accruals and therefore earnings (Dechow and Dichev 2002). The Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model is becoming more widely used in earnings quality research (Xie, 
Xie and Xu 2003b; Francis et al. 2004; Aboody, Hughes and Liu 2005; Francis et al. 
2005a; Francis, Nanda and Olsson 2005b; Francis, Olsson and Schipper 2005c; 
Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi 2006).  
Finally, most of the prior studies used only cross-sectional data in their 
analysis of audit committees and financial reporting quality. Such tests potentially 
encounter the problem of omitted variables associated with both audit committees and 
financial reporting quality. This research sought to overcome this problem by 
conducting several changes tests across time, which regressed the changes in the 
earnings quality variables on changes in the audit committee variables. These tests are 
explained in section 3.7 of Chapter 3.  
 
1.3 Motivations  
There are several main motivations behind the investigation of the association 
between audit committees and financial reporting quality. First, high profile corporate 
collapses in Australia and overseas have created considerable concern among 
investors and regulators about the quality of company's financial reporting practices. 
In an attempt to protect investors from financial scandals and to restore trust in 
corporate Australia, the ASX Corporate Governance Council released its report 
containing a set of principles of good corporate governance and best practice 
recommendations (ASX Corporate Governance Council 2003; Elliott and Roberts 
2003). Therefore, audit committees and financial reporting quality are currently very 
topical issues.  
Second, the results of this research will be useful to a number of groups. 
Regulators, such as the ASX, will find the results useful in assessing the effectiveness 
of some of the new audit committee listing rules. These rules came into effect from 1 
January 2003. The new rules mandated that all entities in the S & P All Ordinaries 
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Index must have an audit committee and that all entities in the top 300 of the Index 
must comply with the ASX Corporate Governance Council’s best practice 
recommendations regarding the composition, operation and responsibility of the audit 
committee (Australian Stock Exchange 2006b). The ASX Corporate Governance 
Council recently announced a review of its Principles of Good Corporate Governance 
and Best Practice Recommendations (Australian Stock Exchange 2006a). This further 
demonstrates the current and practical relevance of this research to regulators.  
Finally, for those Australian companies currently without an audit committee, 
this research will assist them in deciding whether they should establish such a 
committee and the associated benefits. Furthermore, for those companies that already 
have an audit committee, the research contributes to their knowledge about whether 
certain characteristics can make their committees more effective. This information 
will be beneficial should the companies decide to restructure their audit committees in 
the future. 
 
1.4 Definitions 
Definitions adopted by researchers are often not uniform. Therefore, key terms 
are defined in this section to establish the positions taken in this research. Definitions 
of the following terms are presented here: corporate governance; audit committees; 
financial reporting quality; earnings quality; and earnings management. 
 
Corporate governance:  
Corporate governance has been defined by the ASX Corporate Governance 
Council (2003, p. 3) as: 
The system by which companies are directed and managed. It influences how the objectives of 
the company are set and achieved, how risk is monitored and assessed, and how performance 
is optimised. 
Audit committees: 
An audit committee is one example of a corporate governance control and has 
been defined as ‘…a committee of the board of directors and as such it assists the 
directors to discharge the board’s responsibilities of oversight and corporate 
governance.’ (AARF, IIAA and AICD 2001, p. 7). Best practice guidelines suggest 
that the responsibilities of audit committees should include: considering the 
appropriateness of the entity's accounting policies and principles; assessing significant 
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estimates and judgements in the financial reports; assessing information from internal 
and external auditors that affects the quality of financial reports; and asking the 
external auditor for an independent judgement about the appropriateness of the 
accounting principles used (AARF, IIAA and AICD 2001). 
Financial reporting quality: 
This research adopts the shareholder/investor protection perspective of 
financial reporting quality. This perspective was defined by Jonas and Blanchet 
(2000, p. 357), who stated that "…quality financial reporting is full and transparent 
financial information that is not designed to obfuscate or mislead users." 
Earnings quality: 
Earnings quality has been defined as "…the extent to which reported earnings 
faithfully represent Hicksian income." (Schipper and Vincent 2003, p. 98). Hicksian 
income is:  
The amount that can be consumed (that is, paid out as dividends) during a period, while 
leaving the firm equally well off at the beginning and end of the period. (Schipper and Vincent 
2003, p. 97). 
The specific earnings quality constructs developed in this research are derived 
from the relations among income accruals and cash. Schipper and Vincent (2003) 
argued that the portion of accruals that is not manipulated and error free increases the 
extent to which accounting earnings faithfully represents Hicksian income. 
Earnings management: 
Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368) defined earnings management as occurring 
when: 
Managers use judgement in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying performance of the company 
or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers. 
Earnings management is viewed as having an inverse association with earnings 
quality (Schipper and Vincent 2003): the greater the extent of earnings management, 
the lower the quality of earnings and vice versa. 
 
1.5 Institutional setting  
For many years in Australia, numerous public and private sector committees 
recommended that audit committees should become a mandatory requirement for all 
companies listed on the ASX. These include the Senate Standing Committee on Legal 
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and Constitutional Affairs (1989), the House of Representatives Standing Committee 
on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (1992), the Working Party of the Ministerial 
Council for Corporations (1997) and the Ramsay (2001) report.  
However, the approach adopted by the ASX regarding audit committees from 
the early 1990s was one of mandatory disclosure. From 1 July 1993, the ASX 
introduced listing rule 3C(3)(i), which required all listed entities to disclose in their 
annual reports whether they had an audit committee. If they did not have such a 
committee, they needed to disclose the reasons why. Concerns were expressed in 
submissions to the ASX in response to its 1992 Exposure Draft, that a mandatory 
audit committee requirement would be burdensome for many listed companies 
(Australian Stock Exchange 1994). The ASX subsequently amended its listing rules 
by introducing listing rule 3C(3)(j), which applied for reporting periods ending on or 
after 30 June 1996. This rule required listed companies to include in their annual 
report a statement of the company's main corporate governance practices during the 
reporting period (Carson 1996). 
In March 2003, the ASX Corporate Governance Council released a report 
containing a set of principles for good corporate governance and best practice 
recommendations (ASX Corporate Governance Council 2003). Best practice 
recommendation 4.2 stated that boards of directors should establish an audit 
committee (ASX Corporate Governance Council 2003). Following this 
recommendation, the ASX changed its listing rules from 1 January 2003. Listing rule 
12.7 requires all entities in the S & P All Ordinaries Index at the beginning of their 
financial years, to have an audit committee during the year. Furthermore, under this 
rule all entities in the top 300 of the Index are required to comply with the ASX 
Corporate Governance Council’s best practice recommendations relating to the 
composition, operation and responsibility of the audit committee (Australian Stock 
Exchange 2006b). Recommendation 4.3 (ASX Corporate Governance Council 2003) 
stated that the audit committee should consist of:  
• only non-executive directors;  
• a majority of independent directors;  
• an independent chairperson who is not the board chairperson; and  
• at least three members.  
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Recommendation 4.4 (ASX Corporate Governance Council 2003) stated that 
the audit committee should have a formal charter, which clearly sets out the 
committee’s roles and responsibilities, composition, structure and membership 
requirements. ASX listing rule 4.10.3 also requires entities to include in their annual 
reports a statement disclosing the extent to which they have followed all of the best 
practice recommendations (Australian Stock Exchange 2006b). The ASX Corporate 
Governance Council recently called for submissions on a review of the principles of 
good corporate governance and the best practice recommendations (Australian Stock 
Exchange 2006a). The main objectives of an audit committee according to best 
practice guidelines include: improving the credibility and objectivity of the financial 
reporting process; improving the efficiency of the board of directors by delegating 
tasks to the committee; and facilitating the maintenance of the independence of the 
external auditor (AARF, IIAA and AICD 2001). 
In the United States, there has been considerably more regulation of audit 
committees than in Australia. Since 1978, it has been a condition of listing on the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) that all companies have an audit committee 
composed entirely of outside directors (Vanasco 1994). The NASDAQ exchange has 
mandated that all registrants in the National Market System have an audit committee 
since 1989. The American Stock Exchange (AMEX) has had a mandatory audit 
committee requirement for its listed companies since 1992 (McMullen 1996). In 
1998, the NYSE and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) co-
sponsored a committee to study audit committee effectiveness. The Blue Ribbon 
Committee (1999) made numerous recommendations regarding the performance of 
audit committees. Most of the recommendations were adopted by the NYSE and the 
NASD. Both Exchanges now require listed companies to maintain audit committees 
with at least three directors, all of whom are independent of management (Klein 
2003).  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed by the US Congress in 2002 and is aimed 
at improving the financial reporting systems of public companies. The Act "…grants 
rights to and imposes obligations on the audit committee that previously it did not 
have." (Klein 2003, p. 347). The rights granted to audit committees under the Act 
include rights to: sufficient funding to perform their duties adequately; meet with the 
internal and external auditors separate from management; and funding for outside 
advisers (Savich 2006). Among the obligations imposed on audit committees under 
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the Act are the responsibility for the appointment, compensation and oversight of the 
work done by the external auditor (Klein 2003). The Act also requires that all audit 
committee members must be outside directors not employed by or associated with the 
company and each audit committee must have at least one member who is a financial 
expert (Savich 2006). 
 
1.6 Delimitations of scope  
There are two main delimitations of scope placed on this research. First, the 
population from which the sample was drawn was all top 500 companies listed on the 
ASX in 2001. Top 500 companies were selected because of the wider availability of 
annual report information on the databases used for this research. Therefore, the 
results of this research may not be generalisable to smaller companies. Furthermore, 
2001 was selected as the base year to avoid any effects of companies anticipating the 
new ASX listing rules on audit committees, which came into effect from 1 January 
2003. In 2002, some companies may have restructured their audit committees in 
preparation for the new listing rules.  
Second, only those companies that formed their audit committees after 1993 
were included in the tests comparing financial reporting quality in the years before 
and after audit committee formation. This is because the original ASX listing rule 
requiring companies to disclose whether they had an audit committee came into effect 
from 1 July 1993. For companies forming their audit committees prior to this date, it 
was not possible to use their annual report disclosures to determine the year of audit 
committee formation. Consequently, the results may not be generalisable to 
companies that formed their audit committees prior to 1993. 
 
1.7 Outline of the research 
Chapter 2 presents a review of the main streams of literature relevant to this 
research. First, prior research into corporate governance is reviewed with a discussion 
of research involving the board of directors, the external auditors and audit 
committees. The audit committee literature is covered in more detail as it is most 
closely related to this research. The specific areas of audit committee research 
covered relate to: audit committee formation, audit committee characteristics; and 
audit committee effectiveness. Second, the literature on financial reporting quality is 
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analysed. Specific areas covered are: perspectives of financial reporting quality; and 
methods of measuring financial reporting quality. Third, the prior research that has 
specifically examined the issue of audit committees and financial reporting quality is 
analysed. Finally, hypotheses are developed and justified. 
Chapter 3 explains the research method that was used to test the hypotheses. 
First, there is a justification for the method chosen to measure financial reporting 
quality. Second, the population from which the sample was chosen and the sample 
selection methods used are explained. The data sources used in this research are also 
outlined. Third, there is an explanation of the measurement of the dependent variable. 
Fourth, the measurement of the independent variables, including the control variables, 
is discussed. Finally, the empirical tests used to test the hypotheses are detailed.  
Chapter 4 analyses the results obtained from the empirical tests. First, there is 
a review of the population from which the sample was drawn, as well as an 
explanation of the samples that were used in the three groups of tests. Second, the 
results obtained from the tests on the formation of an audit committee and financial 
reporting quality are analysed. Second, the results of the regressions of financial 
reporting quality and the audit committee characteristics are evaluated. Finally, the 
regression results from the tests on changes in financial reporting quality and changes 
in audit committee characteristics are reviewed. 
Chapter 5 presents the main conclusions and implications arising from the 
results. First, conclusions relating to the hypotheses are discussed as well as the 
conclusions for the overall research questions identified in section 1.1. Second, there 
is a discussion of the implications of these conclusions for both theory and practice. 
Third, limitations of this research are presented. Finally, a number of avenues for 
future research that arise from the limitations are discussed. 
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2 Literature Review and Hypotheses 
2.1 Introduction 
The main aims of this Chapter are to review the literature relevant to this 
research and to develop the hypotheses that are tested. The Chapter is organised as 
follows: section 2.2 restates the two research questions that were introduced in 
Chapter 1; section 2.3 reviews the prior corporate governance research in the areas of 
the board, the auditor and the audit committee; section 2.4 overviews the research on 
financial reporting quality in terms of its different perspectives and methods of 
measurement; section 2.5 reviews the prior literature on the association between audit 
committees and financial reporting quality; section 2.6 develops the hypotheses that 
were tested; and section 2.7 concludes the Chapter by summarising its main themes. 
 
2.2 Research questions 
The two research questions investigated in this research were: 
 
Is the formation of audit committees associated with improved 
financial reporting quality? 
 
Are certain audit committee characteristics associated with improved 
financial reporting quality? 
 
2.3 Corporate governance literature 
The two major streams of literature relevant to this research are corporate 
governance and financial reporting quality. Corporate governance research has mainly 
focussed on: the board of directors, the external auditor; and the audit committee. 
These groups have been identified as three of the major stakeholders in the corporate 
governance mosaic (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy and Wright 2004). This section provides 
an overview of the prior literature in these three areas, with the emphasis being on 
audit committee research, which most closely aligns with the major focus of this 
research. 
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2.3.1 Board literature 
Prior research involving the board of directors has focussed on several areas. 
These include: the impact of the board on financial statement fraud and earnings 
management; the association between board and audit committee characteristics; the 
association between the board and firm performance; and determinants of board 
composition.  
The impact of the board of directors on financial statement fraud has been 
investigated by several prior studies. Beasley (1996) performed logit regression 
analysis on 75 fraud firms and 75 no-fraud firms in the United States and found that 
the no-fraud firms had boards with significantly higher percentages of outside 
members than the fraud firms. Similarly, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) found 
that firms manipulating their earnings through alleged violations of generally accepted 
accounting principles, were more likely to have boards of directors dominated by 
management. Using data on a sample of Australian companies that experienced 
financial statement fraud, Sharma (2004) found as the percentage of independent 
directors increased, the likelihood of fraud decreased. Taken together, these studies 
suggest that less independent boards of directors are likely to be associated with 
instances of financial statement fraud, which are extreme cases of poor quality 
financial reporting. 
Other studies have analysed the association between characteristics of the 
board of directors and earnings management, which is a less extreme case of poor 
quality financial reporting. For example, the results of Peasnell, Pope and Young 
(2005) indicated that the likelihood of managers making income-increasing abnormal 
accruals was negatively related to the proportion of outside board members. Other 
studies in this area include Klein (2002a), Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003a), 
Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2005) and Vafeas (2005). These papers are 
discussed further in section 2.5.2. Overall, these studies provide support for the 
importance of the independence of the board in decreasing the likelihood of earnings 
management. The independence of the audit committee, which comprises board 
members, was one of the variables examined in this research. 
Beasley and Salterio (2001) analysed the association between the 
characteristics of the board and the audit committee. Their results indicated that 
Canadian firms with more than the mandated minimum of outside directors on the 
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audit committee, had larger boards with more outside directors serving on them. Their 
study highlights the importance of the board of directors at influencing the 
composition of the audit committee. Therefore, this research included several board 
characteristics as control variables. 
Numerous researchers have examined the association between the board of 
directors and firm performance (Baysinger and Butler 1985; Fosberg 1989; 
Schellenger, Wood and Tashakori 1989; Hermalin and Weisbach 1991). For example, 
Baysinger and Butler (1985) found that firms with higher proportions of independent 
directors in the early 1970s achieved superior performance later in the decade. 
Whereas, papers such as Zahra and Pearce (1989) and Bathala and Rao (1995) 
highlighted the inconsistent results in research examining the board of directors and 
firm performance. Therefore, the importance of the independence of board members 
to firm performance is questionable. 
A number of prior studies have examined the issue of the determinants of 
board composition. For example, Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) found that firms 
added inside directors when the CEO neared retirement and that inside directors were 
more likely to leave the board after a firm performed poorly. Furthermore, Bathala 
and Rao (1995) found a systematic association between the proportion of external 
members on the board and variables such as managerial stock ownership, dividend 
payout and debt leverage. Hossain, Cahan and Adams (2000) found the percentage of 
outside directors was related to two of the four measures of investment opportunities 
they employed. Therefore, these prior studies indicate that a number of variables are 
associated with board independence. 
2.3.2 Auditor literature 
There is a very large body of prior research that has examined various issues 
related to the external auditor1. As the focus of this research is on the association 
between audit committees and financial reporting quality, this section discusses the 
prior auditor research associated with the audit committee and financial reporting 
quality.  
Prior research involving the auditor and audit committee can be categorised 
into research that has examined: auditor selection and switches; audit reporting; and 
                                                 
1 Cohen, Krishnamoorthy and Wright (2004) and Watkins, Hillison and Morecroft (2004) have 
provided more detailed reviews of this area of literature. 
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audit fees. Abbott and Parker (2000) studied auditor selection as one of the often 
noted functions of the audit committee. Their study found that firms more likely to 
use industry specialist auditors had audit committees not comprising employees and 
that met at least twice per year. Archambeault and DeZoort (2001) found that 
companies involved in suspicious auditor switches: were less likely to have an audit 
committee; had a smaller percentage of independent audit committee members; had 
fewer audit committee members with relevant experience; held fewer audit committee 
meetings; and had smaller audit committees. Similarly, Lee, Mande and Ortman 
(2004) found that the independence of both the audit committee and the board were 
negatively associated with the likelihood of an auditor-initiated switch. Therefore, 
prior research on auditor selection and switches has shown an association between 
these events and various characteristics of audit committees. 
Another group of studies investigated the association between audit 
committees and audit reporting. For example, Monroe, Teh and Robinson (1995) 
found that companies with an audit committee received a significantly lower 
proportion of qualified audit reports than companies without an audit committee. 
More recent studies in the area of audit reports include Carcello and Neal (2000) 
whose results showed that the greater the percentage of affiliated audit committee 
directors, the lower the probability that the auditor would issue a going-concern audit 
report. In a related study, Carcello and Neal (2003a) analysed auditor dismissals 
following the issuance of going-concern audit reports from Big 6 audit firms. The 
study's results suggested that more independent audit committees with greater 
governance expertise and lower stockholdings could more effectively shield auditors 
from dismissal after a going-concern audit report was issued. The results of these 
studies suggest that audit committees have an impact on the audit reporting process. 
Several other studies have focussed on the association between audit 
committees, audit fees and non-audit service (NAS) fees. Abbott et. al. (2003a) found 
that audit committee independence and financial expertise were significantly 
positively associated with audit fees. In a similar study, Abbott et. al. (2003b) found 
that more independent audit committees, meeting at least four times per year, were 
significantly negatively associated with the ratio of NAS fees to audit fees. In a recent 
Australian study, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) found that more frequent audit 
committee meetings were associated with higher audit fees. The audit committee's 
expertise was also associated with higher audit fees when meeting frequency and 
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independence was low. Overall, these provide evidence of an association between 
certain audit committee characteristics and audit fees. 
Another group of auditor studies related to this research has examined the 
association between audit quality and financial reporting quality. Most of these 
studies used variations of the Jones (1991) discretionary accruals model to develop 
measures of earnings management to proxy for financial reporting quality. Both 
Becker et al. (1998) and Francis, Maydew and Sparks (1999) found that companies 
with Big 6 auditors had lower amounts of discretionary accruals than those audited by 
non-Big 6 auditors. A similar result was found in Chen, Lin and Zhou (2005) in the 
case of Taiwan IPO firms. Together, these results suggest that Big 6 audit firms can 
more effectively constrain earnings management than non-Big 6 audit firms. 
Similarly, both Balsam, Krishnan and Yang (2003) and Krishnan (2003) found 
support for the ability of industry specialist auditors to mitigate earnings management 
by their clients more than non-industry specialist auditors.  
2.3.3 Audit committee literature 
This section reviews the prior literature on audit committees, which is a major 
focus of this research. The following specific areas are addressed: audit committee 
formation; audit committee characteristics; and audit committee effectiveness. The 
prior research on formation and characteristics is relevant because this research 
examines the association between the formation of an audit committee and its 
characteristics and financial reporting quality. The discussion on prior audit 
committee effectiveness research is relevant because it demonstrates several 
alternative approaches that have been used for examining the broad issue of audit 
committee effectiveness. This research used a different approach to examining this 
issue, i.e., by testing the association between audit committees and three proxy 
measures for financial reporting quality. 
2.3.3.1 Audit committee formation 
The first research question investigated by this research was "Is the 
formation of audit committees associated with improved financial reporting 
quality?" As discussed further in Chapter 3, the approach taken in answering 
this question was to examine whether financial reporting quality improved in 
the year following the formation of the audit committee. Therefore, it is 
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relevant to review the prior literature that has examined the issue of the 
formation of audit committees. This literature provides evidence of the 
variables found to be associated with audit committee formation.  
Eichenseher and Shields (1985) argued that increased legal exposure for 
boards of directors created a trend toward audit committee formation and the 
movement toward Big-Eight auditors. The benefits of audit committee formation were 
expressed in terms of increased audit efficiency and providing evidence that the board 
had exercised due care in fulfilling its duties (Eichenseher and Shields 1985). They 
found that companies changing auditors were more likely to form an audit committee 
if the new auditor was a Big-Eight firm.  
Several studies have used an agency theory framework to analyse the 
incentives for companies to form audit committees. Pincus, Rusbarsky and Wong 
(1989) found that companies voluntarily forming audit committees had a lower 
managerial ownership of shares than companies without audit committees. There was 
also support for the association between audit committee formation and company size, 
proportion of outside directors, a Big Eight auditor and participation in the National 
Market System. Using data on a sample of New Zealand companies, Bradbury (1990) 
found that the voluntary formation of an audit committee was related to the number of 
directors on the board and intercorporate ownership. However, variables such as the 
proportion and distribution of non-managerial ownership, financial leverage and 
company size were not significantly related to audit committee formation. Collier 
(1993) found support for the association between increased agency costs of debt and 
the voluntary formation of audit committees in his sample of UK companies. This 
result was not found in either of the two earlier studies. Collier (1993) speculated that 
the differences in results between the three studies could be explain by population and 
environmental factors. Consistent with Collier (1993), leverage was found to be 
significantly related to audit committee formation by Adams (1997). Chau and Leung 
(2006) found evidence of an association between audit committee existence and the 
level of family shareholding, the proportion of independent non-executive directors 
on the board and an independent chairman. 
An Australian study that examined voluntary audit committee formation was 
Carson (2002). This study investigated a number of factors that were hypothesised to 
affect the presence of various board sub-committees including audit committees. The 
presence of an audit committee was found to be positively associated with the 
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existence of a Big 6 auditor and the number of intercorporate relationships of the 
directors on the board. 
These prior studies have found that a number of variables were associated with 
the voluntary formation of audit committees. This information provides valuable 
insights into the circumstances where audit committees are more likely to be formed. 
However, it does not directly provide empirical evidence on the benefits obtained 
from companies forming audit committees. This research investigated whether the 
formation of an audit committee was associated with improved financial reporting 
quality. Therefore, it provides empirical evidence on one of the most widely 
suggested benefits of audit committee formation. The next section provides an 
overview of the prior research into various characteristics of audit committees.  
2.3.3.2 Audit committee characteristics 
The second research question investigated by this research was “Are certain 
audit committee characteristics associated with improved financial reporting quality?” 
This relates to the issue of the effectiveness of the audit committee at completing one 
of its main suggested tasks, i.e., improving the quality of financial reporting. DeZoort 
et al. (2002) identified several characteristics that they believed contributed to the 
effectiveness of the audit committee. This section overviews the prior research on 
those characteristics identified by DeZoort et al. (2002), which were examined in this 
research, i.e., audit committee independence, expertise, and diligence.  
 
Audit committee independence:  
The independence of the audit committee has been widely researched in a 
variety of prior studies. It has been widely argued as being one of the key 
characteristics associated with the effectiveness of the audit committee. An early 
descriptive study on audit committee independence by Vicknair, Hickman and Carnes 
(1993) reported that approximately one third of the audit committee members in their 
sample of NYSE firms in the 1980s were classified as "grey" area directors. These 
directors included relatives of management, company consultants, interlocking 
directors and retired executives. They stated that the independence of such directors 
was subject to question (Vicknair, Hickman and Carnes 1993). Guy and Zeff (2002) 
expressed similar concerns about the appointment of retired audit partners to audit 
committees. 
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The determinants of audit committee independence were investigated in Klein 
(2002b). This study reported that the independence of the audit committee increased 
with board size and board independence and decreased with firms' growth 
opportunities and firms reporting consecutive losses. The significant results relating to 
the board variables highlight the importance of the board of directors' influence over 
the audit committee. 
An Australian study that studied audit committee independence was Cotter 
and Silvester (2003). This study tested hypotheses on the association between board 
and monitoring committee independence on a number of agency variables as well as 
firm value. Their results documented a negative association between audit committee 
independence and leverage. The authors suggested that this result reflected reduced 
monitoring by debt-holders being compensated for by higher audit committee 
independence (Cotter and Silvester 2003). 
Carcello and Neal (2003b) argued that audit committee independence was 
related to financial condition disclosures for companies experiencing financial 
distress. Specifically, they analysed the disclosures made in the financial statement 
notes and the management discussion and analysis to determine whether the 
disclosures were optimistic or non-optimistic about the companies' future survival. 
For companies experiencing financial distress, a significant positive association was 
found between the percentage of affiliated audit committee directors and the optimism 
of the going concern disclosures. 
Several studies have investigated the link between audit committee 
independence, earnings management and earnings quality. These studies include 
Klein (2002a), Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003a), Choi, Jeon and Park (2004), 
Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau (2004), Van der Zahn and Tower (2004), Davidson, 
Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2005), Vafeas (2005), Yang and Krishnan (2005) and 
Rahman and Ali (2006). These prior studies are closely related to the main focus of 
this research and are reviewed in section 2.5.2. 
One paper that has been sceptical of the role of audit committees and the 
importance placed on their independence is Wolnizer (1995). This paper argued that: 
Unless the establishment of audit committees is accompanied by changes in accounting and 
auditing practices such that the elements of financial statements can be authenticated by 
recourse to reliable or public evidence, it is unlikely that audit committees will lead to more 
reliable financial reporting (Wolnizer 1995, p. 45). 
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This argument is based in part on the view that independence is not sufficient alone to 
guarantee the reliability of a professional person's judgement. Wolnizer (1995) 
believed there was a need for changes to accounting and auditing rules to allow the 
objectives of audit committees to be fulfilled. 
Overall, the prior literature has found that several variables are associated with 
audit committee independence. These variables include board size and board 
independence. The next section discusses another widely researched audit committee 
characteristic. 
 
Audit committee expertise: 
Audit committee expertise is another characteristic that has been linked to 
audit committee effectiveness and has received considerable attention in the prior 
literature. Several studies have conducted experiments or surveys to investigate this 
characteristic. DeZoort (1998) used an internal control oversight task with a group of 
audit committee members and a group of external auditors. The results revealed that 
audit committee members with experience made internal control judgements more 
like the auditors than members without experience. DeZoort and Salterio (2001) 
surveyed a sample of Canadian audit committee members to determine their reactions 
to a dispute between the auditor and corporate management. They found that higher 
support for the auditor by audit committee members was associated with greater 
independent director experience and greater audit-reporting knowledge. However, 
there was no significant association found between audit committee member 
judgement and financial-reporting knowledge. McDaniel, Martin and Maines (2002) 
carried out an experiment to investigate differences in judgements about financial 
reporting quality between financial experts and financial literates. The conclusions 
from the study included that the inclusion of financial experts on audit committees 
was likely to improve the consistency of assessments of overall reporting quality 
(McDaniel, Martin and Maines 2002). 
Several other studies have adopted an archival approach in their examination 
of audit committee expertise. Davidson, Xie and Xu (2004) investigated stock returns 
around the time of appointment of audit committee members. The results showed 
significant stock price reactions when new audit committee members had financial 
expertise. Krishnan (2005) found that audit committees with financial expertise were 
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significantly less likely to be associated with the presence of internal control 
questions.  
Another group of studies has analysed the association between the expertise of 
the audit committee, earnings management and earnings quality. These studies are 
closely related to this research and include Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau (2004), 
Choi, Jeon and Park (2004), Van der Zahn and Tower (2004), Vafeas (2005), Yang 
and Krishnan (2005), Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi (2006) and Rahman and Ali 
(2006). These prior studies are reviewed in section 2.5.2. 
Some general conclusions can be drawn from the prior studies on audit 
committee expertise and experience. The survey and experimental literature have 
identified the importance of different forms of experience and expertise on various 
operational activities of the audit committee. Furthermore, the prior archival studies 
have found support for audit committee expertise contributing to improved stock 
returns, less internal control problems and less earnings management. The next 
section reviews the prior literature on audit committee diligence, which has also been 
widely researched.  
 
Audit committee diligence:  
The diligence2 of the audit committee in carrying out its duties has also been 
linked to the audit committee's effectiveness. Several different proxies have been used 
in the literature for audit committee diligence. The most common proxy used has been 
the number of audit committee meetings per year. Two studies that have analysed 
meeting frequency in relation to its association with fraudulent financial reporting 
Abbott, Park and Parker (2000) and Beasley et al. (2000). Cases of financial statement 
fraud represent extreme cases of poor quality financial reporting. These studies are 
discussed further in section 2.5.1. Studies that have examined the association between 
meeting frequency, earnings management and earnings quality include Xie, Davidson 
and DaDalt (2003a), Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau (2004), Choi, Jeon and Park 
(2004), , Van der Zahn and Tower (2004), Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 
(2005), Vafeas (2005), Yang and Krishnan (2005), and Rahman and Ali (2006) . 
These prior studies are reviewed in section 2.5.2. 
                                                 
2 Diligence is closely related to the level of audit committee activity, which was one of the audit 
committee characteristics examined in this research. 
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Audit committee meeting frequency has also been linked to various other audit 
committee and company variables. Menon and Williams (1994) used a sample of 200 
companies to test for the association between audit committee activity and the 
following variables: management stockholdings; leverage; firm size; auditor size; 
proportion of outsiders on the board; and board size. The results indicated that audit 
committee meeting frequency was associated with the proportion of outside directors 
and firm size. Taking a similar approach, Collier and Gregory (1999) found that high 
quality auditors and leverage had a positive association with audit committee activity, 
while the inclusion of insiders on the audit committee was negatively related to 
activity. This study used both the number and duration of meetings to proxy for audit 
committee activity. 
Another proxy for audit committee diligence that has been used in the 
literature is the voluntary disclosure of audit committee information in annual reports. 
Turpin and DeZoort (1998) studied the characteristics of a sample of US companies 
that voluntarily included a separate audit committee report (ACR) in their annual 
report. The findings showed that firms preparing an ACR were larger than firms that 
did not and that company management was generally responsible for the inclusion of 
the ACR in the annual report. Similarly, Carcello, Hermanson and Neal (2002) 
examined the disclosures in audit committee reports as required by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission in the United States. Voluntary disclosures in the reports were 
found to be more common for depository institutions, larger companies, companies 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange and companies with more independent audit 
committees. 
In summary, the prior literature has used a number of different proxies for 
audit committee diligence, including the number of audit committee meetings and the 
voluntary annual report disclosure of audit committee information. The literature has 
also examined the link between diligence and issues such as fraudulent financial 
reporting, earnings management and various audit committee and company variables. 
The next section overviews the survey and field study literature on the broad issue of 
the effectiveness of audit committees. 
2.3.3.3 Audit committee effectiveness 
The previous section presented an overview of the prior research into the 
major audit committee characteristics that have been suggested to contribute to audit 
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committee effectiveness. This section discusses several studies that have directly 
examined this issue through the use of survey and field study approaches. 
Spangler and Braiotta (1990) sought to examine the issue of audit committee 
effectiveness in terms of the leadership styles of the chairpersons of audit committees. 
This study surveyed audit committee members, audit partners and senior company 
management. The results suggested that transformational leadership and active 
management by exception had a substantial impact on audit committee effectiveness. 
Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) proposed that audit committee effectiveness was a 
function of the types and extent of audit committee power. A survey of audit 
committee representatives was conducted. Audit committee effectiveness was 
examined in terms of oversight roles relating to financial reporting, external auditors 
and internal control. The findings of the study indicated that effective audit 
committees required a strong organisational charter, institutional support and 
diligence. A follow-up study by Kalbers and Fogarty (1998) investigated agency 
theory and institutional theory explanations for audit committee effectiveness. Using 
data from Kalbers and Fogarty (1993), this study found that agency theory variables 
were not strongly linked to audit committee effectiveness. There was some support 
for a link between effectiveness and organisational bases of power for the audit 
committee.  
In another survey study, Krishnamoorthy, Wright and Cohen (2002a) 
examined a number of issues related to audit committee effectiveness and financial 
reporting quality. This study surveyed audit partners and managers to gather their 
views on, amongst other things: the functions and responsibilities of audit committees 
and the factors and attributes that ensure audit committee effectiveness. A majority of 
the survey participants indicated that ensuring high quality accounting policies and 
financial reporting oversight were the most important functions of an audit committee. 
The participants also viewed audit committee members as only moderately effective 
in carrying out their financial reporting responsibilities. 
Gendron, Bedard and Gosselin (2004) used a field study approach to 
investigate audit committee effectiveness. This study sought to analyse the following 
issues: the matters that audit committee members emphasise in meetings; how audit 
committee members evaluate these matters; and how audit committee members assess 
responses and comments from managers and auditors during meetings. Three 
Canadian public corporations were used as the basis for the field study. It was found 
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that audit committee members emphasised several key issues in meetings including: 
the accuracy of financial statements; the effectiveness of internal controls; and the 
quality of the audit work performed. Furthermore, they found that a key aspect of the 
audit committee's work was asking challenging questions of managers and auditors 
and assessing the responses.  
While the survey and field study approaches have provided valuable insights 
into issues related to audit committee effectiveness, there are several inherent 
limitations associated with these approaches. First, there is often a low response rate 
from respondents representing difficulties in enlisting participation in such research. 
An implication of this is that if few responses are obtained from a given audit 
committee, the individual responses may not be generalisable to the audit committee 
itself (Spangler and Braiotta 1990).  
Second, survey studies develop subjective measures of audit committee 
effectiveness because they are based on the perceptions of respondents. As Spangler 
and Braiotta (1990, p. 152) note, “Individual perceptual data may be unreliable and 
invalid due to individual respondents’ tendency to be strict, lenient, or to avoid 
extreme responses.” The biases and subjectivity of individuals can result in measures 
of audit committee effectiveness that do not accurately reflect the committees’ overall 
performance. Members of the audit committees may tend to overstate their own 
effectiveness so as to portray themselves in the best light, while senior management 
may understate the committees’ effectiveness if it has been critical of senior 
management (Spangler and Braiotta 1990). A limitation of the field study approach 
used in studies such as Gendron, Bedard and Gosselin (2004) is that only a very small 
number of companies is usually involved, which limits the generalisability of the 
results to other companies.  
This research used an archival approach in its examination of the broad issue 
of the effectiveness of the audit committee. This involved gathering annual report data 
on a sample of companies to analyse the association between audit committees and 
financial reporting quality. The research method adopted is explained in more detail 
in Chapter 3. The next section reviews the literature on financial reporting quality. 
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2.4 Financial reporting quality 
The second major stream of relevant literature is research on financial 
reporting quality. This section first discusses different perspectives of financial 
reporting quality. Second, the different methods used in prior studies for measuring 
financial reporting quality are outlined.  
2.4.1 Perspectives of financial reporting quality 
Jonas and Blanchet (2000) described the two general perspectives widely used 
in assessing the quality of financial reporting. The first perspective is based on the 
needs of users. Under this perspective, financial reporting quality is determined 
relative to the usefulness of the financial information to the users of the information. 
This approach is adopted in the Australian conceptual framework. SAC 2 Objective of 
General Purpose Financial Reporting  states that the primary objective of general 
purpose financial reporting is to "…provide information to users that is useful for 
making and evaluating decisions about the allocation of scarce users" (CPA Australia 
2006, p. 15). The AASB Framework explains the qualitative characteristics that make 
financial reporting information useful to users. These are the understandability, 
relevance, reliability and comparability of the information (CPA Australia 2006). 
The second perspective of financial reporting quality is focussed on the notion 
of shareholder/investor protection. This perspective defines quality financial reporting 
as "…full and transparent financial information that is not designed to obfuscate or 
mislead users" (Jonas and Blanchet 2000, p. 357). Consistent with this perspective, 
the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) has a statutory obligation to ensure that their 
markets are fair, orderly and transparent. Furthermore, the ASX has a program of 
market supervision that is aimed at achieving good disclosure, thereby seeking "…to 
empower the investor to make an informed judgement" (Australian Stock Exchange 
2006c, p. 20). Arthur Levitt, former chairman of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in the United States, stressed the importance of transparent, timely and 
reliable financial statements to the protection of investors (Levitt 1998). 
There is a fundamental distinction between these two perspectives of financial 
reporting quality. The user needs perspective is mainly concerned with providing 
relevant information to users for making decisions, whereas the shareholder/investor 
protection perspective aims to ensure the information provided to users is sufficient 
for their needs, transparent and competent (Jonas and Blanchet 2000).  
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2.4.2 Methods of measuring financial reporting quality 
A number of methods have been used in the research literature to empirically 
measure financial reporting quality. One broad method has been to use a variety of 
approaches to measure the quality of the earnings numbers reported in firms' financial 
reports. Under this method, the higher the quality of earnings, the higher is the overall 
financial reporting quality. As noted by Schipper and Vincent (2003), there is neither 
a widely agreed meaning given to the term "earnings quality", nor a generally 
accepted approach to measuring this concept.  
This research used two empirical models to measure earnings quality. These 
models are explained in more detail in section 3.5 of Chapter 3. The first model used 
was a modified version of the Jones (1991) model of discretionary accruals. This 
model has been widely used in the literature to capture earnings management, which 
is viewed as an inverse measure of earnings quality (e.g. DeFond and Jiambalvo 
1994; Subramanyam 1996; Becker et al. 1998; Teoh, Welch and Wong 1998a; 
Francis, Maydew and Sparks 1999; Kasznik 1999; Bartov, Gul and Tsui 2001; Chung, 
Firth and Kim 2002; Frankel, Johnson and Nelson 2002; Balsam, Krishnan and Yang 
2003; Chung and Kallapur 2003; Gul, Chen and Tsui 2003; Koh 2003; Krishnan 
2003; Dowdell and Krishnan 2004; Chen, Lin and Zhou 2005). 
Earnings management has been defined by Healey and Wahlen (1999, p. 368) 
as: 
Earnings management occurs when managers use judgement in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the 
underlying performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on 
reported accounting numbers.  
Similarly, Schipper (1989, p. 92) defined earnings management as "…a purposeful 
intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining 
some private gain." 
These definitions take an opportunistic view of earnings management, 
whereby the intent of management is to obtain some private gain by misleading 
stakeholders or influencing contractual outcomes. Therefore, under this perspective, 
earnings management negatively impacts on the quality of earnings, i.e., the greater 
the earnings management, the lower the earnings quality and vice versa. If earnings 
were managed opportunistically, the reported earnings number and the overall 
financial reports would be of a lower quality. This relates to both perspectives of 
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financial reporting quality from Jonas and Blanchet (2000), as opportunistic earnings 
management both decreases the usefulness of the financial information for users (the 
user needs perspective) and misleads users (the shareholder/investor protection 
perspective). An alternative view is that earnings are managed to allow managers to 
reveal more private information to users about the financial reports (Schipper 1989; 
Healy and Wahlen 1999).  
The second model used to measure earnings quality was the Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model. This model argues that estimation errors in accruals and 
subsequent corrections of these errors, decreases the quality of accruals and earnings. 
However, unlike the Jones (1991) type models of discretionary accruals that "…focus 
on the opportunistic use of accruals to window-dress and mislead users of financial 
statements", no attempt is made to separate the intentional from the unintentional 
accrual estimation errors (Dechow and Dichev 2002, p. 36). This is because both 
types of errors imply low quality accruals and, therefore, earnings. Therefore, while 
the Jones (1991) model assumes that accruals and earnings quality is only affected by 
management intent to manipulate, the Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure of 
earnings quality incorporates both intentional and unintentional estimation errors in 
accruals. Intentional errors arise from incentives to manage earnings and would be 
similar to opportunistic earnings management proxied by the Jones (1991) model. 
Unintentional errors arise from management lapses and environmental uncertainty 
(Francis et al. 2005a). 
Several recent papers have used the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model as part 
of their empirical tests. First, Xie, Xie and Xu (2003b) examined the association 
between earnings quality and audit committee monitoring service, which was proxied 
by the frequency of annual audit committee meetings. Second, Dhaliwal, Naiker and 
Navissi (2006) investigated the association between three types of audit committee 
financial expertise and accruals quality. Other recent papers that have used the 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model include: Francis et al. (2005a) who investigated the 
pricing of accruals quality by investors; Francis et al. (2004) who examined the 
association between the cost of equity capital and seven earnings attributes, which 
included accruals quality; Francis, Nanda and Olsson (2005b) who studied the 
relations among voluntary disclosure, information quality and costs of capital; 
Francis, Olsson and Schipper (2005c) who analysed the link between financial 
reporting choices affecting accruals quality and firms' use of call options; and 
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Aboody, Hughes and Liu (2005) who examined the association between earnings 
quality, insider trading and the cost of capital. 
A number of other approaches have been used in prior studies to measure the 
quality of earnings. Wild (1994) measured earnings quality as the informativeness of 
earnings reports before and after audit committee formation. Informativeness was 
measured by the extent of market reaction to the release of the earnings reports. 
Earnings quality was measured by Vafeas (2005) using the existence of small 
earnings increases and the avoidance of negative earnings surprises. 
Apart from earnings quality, several other methods have been used in the 
literature to measure overall financial reporting quality. A number of studies have 
surveyed different groups of stakeholders such as investors (Hodge 2003) and 
auditors (Krishnamoorthy, Wright and Cohen 2002b) to gather their perceptions of the 
quality of earnings and financial reporting. Felo, Krishnamurthy and Solieri (2003) 
used analysts ratings from the Association for Investment Management and Research 
to measure financial reporting quality. These ratings are based on evaluations by sub-
committees of analysts of the quality of annual published information, quarterly and 
other published information and information provided through the investor relations 
program. A similar approach was used in studies such as Lang and Lundholm (1993; 
1996). 
 
2.5 Audit committees and financial reporting quality literature  
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 of this Chapter discuss the two major streams of prior 
literature related to this research, i.e., corporate governance and financial reporting 
quality. This section draws these two streams together by presenting an overview of 
the literature that has investigated the association between various aspects of audit 
committees and financial reporting quality. Section 2.5.1 discusses the prior studies 
on audit committees and financial statement fraud, which can be viewed as extreme 
cases of poor quality financial reporting. Section 2.5.2 presents an overview of the 
prior research into audit committees and earnings management. As noted above, 
earnings management has been widely used as an inverse measure of earnings quality 
and, therefore, financial reporting quality. Section 2.5.2 also overviews several prior 
studies on the association between audit committees and other measures of earnings 
quality.  
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2.5.1 Audit committees and financial statement fraud 
Numerous studies have analysed the link between audit committees and 
instances of financial statement fraud. Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) 
investigated companies subject to accounting enforcement actions by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission for alleged breaches of Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles. They found that companies that were manipulating their earnings were less 
likely to have an audit committee. McMullen (1996) examined five potential 
consequences of audit committees involving the occurrence of errors, irregularities 
and illegal acts relating to financial reporting. Her findings showed that companies 
with more reliable financial reporting were more likely to have audit committees. 
However, in his analysis of fraud firms and no-fraud firms, Beasley (1996) found that 
the presence of an audit committee did not significantly affect the likelihood of 
financial statement fraud. 
While the studies discussed in the previous paragraph primarily tested the 
existence of an audit committee, several other studies have examined various audit 
committee characteristics and their association with cases of fraud. Beasley et al. 
(2000) looked at differences in corporate governance between fraud and no-fraud 
companies. They found that fraud companies in certain industries had less 
independent audit committees and fewer audit committee meetings. In a similar study, 
Abbott, Park and Parker (2000) found that firms with audit committees comprised of 
independent directors and that met at least twice a year were less likely to be 
sanctioned for fraudulent or misleading financial reporting. The findings of the study 
of UK audit committees by Song and Windram (2004) suggested that the financial 
literacy of audit committees and their activity level contributed to the probability of 
companies complying with financial reporting standards. Abbott, Parker and Peters 
(2004) examined instances of companies restating their annual results and found a 
significant association between the independence and activity level of the audit 
committee and the occurrence of restatements. In a similar study, Lin, Li and Yang 
(2006) analysed the association between the occurrence of earnings restatements and 
audit committee characteristics. Only the size of the audit committee was significantly 
negatively associated with earnings restatements. 
A number of other studies have focussed more on the characteristics of the 
board and auditor and their association with fraudulent financial reporting. Using data 
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on cases of fraud in Australia, Sharma (2004) found that the likelihood of fraud 
decreased as the percentage of independent directors on the board increased. Carcello 
and Nagy (2004) found a significant negative association between auditor industry 
specialisation and client financial fraud, but the association was weaker for larger 
clients.  
In summary, there have been some mixed results in the literature on the 
association between the existence of audit committees and cases of financial 
statement fraud. While Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) and McMullen (1996) 
found evidence of an association between these variables, Beasley (1996) did not 
identify such an association. Furthermore, the following audit committee 
characteristics have been found to be significantly associated with financial statement 
fraud or earnings restatements: independence (Abbott, Park and Parker 2000; Beasley 
et al. 2000; Abbott, Parker and Peters 2004); activity (Abbott, Park and Parker 2000; 
Beasley et al. 2000; Abbott, Parker and Peters 2004; Song and Windram 2004); 
expertise (Song and Windram 2004); and size (Lin, Li and Yang 2006).  
2.5.2 Audit committees, earnings management and earnings quality 
A number of prior studies have analysed the association between audit 
committees and earnings management or other measures of earnings quality (Klein 
2002a; Xie, Davidson and DaDalt 2003a; Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau 2004; Choi, 
Jeon and Park 2004; Jeon, Choi and Park 2004; Van der Zahn and Tower 2004; 
Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 2005; Vafeas 2005; Yang and Krishnan 2005; 
Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi 2006; Rahman and Ali 2006). Table 2.1 below presents 
a summary of each of these studies.
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 Table 2.1 Summary of prior studies on audit committees, earnings management and earnings quality 
 
Author(s) Sample Dependent Variable Independent variables Results 
Klein (2002a) 692 firm-years from the 
US S&P 500 Index in 
1992 and 1993. 
Absolute values of abnormal 
accruals calculated from a 
cross sectional version of the 
Jones (1991) model. 
Measures of audit 
committee and board 
independence and 
various control variables. 
Firms with boards and/or audit 
committees with less than a 
majority of independent directors 
were more likely to have larger 
absolute abnormal accruals. 
There was no evidence of a 
systematic association between 
an all-independent audit 
committee and abnormal 
accruals. Firms changing their 
board or audit committees from 
having a majority to a minority 
of outside directors experienced 
large increases in absolute 
abnormal accruals.  
Xie, Davidson and 
DaDalt (2003a) 
282 firm-years from the 
US S&P 500 Index in 
1992, 1994 and 1996. 
Discretionary current 
accruals calculated from a 
cross sectional version of the 
Jones (1991) model adjusted 
by Teoh, Welch and Wong 
(1998a). 
CEO duality, number of 
board meetings, number 
of audit committee 
meetings, measures of 
board and audit 
committee independence, 
measures of board and 
audit committee 
composition, and various 
control variables.  
Earnings management was less 
likely to occur in companies 
whose boards include both more 
independent directors and 
directors with corporate 
experience. Composition of the 
audit committee was associated 
with the level of earnings 
management. There was an 
association between lower levels 
of earnings management and the 
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meeting frequency of boards and 
audit committees. 
Choi, Jeon and Park 
(2004) 
116 firm-years from the 
Korean Stock 
Exchange in 2000 and 
2001. 
Discretionary accruals 
calculated from a cross 
sectional version of the Jones 
(1991) model.  
Measures of audit 
committee independence, 
competency and activity, 
audit committee size and 
various control variables. 
Audit committee members’ 
shareholdings were positively 
associated with earnings 
management. The presence of 
professors or employees of 
financial institutions on the audit 
committee was negatively 
associated with earnings 
management. 
Jeon, Choi and Park 
(2004) 
116 firm-years from the 
Korean Stock 
Exchange in 2000 and 
2001. 
Discretionary accruals 
calculated from a cross 
sectional version of the  
modified Jones (1991) model 
(Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney 1995). 
Audit committee 
formation. 
There was no significant 
decrease in earnings 
management for firms that 
established audit committees 
between the periods before and 
after establishment. 
Van der Zahn and 
Tower (2004) 
485 firm-years from the 
Singapore Stock 
Exchange in 2000 and 
2001. 
Discretionary accruals 
calculated from a cross 
sectional version of the Jones 
(1991) model. 
Audit committee 
independence, audit 
committee expertise, 
number of audit 
committee meetings and 
various control variables. 
Firms with a higher proportion of 
independent audit committee 
members were more effective at 
reducing earnings management. 
There was no significant 
association between the 
magnitude of earnings 
management and the level of an 
audit committee’ financial 
expertise amongst its 
independent directors. There was 
strong evidence that more active 
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audit committees were more 
effective at constraining earnings 
management. 
Bedard, Chtourou and 
Courteau (2004) 
300 firm-years from the 
US Compustat database 
in 1996. 
Abnormal accruals 
calculated from the cross 
sectional version of the 
modified Jones (1991) model 
(DeFond and Jiambalvo 
1994; Becker et al. 1998). 
Measures of audit 
committee expertise, 
independence and 
activity and various 
control variables. 
The presence of a financial 
expert on the audit committee, a 
committee composed solely of 
independent directors, and a 
clear mandate to oversee the 
financial reporting process and 
the audit were negatively related 
to the likelihood of aggressive 
earnings management. There was 
a negative association between 
governance expertise and the 
likelihood of aggressive earnings 
management. There was no 
significant association between 
either the size of the audit 
committee, the frequency of its 
meetings or the firm-specific 
expertise of its members with the 
likelihood of aggressive earnings 
management.  
Davidson, Goodwin-
Stewart and Kent 
(2005) 
434 firms listed on the 
Australian Stock 
Exchange in 2000. 
Discretionary accruals 
calculated from the cross 
sectional version of the 
modified Jones (1991) model 
(DeFond and Jiambalvo 
1994; Becker et al. 1998). 
Measures of board and 
audit committee 
independence, number of 
audit committee 
meetings, audit 
committee size, 
There was a significant negative 
relation between earnings 
management and a board 
comprised of a majority of non-
executive directors. There was 
support for an association 
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outsourcing of the 
internal audit function 
and auditor size. 
between an audit committee 
comprising a majority of non-
executives and a reduction in 
earnings management. There was 
no support for an association 
between the presence of an 
internal audit function or choice 
of a Big 5 auditor and earnings 
management. 
Yang and Krishnan 
(2005) 
896 firm year 
observations from the 
US Compustat database 
between 1996-2000. 
Total discretionary accruals 
calculated from the cross-
sectional Jones (1991) 
model; and current 
discretionary accruals based 
on Teoh, Wong and Rao 
(1998b). 
Audit committee 
independence, number of 
meetings, financial 
expertise, stock 
ownership, outside 
directorships, tenure and 
number of directors. 
No significant association was 
found between either audit 
committee independence or audit 
committee financial expertise 
and quarterly discretionary 
accruals; the number of outside 
directorships held by audit 
committee directors was 
negatively associated with 
quarterly discretionary accruals; 
stock ownership by independent 
audit committee directors was 
positively associated with 
earnings management; and the 
average tenure of audit 
committee directors was 
negatively associated with 
quarterly earnings management. 
Dhaliwal, Naiker and 
Navissi (2006) 
1,114 firm years from 
the US Compustat 
Accruals quality derived 
from a modified version of 
Measures of audit 
committee expertise; 
There was a significant positive 
relation between accounting 
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database between 1995 
and 1998. 
the Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model as suggested 
by McNichols (2002). 
audit committee 
governance score based 
on audit committee size, 
audit committee 
independence and audit 
committee meetings; 
board governance score 
based on board size, 
board independence, 
share ownership and 
CEO-Chair duality; and 
various control variables. 
expertise in audit committees and 
accruals quality, but no 
significant association between 
accruals quality and the presence 
of finance or supervisory 
expertise in audit committees. 
The positive association between 
audit committees with 
accounting expertise and 
accruals quality was more 
pronounced in the presence of 
strong audit committee 
governance. 
Vafeas (2005) 252 US firms between 
1994 and 2000. 
Small earnings increases and 
avoiding negative earnings 
surprises. 
Measures of audit 
committee independence, 
experience, size, 
meetings, stock 
ownership, member 
tenure, directorships and 
committee memberships 
of members; board inside 
ownership, board 
independence and board 
size; and various control 
variables. 
Audit committee insiders are 
associated with lower earnings 
quality. Audit committee 
meeting frequency is associated 
with higher earnings quality. 
Committee member experience 
in other committees is associated 
with fewer small earnings 
increases. Equity incentives 
increase, and length of board 
tenure decreases, earnings 
quality as measured by the 
avoidance of negative earnings 
surprises. 
Rahman and Ali 
(2006) 
97 firms listed on the 
Main Board of Bursa 
Abnormal working capital 
accruals derived from the 
Measures of audit 
committee independence, 
Earnings management is 
positively related to board size. 
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Malaysia over the 
period 2002-2003. 
cross-sectional modified 
Jones (1991) model. 
competence and meeting 
frequency; board 
independence, board 
member tenure, CEO 
duality and board size; 
corporate ownership; 
cultural characteristics; 
and various control 
variables. 
There were insignificant 
relations between board 
independence and audit 
committee independence and 
earnings management. The study 
also found that ethnicity had no 
effect in mitigating earnings 
management. 
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The majority of these studies used data on companies in the United States, 
with the remainder using data from several Asian countries, as well as Australia. 
Audit committees in countries such as Australia have been less heavily regulated than 
in the United States. Therefore, the use of Australian company data in this research 
allowed for the examination of the association between audit committees and 
financial reporting quality without the confounding effect of regulation. 
The only known published study that has directly examined the association 
between the formation of audit committees, earnings management and, inversely, 
earnings quality is Jeon, Choi and Park (2004). This study used data on a sample of 
Korean companies in 2000 and 2001 to examine whether audit committee formation 
was associated with decreased earnings management. A majority of sample 
companies were required to form an audit committee according to Korean 
government law. The findings indicated that earnings management did not 
significantly decrease in the period after audit committee formation.  
Wild (1994) also examined the link between audit committee formation and 
earnings quality, which was measured by the extent of market reaction to the release 
of earnings reports. For a sample of US companies over the period 1966 to 1980, this 
study found a significant increase in the market's reaction to earnings reports released 
after audit committee formation. However, for studies of this type, there may be other 
factors affecting market reaction, for which no control was provided. 
Therefore, there are inconsistencies in the results of Jeon, Choi and Park 
(2004) and Wild (1994) on the association between audit committee formation and 
earnings quality. Furthermore, the results of  Jeon, Choi and Park (2004) could have 
been affected by government regulation. Therefore, the use of Australian data in this 
research for the examination of audit committee formation, provides greater insights 
into the ability of audit committees to improve financial reporting quality in a 
relatively less regulated setting. 
A range of audit committee characteristics have been tested in prior studies for 
their association with earnings management and other measures of earnings quality. 
The most commonly tested characteristics have been audit committee independence, 
expertise, activity and size. The remainder of this section synthesises the results from 
the prior studies regarding these characteristics. 
Audit committee independence has been found to be significantly associated 
with measures of earnings management or earnings quality in several prior studies 
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(Klein 2002a; Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau 2004; Choi, Jeon and Park 2004; Van 
der Zahn and Tower 2004; Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 2005; Vafeas 
2005). However, within these studies, there are some inconsistencies in the results. 
For example, Klein (2002a) found no evidence of a significant association between an 
audit committee comprised solely of independent directors and her measure of 
earnings management. Whereas, Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau (2004) found that 
the same measure of audit committee independence was negatively associated with 
the likelihood of aggressive earnings management. Furthermore, Yang and Krishnan 
(2005) and Rahman and Ali (2006) did not find any significant association between 
audit committee independence and their earnings management measures. Overall, 
these results suggest that, while there is considerable evidence that the independence 
of an audit committee is positively associated with earnings quality, several 
inconsistencies exist in the literature.   
Several prior studies have found a significant association between the 
expertise of the audit committee, earnings management and earnings quality  (Xie, 
Davidson and DaDalt 2003a; Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau 2004; Choi, Jeon and 
Park 2004; Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi 2006). A number of different measures of 
expertise were used in these studies. Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003a) found that 
earnings management was less likely to occur in companies whose audit committees 
had higher proportions of members with investment banking experience. Bedard, 
Chtourou and Courteau (2004) found that there was a negative association between 
the presence of a financial expert on the audit committee, as well as governance 
expertise, and the likelihood of aggressive earnings management. Choi, Jeon and Park 
(2004) found that the presence of professors or employees of financial institutions on 
the audit committee was negatively associated with earnings management. Dhaliwal, 
Naiker and Navissi (2006) found a significant positive relation between accounting 
expertise in audit committees and accruals quality. However, some inconsistencies 
exist between the results of these studies and others such as Van der Zahn and Tower 
(2004) who failed to find an association between the magnitude of earnings 
management  and the audit committee's financial expertise amongst the independent 
directors.  
Inconsistent results in the prior studies also exist for the association between 
audit committee activity and earnings management or earnings quality. While Xie, 
Davidson and DaDalt (2003a), Van der Zahn and Tower (2004) and Vafeas (2005) 
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each found evidence of a significant association between these variables, Choi, Jeon 
and Park (2004), Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau (2004) and Davidson, Goodwin-
Stewart and Kent (2005) each found that audit committee activity was not 
significantly related to earnings management. Similar inconsistent results also exist in 
relation to the size of the audit committee. Both Choi, Jeon and Park (2004) and Yang 
and Krishnan (2005) found that larger audit committees were associated with lower 
earnings management. However, Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau (2004), Vafeas 
(2005) and Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2005) each did not find a 
significant result for audit committee size.  
The empirical models used to measure earnings management and, inversely, 
earnings quality in most of the prior studies were based on the Jones (1991) model of 
discretionary or abnormal accruals. While this model has been widely used in 
earnings management research, it has subject to criticism in the literature (Dechow, 
Sloan and Sweeney 1995; Bernard and Skinner 1996; Guay, Kothari and Watts 1996; 
Hansen 1999; Larcker and Richardson 2004). Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi (2006) 
used a modified version of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) to measure accruals and 
earnings quality. This model is becoming more widely used in earnings quality 
research (Xie, Xie and Xu 2003b; Francis et al. 2004; Francis et al. 2005a; Francis, 
Nanda and Olsson 2005b; Francis, Olsson and Schipper 2005c). Vafeas (2005) used 
several alternative measures of earnings quality, which were the existence of small 
earnings increases and the avoidance of negative earnings surprises. This research 
used modified versions of both the Jones (1991) and Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
models to develop the earnings quality measures used in the empirical tests. 
Overall, several conclusions can be drawn from the results of the prior 
research into the association between audit committees, earnings management and 
earnings quality, which are relevant to the research questions investigated in this 
research. First, there has only been limited prior research into the association between 
audit committee formation and earnings quality. Second, there is some evidence 
linking several audit committee characteristics and earnings quality. However, there 
have been mixed results in the literature with several papers failing to find a 
significant association between these variables. 
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2.6 Hypotheses 
From a review of the literature, this section develops the hypotheses used to 
test the research questions. 
2.6.1 Audit committee formation 
Theoretical support for the formation of audit committees can be found in 
agency theory. According to agency theory, shareholders and debtholders act as 
principals who seek to obtain maximum utility from management acting as their agent 
(Kalbers and Fogarty 1998). Assuming economic self-interest, there is the potential 
for opportunistic actions by the agent, which are to the detriment of the principal. Due 
to the separation between ownership and management, the shareholders are unable to 
directly observe the actions of management (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Therefore, a 
system of corporate governance controls is established on the shareholders’ behalf to 
discourage managers from pursuing objectives that do not maximise shareholder 
wealth. These controls are aimed at either aligning managers' and shareholders' 
incentives or limiting the opportunistic activities of managers (Dellaportas et al. 
2005). Audit committees are one example of such a corporate governance control. 
These committees are an important part of the decision control system for the internal 
monitoring by boards of directors (Kalbers and Fogarty 1998). Bradbury (1990) 
argued that audit committees will be voluntarily employed to improve the quality of 
information flows between principal and agent where there are high agency costs. 
Audit committees have been widely recommended in Australia and overseas 
as an important means of improving the quality of corporate financial reporting 
practices (e.g., Blue Ribbon Committee 1999; AARF, IIAA and AICD 2001; Ramsay 
2001; ASX Corporate Governance Council 2003). The Blue Ribbon Committee 
(1999) highlighted that the audit committee's main job is oversight and monitoring of 
the financial reporting process. The Audit Committees’ Best Practice Guide (AARF, 
IIAA and AICD 2001) recommended a number of responsibilities for audit 
committees in the area of external reporting. These responsibilities include: 
considering the appropriateness of the entity's accounting policies and principles; 
assessing significant estimates and judgements in the financial reports; assessing 
information from internal and external auditors that affects the quality of financial 
reports; and asking the external auditor for an independent judgement about the 
appropriateness of the accounting principles used (AARF, IIAA and AICD 2001). 
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Ramsay (2001) noted that both the Treadway Commission and the Kirk Panels in the 
United States recognised the role of audit committees as a means for maintaining 
financial market integrity through improving financial reporting quality. Furthermore, 
the ASX Corporate Governance Council (2003, p. 29) stated that: 
Particularly for larger companies, an audit committee can be a more efficient mechanism than 
the full board for focusing the company on particular issues relevant to verifying and 
safeguarding the integrity of the company’s financial reporting. 
Several prior studies have provided empirical support for the association 
between audit committees and financial reporting quality. McMullen (1996) found 
that companies with more reliable financial reporting were more likely to have audit 
committees. The findings of Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) suggested that 
companies manipulating their earnings were less likely to have an audit committee. 
Beasley et al. (2000) found that fraud companies in certain industries had fewer audit 
committees than no-fraud companies.  
Therefore, based on the above discussion, the following hypothesis is 
proposed: 
H1: The formation of an audit committee is positively associated with an 
increase in financial reporting quality.  
2.6.2 Audit committee independence 
The independence of an audit committee is often considered an essential 
characteristic influencing the committee’s effectiveness in overseeing the financial 
reporting process. This is because of the effect of independence on the directors’ 
ability to effectively monitor a company’s financial reporting. It can be argued that 
independent directors are in the best position to serve as active overseers of the 
financial reporting process, thereby having a greater ability to withstand pressure from 
management to manipulate earnings (Klein 2002a). A director who has no personal or 
business ties with the company’s management would be more likely to report 
management to the appropriate regulatory parties if they became aware of 
questionable financial reporting practices being undertaken by the company. 
Furthermore, independent directors on an audit committee can serve to assist the 
company’s auditors to remain free of any undue influence and interference by 
management (Vicknair, Hickman and Carnes 1993). 
The importance of audit committee independence is reflected in the majority 
of recommendations and laws for the mandatory establishment of audit committees, 
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which recommended or required that they should consist of at least a majority of non-
executive directors (English 1994). The Blue Ribbon Committee (1999, p. 1079) 
argued that:  
…a director without any financial, family, or other material personal ties to management is 
more likely to be able to evaluate objectively the propriety of management’s accounting, 
internal control and reporting practices. 
Following the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999), the audit 
committees of companies listed on the NYSE and NASD must be comprised solely of 
directors who are independent from the company and its management. The ASX 
Corporate Governance Council (2003) recommended that a majority of directors on 
an audit committee should be independent and that the committee’s chairperson be 
independent. 
Empirical support for the importance of audit committee members being 
independent of management can be found in a number of prior studies. Abbott, Park 
and Parker (2000) found that companies whose audit committees were comprised of 
independent directors were less likely to be sanctioned for fraudulent or misleading 
financial reporting. Furthermore, Klein (2002a), Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau 
(2004), Choi, Jeon and Park (2004), Van der Zahn and Tower (2004) and Davidson, 
Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2005) all found support for a negative association 
between audit committee member independence and earnings management.  
Therefore, the following hypotheses are put forward:  
H2a: The independence of an audit committee is positively associated with 
financial reporting quality; 
H2b: An increase in the independence of an audit committee is positively 
associated with an increase in financial reporting quality. 
2.6.3 Audit committee expertise 
In addition to independence, the expertise of the audit committee is often 
considered an important characteristic for its effective operation. It has been argued 
that effective oversight by an audit committee requires that its members possess 
sufficient expertise in accounting and auditing to independently assess the matters that 
are presented to them (Beasley and Salterio 2001; Davidson, Xie and Xu 2004). 
Without a certain degree of expertise, it would be difficult for audit committee 
members to adequately understand the financial information they are required to 
assess. Furthermore, directors with professional legal qualifications are likely to have 
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greater knowledge of their fiduciary duties and the legal requirements regarding 
financial reporting. 
Regulators in the United States and Australia have also placed considerable 
importance on the expertise of audit committee members. Following the Blue Ribbon 
Committee’s (1999) recommendations, the NYSE and NASD exchanges in the United 
States amended their listing rules to require audit committee members to have a 
certain level of financial literacy and accounting or related financial management 
expertise. Similarly, the ASX Corporate Governance Council (2003) recommended 
that all audit committee members be financially literate and at least one member must 
have financial expertise.  
The results of a number of prior studies lend support to the importance of the 
expertise of audit committee members. For example, the experiment by DeZoort 
(1998) found that members with experience in auditing made internal control 
judgements more like auditors than do members without such experience. 
Furthermore, the results of the experimental study by DeZoort and Salterio (2001) 
indicated that greater director experience and audit knowledge were associated with 
higher support by audit committee members for auditors in disputes with client 
management. Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003a), Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau 
(2004) and Choi, Jeon and Park (2004) found support for a negative association 
between the presence of at least one audit committee member with financial expertise 
and earnings management. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
H3a: The expertise of an audit committee is positively associated with 
financial reporting quality; 
H3b: An increase in the expertise of an audit committee is positively 
associated with an increase in financial reporting quality. 
2.6.4 Audit committee activity 
The level of activity of an audit committee has been recommended as 
important to enhance its effectiveness in improving financial reporting quality. It has 
been suggested that the mere formation of an audit committee does not mean that the 
committee is actually relied on by the board of directors to enhance its monitoring 
ability (Menon and Williams 1994). A more active audit committee, i.e., one that 
meets more frequently during the year, would provide its members with greater 
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opportunities for discussing and evaluating the issues that are placed before them 
concerning the company’s financial reporting practices. Audit committees that meet 
only once during the year are unlikely to effectively accomplish their monitoring role 
(Menon and Williams 1994). Similarly, Choi, Jeon and Park (2004, p. 41) argued that 
an "…actively functioning audit committee is more likely to detect earnings 
management than a dormant committee." 
Various committees have also highlighted the importance of having an active 
audit committee. The Treadway Commission in the United States (National 
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1987) argued that an audit committee 
must maintain a constant level of activity to effectively carry out its oversight duties. 
It has also been noted in Australia that the conduct of audit committee meetings will 
greatly influence the ability of members to achieve the committee’s objectives 
(AARF, IIAA and AICD 2001). Best practice guidelines have suggested that audit 
committees should meet at least three or four times per year (Cadbury Committee 
1992; Price Waterhouse 1993; KPMG 1999). 
There is also empirical support for the importance of the level of audit 
committee activity. Abbott, Park and Parker (2000) found that firms whose audit 
committees comprise only independent directors and that meet at least twice per year 
were less likely to be sanctioned for fraudulent or misleading financial reporting. The 
studies by Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003a) and Van der Zahn and Tower (2004) 
found a negative association between earnings management and the activity levels of 
audit committees. 
From the preceding discussion, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
H4a: The activity of an audit committee is positively associated with financial 
reporting quality; 
H4b: An increase in the activity of an audit committee is positively associated 
with an increase in financial reporting quality. 
2.6.5 Audit committee size 
The size of an audit committee can have a positive impact on financial 
reporting quality. Larger audit committees can be more effective as they are likely to 
include members with varied expertise to perform more intense monitoring of 
financial reporting practices (Choi, Jeon and Park 2004). Both the Blue Ribbon 
Committee (1999) and the ASX Corporate Governance Council (2003) recommended 
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that audit committees should have at least three members. It has been suggested that 
at least three members "…provides the necessary strength and diversity of expertise 
and views to ensure appropriate monitoring" (Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau 2004, 
p. 18). However, audit committee size is unlikely to be a linear relationship. In this 
regard, Karamanou and Vafeas (2005, p. 458) note “larger audit committees have a 
wider knowledge base on which to draw but are likely to suffer from process losses 
and diffusion of responsibility.” 
In accordance with the discussion above, the following hypotheses are 
proposed: 
H5a: The size of an audit committee is positively associated with financial 
reporting quality; 
H5b: An increase in the size of an audit committee is positively associated 
with an increase in financial reporting quality. 
2.6.6 Audit committee tenure 
The period of time for which an audit committee has been formed is expected 
to contribute to its effectiveness in carrying out its responsibilities. The longer an 
audit committee has been formed, the greater would be the experience of its members 
at performing their duties on the audit committee. This is expected to have a positive 
impact on financial reporting quality as the audit committee members would have 
more specific knowledge of the company's financial reporting practices. Similar 
arguments have been expressed in terms of external auditor tenure, where there is 
empirical evidence of higher audit quality with longer audit firm tenure (Carey and 
Simnett 2006).   
Therefore, the following hypothesis is put forward: 
H6: The tenure of an audit committee is positively associated with financial 
reporting quality. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This Chapter reviews the literature relevant to this research and develops the 
hypotheses that were tested. First, there is a restatement of the two research questions 
introduced in Chapter 1. Second, prior research into various aspects of corporate 
governance is overviewed, with an emphasis on prior audit committee research. Third, 
the different perspectives of and methods of measuring financial reporting quality are 
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outlined. Fourth, the prior studies on the association between audit committees and 
financial reporting quality are discussed. Finally, the hypotheses tested in this 
research are developed. Chapter 3 explains the research method used to test these 
hypotheses. 
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3 Research Method 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this Chapter is to explain the method used to test the hypotheses 
developed in section 2.6 of Chapter 2. The Chapter is organised as follows: section 
3.2 provides a justification for the chosen research method; section 3.3 explains the 
population from which the sample was chosen and the sample selection methods used; 
section 3.4 identifies the data sources used; section 3.5 explains how the dependent 
variable was measured; section 3.6 discusses the measurement of the independent 
variables including the control variables; section 3.7 details the empirical tests used to 
test the hypotheses; and section 3.8 concludes the Chapter by summarising its main 
themes. 
 
3.2 Justification for the research method 
This research primarily used archival data in the form of company annual 
reports. Financial reporting quality was proxied through the use of three measures of 
earnings quality. These measures were based on the Jones (1991) model of 
discretionary accruals and the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual estimation error 
model. The three groups of empirical tests completed were: tests that examined the 
association between the formation of an audit committee and financial reporting 
quality; tests that analysed the association between audit committee characteristics 
and financial reporting quality; and tests on the association between changes in audit 
committee characteristics and financial reporting quality. The specific audit 
committee characteristics examined were independence, expertise, activity, size and 
tenure. Further detail on the method used is in the remaining sections of this Chapter. 
There were a number of alternative approaches that could have been used to 
analyse the association between audit committees and financial reporting quality. This 
section provides a justification for the chosen method and a discussion of why the 
alternatives were not used. 
First, surveys of a range of interested stakeholders could have been undertaken 
to gather their views on the association between audit committees and financial 
reporting quality. A number of prior studies such as Spangler and Braiotta (1990), 
Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) and Krishnamoorthy, Wright and Cohen (2002a) have 
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examined the broader issue of audit committee effectiveness through the use of survey 
data. Spangler and Braiotta (1990) surveyed audit engagement partners, audit 
committee chairpersons, audit committee members, chief financial officers and chief 
internal auditors to analyse the association between certain leadership characteristics 
and audit committee effectiveness. The study by Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) proposed 
that the effectiveness of audit committees was a function of the types and extent of 
audit committee power. Krishnamoorthy, Wright and Cohen (2002a) surveyed a 
sample of audit partners and managers to determine their views on the effectiveness 
of audit committees in ensuring the quality of the financial reporting process. 
While survey studies can provide some very useful insights, they have a 
number of inherent limitations. First, there is often a low response rate from 
respondents due to difficulties with enlisting participation in such research. An 
implication of this is that if few responses are obtained from a given audit committee, 
the individual responses may not be generalisable to the audit committee itself 
(Spangler and Braiotta 1990). Furthermore, survey results may not be generalisable to 
subjects not included in the study’s original sample. 
A further limitation of survey studies is that they develop subjective measures 
of audit committee effectiveness because they are based on the perceptions of 
respondents. As noted by Spangler and Braiotta (1990, p. 152), “Individual perceptual 
data may be unreliable and invalid due to individual respondents’ tendency to be 
strict, lenient, or to avoid extreme responses.” The biases and subjectivity of 
individuals can result in measures of audit committee effectiveness that do not 
accurately reflect the committee's true performance. Members of the audit committees 
may tend to overstate their own effectiveness so as to portray themselves in the best 
light, while senior management may understate the committee's effectiveness if it has 
been critical of senior management (Spangler and Braiotta 1990). 
Due to the inherent limitations of survey research, it was decided not to use 
this method to collect the necessary data for this research. The use of archival data in 
the form of company annual reports overcomes these limitations in several ways. 
First, the use of annual reports does not suffer from non-response bias, as the 
researcher can readily access the required data from a variety of databases. Second, 
relatively objective measures of financial reporting quality can be calculated from the 
data in annual reports  
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A second method of examining the association between audit committees and 
financial reporting quality would be to examine instances of financial statement fraud. 
These instances would be considered extreme cases of poor quality financial 
reporting. Several prior studies have examined the association between audit 
committees and/or boards of directors and financial statement fraud. These include: 
Beasley (1996); Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996); McMullen (1996); Abbott, Park 
and Parker (2000); Beasley et al. (2000); Sharma (2004); and Song and Windram 
(2004). These papers are discussed further in section 2.5.1 of Chapter 2.  
There are a number of reasons why cases of financial statement fraud were not 
used to examine the association between audit committees and financial reporting 
quality. First, as noted above, cases of financial statement fraud reflect extreme 
instances of poor quality financial reporting. Consequently, these cases would only 
capture a small proportion of all cases of poor quality financial reporting. The 
approach taken in this research was to develop three proxy measures of earnings 
quality that resulted in a larger sample than if financial statement fraud was used. The 
explanation of and justification for the specific proxy measures used is in section 3.5 
of this Chapter. Second, this research used data on Australian listed companies. 
Therefore, given the size of the corporate market in Australia and the number of cases 
of financial statement fraud, it would have been difficult to obtain a sufficiently large 
sample. In this regard, using Australian data for the period 1988-2000, Sharma (2004) 
identified 78 companies experiencing fraud, which was reduced to a final fraud 
sample of 31 companies. 
A third method of examining the association between audit committees and 
financial reporting quality would be to examine various external third party ratings of 
the quality of financial reporting. One study that used this approach was Felo, 
Krishnamurthy and Solieri (2003). This study analysed financial reporting quality as 
measured by financial analysts and reported by the Association for Investment 
Management and Research (AIMR) Review of Corporate Reporting Practices in the 
United States (Felo, Krishnamurthy and Solieri 2003).  
An approach similar to Felo, Krishnamurthy and Solieri (2003) was not used 
in this research for several reasons. First, using external evaluations of financial 
reporting quality would result in subjective measures because they are based on the 
views of the people who undertook the analysis. Furthermore, for Australian 
companies, the only known external evaluation of financial reporting quality is by the 
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Australasian Reporting Awards. Amongst other things, these Awards are designed to 
"…promote excellence in reporting through the publication of informative and factual 
reports" (Australasian Reporting Awards 2006). However, to be eligible for these 
awards, companies must nominate themselves, which means there is likely to be bias 
towards companies that have higher quality financial reporting. Hence, it was decided 
not to use the results of such awards to determine the financial reporting quality of the 
sample companies. 
 
3.3 Population and sample selection 
3.3.1 Population 
The population from which the sample was drawn was the top 500 Australian 
companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) with financial years ending 
during 2001. This year was selected as the base year for the collection of the 
necessary data because, when the data collection for this research commenced, 2001 
was the most recent year for which full financial statement data was available for the 
sample companies. Data for financial years that ended during 2002 was also required 
to calculate the two earnings quality measures based on the Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model. 
Furthermore, the selection of 2001 as the base year is supported by recent 
changes to the ASX listing rules. Following the recommendations of the ASX 
Corporate Governance Council (2003), ASX Listing Rule 12.7 was introduced on 1 
January 2003 requiring all entities in the S & P All Ordinaries Index at the beginning 
of their financial years to have an audit committee during the year. A further 
requirement of this listing rule is that all entities in the top 300 of the Index are 
required to comply with the ASX Corporate Governance Council’s best practice 
recommendations relating to the composition, operation and responsibility of the audit 
committee (Australian Stock Exchange 2006b). Consequently, 2001 was selected as 
the base year to avoid the effect of this listing rule on the sample companies' audit 
committees. If 2003 had been used as the base year, there is likely to have been less 
variation in the audit committee characteristics because of companies complying with 
the listing rule's requirements. The year 2002 was not used to avoid the effects of 
companies making changes to their audit committees in anticipation of the new listing 
rule. 
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Therefore, the decision to use 2001 as the base year affected the availability of 
annual report data. The Annual Reports Collection database (Connect 4 Pty Ltd 2006) 
was used to collect the data to construct the audit committee variables and some of the 
control variables. The measurement of these variables is explained in section 3.6 of 
this Chapter. For 2001, this database only contains the annual reports of the top 500 
companies listed on the ASX. From 2003 onwards, the database contains the annual 
reports of all entities listed on the ASX (Connect 4 Pty Ltd 2006).  
Several types of companies were excluded from the population prior to the 
selection of the sample. Consistent with Clifford and Evans (1997), trusts and foreign 
companies domiciled outside Australia were excluded because their financial 
statements are not always prepared in accordance with the normal disclosure 
requirements for other companies listed on the ASX. Similarly, banks were excluded 
because their financial statements are prepared in accordance with the Banking Act 
1959 (Cwlth), which results in some of their financial statements being of a different 
format and different financial information being disclosed. These exclusions reduced 
the population to 463 companies out of the top 500 companies ASX listed companies 
in 2001. 
3.3.2 Sample selection 
Prior to selecting the sample companies from the population of 463 listed 
Australian companies, an analysis was performed of those companies that did and did 
not have an audit committee during the year 2001. This was necessary because one of 
the empirical tests analysed the difference in financial reporting quality in the years 
before and after audit committee formation. It was necessary to first identify which 
companies had an audit committee before determining the year of formation. To 
identify which companies had an audit committee, reliance was placed on the results 
of the Horwath 2002 Corporate Governance Report (Psaros and Seamer 2002). This 
Report provided information on the corporate governance disclosures of Australia’s 
top 250 companies in their 2001 annual reports. The authors of the Report assessed 
the annual report disclosures and then used this assessment to rank the companies on 
the quality of their corporate governance structures. Only nine companies (3.6%) 
were given a five star rating, which meant that their structures met all best practice 
standards, whereas thirteen companies (5.2%) were given a one star rating indicating 
that their corporate governance structures were lacking in several areas (Psaros and 
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Seamer 2002). From the results of the Report, for many of the top 250 companies, it 
was possible to identify which of them had an audit committee. This was done by 
referring to the company listings in the Report, which contained the number of stars 
allocated to each company based on their corporate governance disclosures. From the 
star rating explanations in the Report, it was concluded that companies with 4, 4.5 or 
5 stars had an audit committee in 2001. 
 For the bottom 250 of the top 500 ASX listed companies, their annual reports 
on the Annual Reports Collection (Connect 4 Pty Ltd 2006) were analysed to identify 
the existence or otherwise of an audit committee. This was also done for those top 250 
companies where the existence or otherwise of an audit committee could not be 
determined from the Horwath 2002 Corporate Governance Report (Psaros and 
Seamer 2002). Since 1 July 1993, under ASX listing rules, Australian listed 
companies have been required to disclose in their annual reports whether they have an 
audit committee (Moroney and Simnett 1996). Furthermore, since 1 July 1996, ASX 
listing rule 4.10.3 has required all listed entities to include in their annual report a 
statement disclosing their main corporate governance practices (Australian Stock 
Exchange 2006b). Therefore, to determine the existence or otherwise of an audit 
committee, the corporate governance statements in the company's annual reports were 
analysed. Overall, it was determined that 422 of the 463 companies in the reduced 
population had an audit committee in 2001. A total of 37 companies disclosed that 
they did not have an audit committee. However, for four companies, it was not 
possible to determine whether an audit committee existed. For those companies 
without an audit committee, the reasons disclosed for not having such a committee are 
summarised in section 4.2 of Chapter 4. 
From the population of 422 companies with an audit committee in 2001, 15 
companies in the Diversified Financials and Real Estate industry groups were 
excluded because companies in both groups do not typically generate any sales 
revenue. From the remaining 407 companies, a random sample of 230 companies was 
initially selected to form the basis for the empirical tests undertaken. The use of a 
reduced sample rendered the collection and collation of the audit committee data for 
the statistical tests more efficient and manageable. On average, it took 3 to 4 hours per 
company to hand collect the necessary audit committee data from the company annual 
reports. The sample was selected using a random number generator to derive 230 
random numbers. The random number generator used was random.org, which was 
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developed by Mads Haahr who works at the University of Dublin, Trinity College in 
Ireland (Haahr 2006). The sample companies were then selected from the listing of 
407 companies with an audit committee in 2001. This selection was done by matching 
the random number with the number corresponding to each company in the list. 
Several of the selected company industry groups were too small to form sufficiently 
large industry matched samples to calculate the earnings quality variables for the 
sample companies. Therefore, another 22 companies from the following four digit 
Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry groups were excluded: 
Automobiles and Components; Consumer Durables and Apparel; Food and Staples 
Retailing; Household and Personal Products; Banks; Insurance; Semiconductors and 
Semiconductor Equipment; and Utilities. This left a final sample of 208 companies 
for tests of the association between audit committee characteristics and earnings 
quality. The use of GICS is further discussed in section 3.5.1.2. 
The following table summarises the sample size used as the basis for the 
empirical tests described in section 3.7: 
Table 3.1 Summary of sample size used for empirical tests 
  Number of companies 
Top 500 ASX listed companies in 2001  500 
Less,   
• Banks, trusts and foreign companies  37  
• Companies without audit committees 37  
• Audit committee existence could not 
be determined 
4 78
Companies with audit committees  422 
Less, Diversified financials and real estate  15
  407
Random sample  230 
Less, Companies from small industry groups  22
Sample for audit committee characteristic 
tests  
 208
 
To assess the representativeness of the reduced sample of 208 companies, it 
was compared to the other 214 companies in the full sample of 422 companies across 
the dimensions of size, leverage, asset growth and return on assets (ROA). 
Independent samples t-tests indicated that the two samples were not significantly 
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different in terms of these variables. Furthermore, table 3.2 below shows that there 
were similar proportions of companies in each industry group across the reduced and 
full samples.  
Table 3.2 Breakdown of companies in industry groups for full and reduced 
samples 
 
 Full sample (422) Reduced sample (208) 
Industry group Number  Percentage Number Percentage 
Capital goods 35 8.3 23 11.1 
Commercial services 
and supplies 
22 5.2 12 5.8 
Energy 20 4.7 15 7.2 
Food, beverage and 
tobacco 
30 7.1 23 11.1 
Healthcare equipment 
and services 
19 4.5 11 5.3 
Hotels, restaurants and 
leisure 
17 4.0 10 4.8 
Materials 83 19.7 49 23.6 
Media 20 4.7 17 8.2 
Pharmaceuticals and 
biotechnology 
16 3.8 7 3.4 
Retailing 22 5.2 15 7.2 
Software and services 25 5.9 14 6.7 
Technology hardware 
and equipment 
10 2.4 6 2.9 
Telecommunication 
services 
14 3.3 6 2.9 
Transportation1 9 2.1 0 0 
Diversified financials2 35 8.3 0 0 
Utilities1 6 1.4 0 0 
Real estate2 17 4.0 0 0 
Insurance1 7 1.7 0 0 
Consumer durables and 
apparel1
3 0.7 0 0 
Automobiles and 
components1
6 1.4 0 0 
Food and staples 
retailing1
4 0.9 0 0 
Household and personal 
products1
1 0.2 0 0 
Semiconductors 1 1 0.2 0 0 
Total 422 100.0   
 
1 Industry group not included in reduced sample due to small number of companies in the industry. 
2 Industry group not included in reduced sample due to lack of sales revenue. 
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3.4 Data sources 
Annual report data were used to measure the variables required to test the 
hypotheses developed in section 2.6 of Chapter 2. The data were obtained from a 
number of sources. As section 3.3.2 above discusses, the Annual Reports Collection 
(Connect 4 Pty Ltd 2006) was used to determine whether the 463 top 500 ASX listed 
companies in 2001 had an audit committee, as well as the year of audit committee 
formation for some of the 208 sample companies. The Annual Reports Collection was 
also used to gather the data for the audit committee and control variables discussed in 
section 3.6. 
 The Aspect Financial Database (SIRCA Ltd 2004) was used to gather the 
various financial statement data items used to calculate the earnings quality variables 
explained in section 3.5. This database "…provides comprehensive coverage of 
financial data on every company listed on the ASX and the New Zealand Stock 
Exchange" (Aspect Financial Pty Ltd 2003, p. 3). To verify the accuracy of the data 
obtained from this database, the Aspect data were cross-checked with the financial 
statement data for 50 sample companies in the Annual Reports Collection (Connect 4 
Pty Ltd 2006). The Aspect database appeared to accurately reflect the financial 
statement data on the Annual Reports Collection. 
The DatAnalysis online database was used to gather data that was not 
available on either of the other two databases. DatAnalysis contains the annual reports 
of all ASX listed companies from 1995 onwards and annual reports back to the early 
1990's for some larger companies (Aspect Huntley 2006). This database was used to 
gather the audit committee, board of directors and audit data for companies whose 
annual reports were not available on the Annual Reports Collection (Connect 4 Pty 
Ltd 2006). Furthermore, DatAnalysis was used to obtain any financial statement data 
items that were missing from the Aspect Financial Database (SIRCA Ltd 2004). The 
Annual Reports Collection (Connect 4 Pty Ltd 2006) was used instead of the 
DatAnalysis database to choose the sample and to gather the audit committee and 
control variable data because its search facilities enabled the necessary data to be 
located and collected more efficiently. 
Information on the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) was 
obtained from Standard & Poor's, which jointly developed the GICS with Morgan 
Stanley Capital International Inc. Since 1 July 2002, the GICS has been used to 
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classify companies listed on the ASX (Australian Stock Exchange 2006d). This 
information was used to form the industry matched samples required to calculate the 
dependent variables as discussed in section 3.5.1.2. 
 
3.5 Measurement of dependent variables 
The construct investigated in this research was financial reporting quality. 
This construct was measured through the development of three proxy measures for 
earnings quality. Earnings quality is one way of capturing the construct of financial 
reporting quality. Alternatively, it could have been captured using third party 
assessments of the quality of the financial disclosures in annual reports or through 
surveys of stakeholders on their perceptions of financial reporting quality. However, 
as section 3.2 notes, these types of approaches inherently develop subjective measures 
of financial reporting quality and can be subject to a bias towards higher quality 
financial reporting. 
Schipper and Vincent (2003) discussed a number of empirical measures used 
by prior research studies to measure earnings quality. They categorised earnings 
quality measures as those derived from: "(1) the time-series properties of earnings; (2) 
selected qualitative characteristics in the FASB's Conceptual Framework; (3) the 
relations among income, cash and accruals; and (4) implementation decisions" 
(Schipper and Vincent 2003, p. 99). The three earnings quality proxies used in this 
research were based on cross-sectional versions of the models developed by Jones 
(1991) and Dechow and Dichev (2002). The use of cross-sectional models is justified 
in section 3.5.1.2. These proxies are part of the third category of earnings quality 
constructs discussed by Schipper and Vincent (2003) and were chosen because they 
have been more widely used in similar prior research than the other measures. 
3.5.1 Jones (1991) model 
The first earnings quality proxy used was based on the model developed in 
Jones (1991). This model focuses on calculating the discretionary portion of total 
accruals, which is then used as a measure of earnings management. To partition total 
accruals into its discretionary and non-discretionary components, Jones (1991) used 
the following expectations model for total accruals to control for changes in the firm's 
economic circumstances: 
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TAi,t/Ait-1 = αi[1/Ait-1] + β1i[ΔREVit/Ait-1] + β2i[PPEit/Ait-1] + εi,t                            (1) 
Where: TAi,t = Total accruals in year t for firm i; 
Ait-1 = Total assets in year t - 1 for firm i; 
ΔREVit = Revenues in year t less revenues in year t - 1 for firm i; 
PPEit = Gross property, plant and equipment in year t for firm i; 
εi,t = Error term in year t for firm i. 
The change in revenues and gross property, plant and equipment were 
included in the above model to control for changes in non-discretionary accruals due 
to changing conditions. The change in revenues was included as it was assumed to be 
an objective measure of the firms’ operations before any manipulation by 
management, whereas gross property, plant and equipment was included to control for 
the non-discretionary depreciation expense (Jones 1991). 
Jones (1991) used ordinary least squares regression for equation (1) to 
generate firm specific coefficients for αi, β1i and β2i. These coefficients were then used 
to estimate the level of non-discretionary accruals for each sample firm using the 
following model: 
NDAit = ai[1/Ait-1] + b1i[ΔREVit/Ait-1] + b2i[PPEit/Ait-1]                                 (2) 
Where: NDAit = Non-discretionary accruals in year t for firm i; 
Ait-1 = Total assets in year t - 1 for firm i; 
ΔREVit = Revenues in year t less revenues in year t - 1 for firm i; 
PPEit = Gross property, plant and equipment in year t for firm i. 
The level of discretionary accruals was then estimated by Jones (1991) using 
the following model. It was used as a proxy for the extent of earnings management: 
DAit = TAi,t/Ait-1 - NDAit                                                                                (3) 
Where: DAi t= Discretionary accruals in year t for firm i 
TAi,t = Total accruals in year t for firm i; 
Ait-1 = Total assets in year t - 1 for firm i; 
NDAit = Non-discretionary accruals in year t for firm i from equation 
(2). 
3.5.1.1 Modified Jones model 
This research used a modification of the original Jones (1991) model as 
proposed by Francis et al. (2005a). They included the change in accounts receivable 
 60
in the estimation model for normal or non-discretionary accruals (i.e., equation (1) 
above). This was done based on the reasoning that, not doing so, would produce 
values for abnormal (discretionary) accruals that are not centred on zero when the 
mean ΔREC is not zero (Francis et al. 2005a). In this research, the estimation model 
was run on cross-sectional samples of companies in the same industry groups as the 
sample companies. Justification for the use of cross-sectional samples is in section 
3.5.1.2. Therefore, for this research, equation (1) above became: 
TAi,t/Ait-1 = αi[1/Ait-1] + β1i[ΔREVit - ΔRECit /Ait-1] + β2i[PPEit/Ait-1] + εi,t    (4) 
Where: TAi,t = Total accruals in year t for firm i (measured by operating profit 
after tax – cash flow from operations); 
Ait-1 = Total assets in year t - 1 for firm i; 
ΔREVit = Revenues in year t less revenues in year t - 1 for firm i; 
ΔRECit = Net receivables in year t less net receivables in year t - 1 for 
firm i; 
PPEit = Gross property, plant and equipment in year t for firm i; 
εi,t = Error term in year t for firm i. 
A further modification of the Jones (1991) model was proposed by Dechow, 
Sloan and Sweeney (1995). This version of the Jones (1991) model adjusted the 
change in revenues for the change in receivables in the estimation of the level of non-
discretionary accruals for each of the sample companies. In this research, the 
following estimation model was run to estimate the level of non-discretionary 
accruals for each sample company using the industry specific coefficients for αi, β1i 
and β2i from equation (4). Therefore, for this research, equation (2) above became: 
NDAit = ai[1/Ait-1] + b1i[ΔREVit - ΔRECit /Ait-1] + b2i[PPEit/Ait-1]                 (5) 
Where: NDAit = Non-discretionary accruals in year t for firm i; 
Ait-1 = Total assets in year t - 1 for firm i; 
ΔREVit = Revenues in year t less revenues in year t - 1 for firm i; 
ΔRECit = Net receivables in year t less net receivables in year t - 1 for 
firm i; 
PPEit = Gross property, plant and equipment in year t for firm i. 
The change in receivables was included because of the assumption in the 
original Jones (1991) model that revenues were entirely non-discretionary. The 
modified Jones (1991) model in equation (4) “…implicitly assumes that all changes in 
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credit sales in the event period result from earnings management” (Dechow, Sloan 
and Sweeney 1995, p. 199). Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) justified the 
inclusion of the change in receivables by arguing that earnings management was more 
likely to occur in relation to credit sales rather than cash sales. 
Using the modifications to the original Jones (1991) model proposed by 
Francis et al. (2005a) and Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995), the level of 
discretionary accruals was then calculated using the approach in equation 3 above, 
i.e., nondiscretionary accruals was subtracted from total accruals to give a measure of 
discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals were used to capture the extent of 
earnings management by the sample companies. Earnings management can be viewed 
as an inverse measure of earnings quality: the higher the extent of earnings 
management, the lower the quality of earnings and vice versa (Schipper and Vincent 
2003). Therefore, the absolute values of the discretionary accruals were used in this 
research as the first proxy for earnings quality. The name of this variable was 
EQJones. 
3.5.1.2 Cross sectional versus time series 
The original Jones (1991) model used a time series approach with at least 14 
years of data for each sample firm. The use of time series data imposes both a 
survivorship bias and a selection bias because at least 10 years of data are required to 
obtain the parameter estimates (Jeter and Shivakumar 1999; Menon and Williams 
2004). This is because firms surviving for 10 or more years "…are more likely to be 
large, mature firms with greater reputational capital to lose if earnings management is 
uncovered" (Jeter and Shivakumar 1999, p. 301). 
 Therefore, many of the prior research studies using the original Jones (1991) 
model or variations of it to estimate earnings management proxies, used cross 
sectional data instead of time series data. The use of cross sectional data involves 
gathering data on companies in the same industry as the sample companies. This 
implicitly assumes that the model coefficients are the same across all companies in 
the same industry during the estimation period (Jeter and Shivakumar 1999; Menon 
and Williams 2004). Examples of studies that have used cross sectional data include 
those that have examined: the underperformance of seasoned equity offerings (Teoh, 
Welch and Wong 1998a); the stock market pricing of discretionary accruals 
(Subramanyam 1996); institutional ownership and monitoring (Chung, Firth and Kim 
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2002; Koh 2003); auditor industry expertise (Balsam, Krishnan and Yang 2003; 
Krishnan 2003); voluntary disclosure (Kasznik 1999); managers' incentives and audit 
fees (Gul, Chen and Tsui 2003); audit quality (Becker et al. 1998; Francis, Maydew 
and Sparks 1999; Chen, Lin and Zhou 2005); non-audit service fees (Frankel, Johnson 
and Nelson 2002; Chung and Kallapur 2003); debt covenant violations (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo 1994); former audit firm personnel as CFOs (Dowdell and Krishnan 2004); 
and audit qualifications (Bartov, Gul and Tsui 2001). 
This research used data on the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) 
to form the industry matched samples necessary for a cross sectional version of the 
Jones (1991) model. As discussed in section 3.4, the GICS has been used to classify 
companies listed on the ASX since 1 July 2002. The GICS currently comprises 10 
Sectors comprising 24 industry groups, 67 industries, and 147 sub-industries 
(Australian Stock Exchange 2006d). 
Four digit GICS industry groups as at 30 April 2003 were used to form the 
industry matched samples. This was the earliest date for which the GICS 
classification structure was available from Standard & Poor's when the data collection 
for this research commenced. Table 3.3 below shows the number of companies in 
each of the 24 GICS industry groups at that date.
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Table 3.3 Number of ASX listed companies in four digit GICS industry 
groups as at 30 April 2003 
 
Industry group Number of companies 
Energy 68 
Materials 417 
Capital Goods 81 
Commercial Services and Supplies 84 
Transportation 23 
Automobiles and Components 13 
Consumer Durables and Apparel 17 
Hotels Restaurants and Leisure 45 
Media 52 
Retailing 36 
Food and Staples Retailing 11 
Food Beverage and Tobacco 57 
Household and Personal Products 2 
Health Care Equipment and Services 61 
Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology 61 
Banks 15 
Diversified Financials 121 
Insurance 10 
Real Estate 95 
Software and Services 110 
Technology Hardware and Equipment 43 
Semiconductors and Semiconductor Equipment 1 
Telecommunication Services 40 
Utilities 17 
 
The use of the modified Jones (1991) model in a cross sectional setting 
required at least 8-10 companies in the same industry group as each of the sample 
companies. Therefore, it was decided to only select companies in those industry 
groups in Table 3.3 that had 20 or more companies. This allowed for the possibility 
that some companies existing as at 30 April 2003 may not have existed in the year for 
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which the financial statement data was sought. Consequently, the following industry 
groups were excluded for this reason: Automobiles and Components; Consumer 
Durables and Apparel; Food and Staples Retailing; Household and Personal Products; 
Banks; Insurance; Semiconductors and Semiconductor Equipment; and Utilities. 
Furthermore, companies from the Diversified Financials industry group were also 
excluded because many of them were investment companies that did not generate any 
sales revenue. Finally, companies in the Real Estate industry group were excluded 
because many of them were property trusts and, therefore, did not generate any sales 
revenue. 
Therefore, the specific GICS industry groups used were: Energy; Materials; 
Capital Goods; Commercial Services and Supplies; Transportation; Hotels, 
Restaurants and Leisure; Media; Retailing; Food, Beverage and Tobacco; Health Care 
Equipment and Services; Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology; Software and Services; 
Technology, Hardware and Equipment; and Telecommunication Services. For each of 
the sample companies, an initial sample of 30 companies from the same industry 
group was selected. The financial statement data for the industry groups was collected 
from the data sources identified in section 3.4 for each of the years for which the data 
was sought. 
3.5.2 Dechow and Dichev (2002) model 
The Jones (1991) model and its variations have been widely used to develop 
proxies for earnings management and, inversely, earnings quality. However, 
discretionary accruals models have been the subject of criticism in a number of 
studies. It has been argued that there is the potential for the misclassification of 
expected accruals as unexpected because of the incompleteness of the expected 
accruals model (Bernard and Skinner 1996; Larcker and Richardson 2004). Guay, 
Kothari and Watts (1996) suggested that their evidence was consistent with the 
models estimating discretionary accruals with considerable imprecision and/or 
misspecification. Hansen (1999) concluded that studies relying entirely on the validity 
of discretionary accruals models were likely to under- or overstate proposed earnings 
management behaviour. Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) demonstrated that 
discretionary accruals models typically generated tests of low power for earnings 
management of economically plausible magnitudes.  
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Therefore, to attempt to overcome criticisms of the modified Jones model, an 
alternative model was also used to develop proxies for earnings quality. This 
alternative model was based on the accrual estimation error model developed in 
Dechow and Dichev (2002), which ran the following firm-level time-series regression 
for each sample company. All variables in equation (6) were divided by average total 
assets: 
ΔWCt = b0 + b1CFOt-1 + b2CFOt + b3CFOt+1 + εt                                                  (6) 
Where: ΔWCt =Δ Working capital in year t i.e. ΔAccounts receivable + 
ΔInventory - ΔAccounts payable - ΔTaxes payable + ΔOther assets 
(net); 
 CFOt-1 = Cash flows from operations in year t – 1; 
 CFOt = Cash flows from operations in year t; 
 CFOt+1 = Cash flows from operations year in year t + 1; 
This model rests on the argument that estimation errors in accruals and their 
subsequent corrections represent noise that reduces the beneficial role of accruals. 
Consequently, accruals quality and earnings quality decrease with the magnitude of 
the accrual estimation errors (Dechow and Dichev 2002). Estimation errors can occur, 
e.g., when the cash receipt from a debtor is less than the original credit sale that was 
recorded. This may result from the bankruptcy of the debtor resulting in an inability to 
pay the full amount owing, or due to opportunistic earnings management being 
undertaken by company management. Both of these events have an adverse effect on 
earnings quality. 
The residuals from equation (6) capture the extent to which accruals map into 
cash flow realisations in past, present and future cash flows. Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) used the standard deviation of the residuals from their time series model as a 
firm-level measure of accruals and earnings quality. A higher standard deviation of 
the residuals, denotes a poorer match between accruals and cash flows and, therefore, 
lower quality accruals and earnings (Dechow and Dichev 2002).  
However, the standard deviation of residuals used by Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) could not be used in this research as a measure of earnings quality because it 
provides a measure of earnings quality across a number of years. The empirical tests 
discussed in section 3.7 required measures of earnings quality for specific firm years. 
The absolute values of the residuals were, therefore, used in this research as the 
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second earnings quality proxy. The higher the residual for each sample company, the 
lower the quality of accruals and earnings and vice versa. This variable was named 
EQDD. Dechow and Dichev (2002) also used the absolute value of the residuals as an 
alternative measure of accruals quality and found that the tenor of their results was 
similar for this alternative specification.  
 Furthermore, Dechow and Dichev (2002) used a time series design, which 
requires approximately 10 years of data for each sample company to estimate the 
regression coefficients. It can be difficult to obtain such data for a sufficiently large 
sample of Australian companies. Therefore, this research used a cross-sectional 
design instead, whereby equation (6) was run using industry group matched samples, 
instead of time-series samples for each sample company. The industry matched 
samples were formed using the procedure discussed in section 3.5.1.2. If the standard 
deviations of the residuals had been used with the cross-sectional data, this would 
have given measures of earnings quality across each industry group and not for the 
specific sample companies.  
In her discussion of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) paper, McNichols (2002) 
suggested including two variables from the original Jones (1991) model, i.e., the 
change in current sales and the level of property plant and equipment. McNichols 
(2002) believed that linking the two approaches taken by Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
and Jones (1991) had the potential to strengthen both approaches and calibrate the 
errors from both models. McNichols (2002) found that the model with the most 
explanatory power was the one that added the two variables from the original Jones 
(1991) model to the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. Therefore, this research used 
the following regression to calculate a third proxy for earnings quality. This variable 
was named EQDDadj. As with equation (6), cross sectional industry matched samples 
were used and the absolute values of the residual for each sample company were used 
as the measure of earnings quality:  
ΔWCt = b0 + b1CFOt-1 + b2CFOt + b3CFOt+1 + b4ΔSalest + b5PPEt +εt        (7) 
Where: ΔWCt =Δ Working capital in year t i.e. ΔAccounts receivable + 
ΔInventory - ΔAccounts payable - ΔTaxes payable + ΔOther assets 
(net). For ease of calculations, this was calculated as (ΔCurrent Assets 
– ΔCurrent Liabilities) – ΔCash.; 
 CFOt-1 = Cash flows from operations in year t – 1; 
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 CFOt = Cash flows from operations in year t; 
 CFOt+1 = Cash flows from operations year in year t + 1; 
 ΔSalest = Sales in year t – Sales in year t – 1; 
 PPEt = Gross property, plant and equipment in year t. 
 
3.6 Measurement of independent variables 
This section explains the measures used for the independent variables, as well 
as several control variables. A summary of the measures for the variables is presented 
in the table below.
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Table 3.4 Measurement of independent and control variables 
 
 Variable Name Variable measurement 
Independent variables ACIND The proportion of 
independent directors on 
the audit committee. 
 ACACCEXP The proportion of audit 
committee members with 
professional accounting 
qualifications. 
 ACLEGEXP The proportion of audit 
committee members with 
professional legal 
qualifications. 
 ACMEET The number of audit 
committee meetings for 
the year. 
 ACSIZE The number of directors 
on the audit committee. 
 ACTENURE The number of years 
between the year in which 
the audit committee was 
formed and 2001. 
Control variables BDSIZE The number of directors 
on the board. 
 BDIND The proportion of 
independent directors on 
the board. 
 BDACCEXP The proportion of board 
members with professional 
accounting qualifications. 
 BDLEGEXP The proportion of board 
members with professional 
legal qualifications. 
 BDMEET The number of board 
meetings for the year. 
 AUDITOR 1 = a company’s auditor 
was a Big 5 or 6 firm and 
0 = otherwise. 
 LNSIZE The natural log of total 
assets. 
 LEV The ratio of total liabilities 
to total assets. 
 INDUSTRY 1 = a company was from a 
particular industry group 
and 0 = otherwise. 
 YEAR 1 = the year after audit 
committee formation and 
0 = otherwise. 
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3.6.1 Audit committee formation  
Hypothesis 1 proposes that the formation of an audit committee is positively 
associated with an increase in financial reporting quality. The year of formation of the 
sample companies’ audit committees was identified in several ways. First, a small 
number of companies disclosed in their 2001 annual reports the year that they formed 
their audit committee. Second, limited data on the year of audit committee formation 
was available from the results of the survey by Baxter (2001). This study surveyed a 
sample of ASX listed companies to determine their level of compliance with best 
practice guidelines for audit committees. Part of the data collected from this survey 
was the year that the companies established their audit committees.  
Third, some data on companies that formed their audit committee prior to 1 
July 1993 was obtained from one of the authors of the Monroe, Teh and Robinson 
(1995) study. As the original ASX listing rule requiring listed entities to disclose the 
existence of an audit committee became effective on this date, it was not possible to 
use annual reports to reliably determine the year of audit committee formation prior to 
this date. Therefore, companies forming an audit committee prior to 1 July 1993 were 
excluded from the tests that compared financial reporting quality in the years before 
and after the formation of an audit committee. Furthermore, companies that listed on 
the ASX with an audit committee were excluded from these tests because the year of 
audit committee formation could not be reliably determined. After the exclusion of a 
further 11 companies due to the unavailability of data, this reduced the final sample 
for these tests to 58 companies. 
Finally, the annual reports of those sample companies not covered by Baxter 
(2001) and Monroe, Teh and Robinson (1995) were analysed on the Annual Reports 
Collection (Connect 4 Pty Ltd 2006) to determine the years of audit committee 
formation. If a company disclosed that it had an audit committee in one year but 
disclosed that it did not have an audit committee in the immediately previous year, it 
was assumed that the committee was formed during the later year. For example, if a 
company disclosed that it had an audit committee in 1998, but disclosed that it did not 
have an audit committee in 1997, it was assumed that the committee was formed 
sometime during the 1998 financial year. Where annual reports for every year were 
not available on the Annual Reports Collection, annual reports on the DatAnalysis 
online database (Aspect Huntley 2006) were examined instead.  
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3.6.2 Audit committee independence 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b refer to the association between the independence of the 
audit committee and financial reporting quality. The first step in developing a 
measure of audit committee independence was to individually assess the 
independence of the directors who were members of their company's audit committee. 
In doing so, the definition of director independence as specified by the ASX 
Corporate Governance Council (2003) was used. According to this definition (ASX 
Corporate Governance Council 2003, p. 20), an independent director is defined as a 
non-executive director who: 
(1) is not a substantial shareholder of the company or an officer of, or otherwise 
associated directly with, a substantial shareholder of the company; 
(2) within the last 3 years has not been employed in an executive capacity by the 
company or another group member, or been a director after ceasing to hold any 
such appointment; 
(3) within the last 3 years has not been a principal of a material professional adviser 
or a material consultant to the company or another group member, or an 
employee materially associated with the service provided; 
(4) is not a material supplier or customer of the company or other group member, or 
an officer of or otherwise associated directly or indirectly with a material 
supplier or customer; 
(5) has no material contractual relationship with the company or another group 
member other than as a director of the company; 
(6) has not served on the board for a period which could, or could reasonably be 
perceived to, materially interfere with the director’s ability to act in the best 
interests of the company; or  
(7) is free from any interest and any business or other relationship which could, or 
could reasonably be perceived to, materially interfere with the director’s ability 
to act in the best interests of the company. 
The identification of whether the directors on the sample companies' audit 
committees were independent according to this definition was based solely on 
information disclosed in the companies’ annual reports. The following areas of the 
annual reports were analysed to obtain the information necessary to determine the 
independence of the directors: information on the directors’ experience, qualifications 
and background in the directors' reports; corporate governance statements; listings of 
significant shareholders; related party disclosures; director remuneration notes; loans 
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disclosures; and economic dependency disclosures3. After assessing the independence 
of each audit committee director, they were coded as 1 if they were considered 
independent or 0 if they were considered non-independent. 
Consistent with the approach taken by Stapledon and Lawrence (1997), when 
assessing the independence or otherwise of individual audit committee members 
based on annual report disclosures, a number of assumptions were made. First, in 
accordance with s. 9 of the Corporations Act 2001, a substantial shareholder was 
defined as a person who had a relevant interest4 in at least five percent of the voting 
shares of the company. The ASX Corporate Governance Council (2003) also used the 
same definition of a substantial shareholder. Second, professional advisers included 
those directors who were solicitors, accountants, auditors or bankers to the company. 
Third, due to the limited details often disclosed about directors’ involvement in 
contractual relationships with the company, any relationship disclosed in the annual 
report was considered significant for the purpose of determining the directors’ 
independence (Stapledon and Lawrence 1997). Similar assumptions were also made 
in the studies by Clifford and Evans (1997) and Cotter and Silvester (2003). 
Having assessed the independence of each audit committee director, the next 
step was to decide upon the appropriate measure of overall audit committee 
independence. The measure used was the proportion of audit committee members 
who were categorised as independent directors. This variable was named ACIND and 
has been commonly used in the literature by papers including Carcello and Neal 
(2000); Klein (2002a) and Klein (2002b) and Cotter and Silvester (2003). 
3.6.3 Audit committee expertise 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b refer to the association between the expertise of the 
audit committee and financial reporting quality. Two variables were used to measure 
the extent of audit committee expertise.  
                                                 
3 Public companies are required by s. 300 of the Corporations Act 2001 to disclose in their annual 
reports: details of each directors’ qualifications, experience and special responsibilities (s. 300(10)(a)); 
the number of meetings of each board committee held during the year and each director’s attendance at 
those meetings (s. 300(10)(c)); each directors’ relevant interests in shares of the company or a related 
body corporate (s. 300(11)(a)); and contracts to which each director is a party or under which the 
director is entitled to a benefit (s. 300(11)(d)(i)). 
4 Section 608 of the Corporations Act 2001 defines a relevant interest in securities as one where a 
person: is the holder of the securities; has the power to exercise, or control the exercise of, a right to 
vote attached to the securities; or has power to dispose of, or control the exercise of a power to dispose 
of, the securities. 
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First, similar to papers such as Van der Zahn and Tower (2004) and Bedard, 
Chtourou and Courteau (2004), the expertise of individual audit committee members 
was measured by whether they had professional accounting qualifications such as 
being either a Certified Practising Accountant (CPA) or a Chartered Accountant (CA). 
The logic behind this measure was that people holding such qualifications should 
have a relatively higher level of accounting knowledge than people without such 
qualifications. While somewhat arbitrary, this measure is relatively objective and 
therefore did not involve making value judgements as to whether directors had 
relevant expertise. Therefore, the first audit committee expertise variable used was 
measured as a continuous variable, i.e., the proportion of audit committee members 
with professional accounting qualifications. This variable was named ACACCEXP. 
Second, audit committee member expertise was also measured by whether the 
directors had professional legal qualifications. A similar measurement is also used in 
papers such as Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003a) and Van der Zahn and Tower 
(2004). The logic here is that directors who hold professional legal qualifications are 
likely to have greater knowledge of their fiduciary duties and the legal requirements 
regarding financial reporting than other directors. Therefore, the second audit 
committee expertise variable used was also measured as a continuous variable, i.e., 
the proportion of audit committee members with professional legal qualifications. 
This variable was named ACLEGEXP. 
3.6.4 Audit committee activity 
Hypotheses 4a and 4b refer to the association between the activity of the audit 
committee and financial reporting quality. Audit committee activity was measured by 
the number of audit committee meetings held during the year (ACMEET). This 
information must be disclosed in company annual reports according to s 300(10)(c) of 
the Corporations Act 2001. Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003a) and Van der Zahn and 
Tower (2004) also used the number of audit committee meetings as a measure of audit 
committee activity.  
3.6.5 Audit committee size 
Hypotheses 5a and 5b suggest that the size of the audit committee is 
associated with financial reporting quality. Audit committee size (ACSIZE) was 
measured by the number of directors on the audit committee. This variable has been 
 73
tested in a number of previous studies (Xie, Davidson and DaDalt 2003a; Bedard, 
Chtourou and Courteau 2004; Choi, Jeon and Park 2004; Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart 
and Kent 2005). 
3.6.6 Audit committee tenure 
Hypothesis 6 proposes an association between the tenure of the audit 
committee and financial reporting quality. Audit committee tenure (ACTENURE) 
was measured as the number of years since the audit committee was formed. This was 
calculated as the difference between 2001 and the year of audit committee formation. 
3.6.7 Control variables 
In order to test the association between financial reporting quality and the 
various audit committee variables discussed in the previous sections, it was important 
to include control variables that could be associated with financial reporting quality 
and/or audit committees. The board of directors, the external auditors and the audit 
committee each contribute to effective corporate governance and ultimately the 
quality of financial reporting (Blue Ribbon Committee 1999).  
As the board of directors directly controls audit committee membership, it 
determines the level of independence and expertise of the audit committee. 
Furthermore, as the board approves the audit committee’s charter, the board 
influences the frequency of audit committee meetings and the responsibilities of the 
committee. The more board meetings that are held, the greater may be the number of 
audit committee meetings to address the financial reporting and other issues raised by 
the board. As the board formally approves the financial statements prepared by 
management, it would be able to influence the quality of financial reporting. 
Therefore, based on prior research (Beasley and Salterio 2001; Klein 2002b; Peasnell, 
Pope and Young 2005), the following board of director characteristics were included 
as control variables: the number of directors on the board (BDSIZE); the proportion 
of independent directors serving on the board (BDIND); the proportion of board 
members with professional accounting qualifications (BDACCEXP); the proportion 
of board members with professional legal qualifications (BDLEGEXP); and the 
number of board meetings for the year (BDMEET). 
The external auditor can also play a major role in determining audit committee 
characteristics and financial reporting quality. Higher quality auditors are expected to 
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have greater incentives to encourage their clients’ boards of directors to improve the 
independence and expertise of audit committee members. This is because these audit 
committee characteristics are likely to influence financial reporting quality. If higher 
quality auditors are determined by their size, because of their larger client base, such 
larger auditors have more to lose in the event of a loss of reputation (Becker et al. 
1998). This loss of reputation can occur if it becomes known in the community that 
the auditors are associated with clients that engage in earnings management that 
reduces the quality of their financial reporting. The larger potential loss for higher 
quality auditors results in a relatively greater incentive to remain independent of their 
clients compared to lower quality auditors that have a much smaller client base 
(Becker et al. 1998). Being associated with clients whose audit committees have 
higher levels of independence and expertise can enhance the auditor’s independence. 
As it can be argued that higher quality auditors have more to lose from a loss 
of reputation in the event of audit failure, they also have greater incentives to detect 
and reveal management misreporting resulting from earnings management (Becker et 
al. 1998). Therefore, to control for the potential effect of audit quality on the audit 
committee characteristics and financial reporting quality, a control variable was 
included (AUDITOR). It was coded as 1 if the company’s auditor was a Big 5 or 6 
firm5 and 0 otherwise. This measure of audit quality has often been used in the 
literature (Watkins, Hillison and Morecroft 2004).  
A number of other control variables that may influence audit committee 
characteristics and/or financial reporting quality were also included. These variables 
were: company size as measured by the natural log of total assets (LNSIZE); leverage 
(LEV) as measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; and a series of 
industry dummy variables to control for any industry specific effects. A series of time 
indicator dummy variables was included in the tests that focussed on the change in the 
audit committee characteristics and financial reporting quality to control for any year 
specific effects.  Larger firms may be more likely to have an audit committee because 
they have more resources to support such a corporate governance mechanism. 
Furthermore, the audit committees of larger firms are likely to have greater 
                                                 
5 Previously, the Big 6 accounting firms comprised Price Waterhouse, Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst and Young, KPMG Peat Marwick and Arthur Andersen. Following the 
merger of Price Waterhouse and Coopers and Lybrand in 1997, the Big 6 then became known as the 
Big 5. The period of study of this research included the periods both pre and post the merger of Price 
Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand. 
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independence, be larger and meet more often because of the greater resources they 
have at their disposal. Firms with higher leverage may be closer to their debt covenant 
constraints and therefore have greater incentives to manage their earnings, thereby 
adversely affecting financial reporting quality. 
 
3.7 Empirical tests of hypotheses 
This section explains the empirical tests carried out to test the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter 2. First, section 3.7.1 describes the tests relating to the 
hypothesis on the association between the formation of an audit committee and 
financial reporting quality. Third, section 3.7.2 explains the tests concerning the 
hypotheses relating to audit committee characteristics and financial reporting quality. 
Finally, section 3.7.3 outlines the tests related to the hypotheses on the association 
between changes in audit committee characteristics and changes in financial reporting 
quality. 
3.7.1 Audit committee formation and financial reporting quality 
To test for the effect of the formation of an audit committee on financial 
reporting quality, a comparison was made of the earnings quality variables in the year 
before and the year after the audit committees were formed. This involved the re-
estimation of the earnings quality variables from both the Jones (1991) and Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) models in the years before and after audit committee formation. 
The comparison of the variables was done to determine whether there were any 
statistically significant differences in earnings quality as a result of the formation of 
the audit committees. Both the parametric matched-pairs t-test and the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test in SPSS were used for this purpose. The t-test analysed 
the differences in the means of the earnings quality variables in the years before and 
after audit committee formation. To allow for possible violations of the main 
assumptions of the t-test, the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed ranks test was also 
used. This test also looked for significant differences in the earnings quality variables 
in the years before and after audit committee formation, which was done on the basis 
of the differences between negative and positive ranks. Negative ranks represented 
where the earnings quality variables in the year after audit committee formation were 
less than the same variable in the year before formation. Positive ranks were the 
opposite of negative ranks.  
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The measurement of the three earnings quality variables used in this research 
was discussed earlier in this Chapter. The absolute values of the earnings quality 
variables were used because the tests described in the previous paragraph were 
designed to determine if there was a significant difference in earnings quality between 
the years before and after audit committee formation. In doing so, the sign of the 
earnings quality variables was not relevant because their absolute value captured the 
level of earnings quality. The higher the absolute value of the earnings quality 
variables, the lower was the earnings quality and vice versa. For example when using 
the t-test, if the mean absolute value of the earnings quality variables was lower in the 
year after audit committee formation, this suggested that the earnings quality had 
improved following formation. 
3.7.2 Audit committee characteristics and financial reporting quality  
Hypotheses 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a and 6 propose that financial reporting quality is 
positively associated with the independence of the audit committee, its expertise, its 
activity, its size and its tenure. Therefore, to test these hypotheses, the following 
regression model for earnings quality was estimated for all firms k in the sample with 
an audit committee for year t. This model was run on the full random sample of 208 
top 500 ASX listed companies with an audit committee in 2001: 
EQk,t = a t +  b∑ 0t INDUSTRY + b1t ACIND + b2t ACACCEXP +             
b3t ACLEGEXP + b4t ACMEET  + b5t ACSIZE + b6t ACTENURE + 
b7t BDSIZE + b8t BDIND + b9t BDACCEXP + b10t BDLEGEXP +   
b11t BDMEET + b12t AUDITOR + b13t LNSIZE + b14t LEV + εt  (8)
      
The terms in this model were measured as follows: 
EQk,t = The measures for earnings quality calculated from the cross-sectional 
modified Jones (1991) and Dechow and Dichev (2002) models; 
INDUSTRY = A series of industry dummy variables: 1 = a company was from 
a particular industry group and 0 = otherwise. 
ACIND = The proportion of independent directors on the audit committee;  
ACACCEXP = The proportion of audit committee members with professional 
accounting qualifications; 
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ACLEGEXP = The proportion of audit committee members with professional 
legal qualifications; 
ACMEET = The number of audit committee meetings for the year;  
ACSIZE = The number of directors on the audit committee; 
ACTENURE = The number of years between the year in which the audit 
committee was formed and 2001; 
BDSIZE = The number of directors on the board; 
BDIND = The proportion of independent directors on the board; 
BDACCEXP = The proportion of board members with professional 
accounting qualifications; 
BDLEGEXP = The proportion of board members with professional legal 
qualifications; 
BDMEET = The number of board meetings for the year; 
AUDITOR: 1 = a company’s auditor was a Big 5 or 6 firm and 0 = otherwise; 
LNSIZE = The natural log of total assets; 
LEV = The ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
Some of the variables contained in equation (8) require further explanation. 
First, the absolute values of the EQ variables were used because the sign of the 
variables was not relevant in determining the level of earnings quality. This is because 
lower absolute values for the EQ variables indicated higher earnings quality and vice 
versa. Therefore, there was an inverse relation between the absolute value of the EQ 
variables and earnings quality and ultimately financial reporting quality. 
Consequently, based on hypotheses 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a and 6, it was predicted that there 
would be a negative relation between the audit committee variables and the absolute 
values of the earnings quality variables because of this inverse relation. Second, for 
those companies in the sample that formed their audit committee prior to 1 July 1993, 
1993 was arbitrarily selected as the year of audit committee formation for the purpose 
of calculating ACTENURE. Similarly, for those companies in the sample that listed 
on the ASX already with an audit committee, the year after listing was chosen as the 
year of audit committee formation. 
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3.7.3 Changes in audit committee characteristics and financial reporting 
quality 
Hypotheses 2b, 3b, 4b and 5b propose that an increase in financial reporting 
quality is positively associated with increases in the independence of the audit 
committee, its expertise, activity and size. Therefore, to further analyse the effect of 
the changes in audit committee characteristics on financial reporting quality, a similar 
regression model to equation (8) was also run. It focused on the changes in the 
characteristics and the changes in the earnings quality variables between the year after 
the formation of the audit committee and 2001. The regression model for this was as 
follows: 
Δ EQk,t = a t + ∑  b0t INDUSTRY +  b∑
=
01
93Y
1Y YEAR + b2t Δ ACIND +   
b3t Δ ACACCEXP + b4t Δ ACLEGEXP + b5t Δ ACMEET +        
b6t Δ ACSIZE + b7t Δ BDSIZE + b8t Δ BDIND +                          
b9t Δ BDACCEXP + b10t Δ BDLEGEXP + b11t Δ BDMEET +    
b12t Δ AUDITOR + b13t LNΔSIZE + b14t Δ LEV + εt           (9) 
The variables in this model were measured as follows: 
Δ EQk,t = The change in the measures for earnings quality calculated from the 
cross-sectional modified Jones (1991) and Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
models; 
INDUSTRY = A series of industry dummy variables: 1 = a company was from 
a particular industry group and 0 = otherwise; 
YEAR = A series of time indicator dummy variables: 1 = the year after audit 
committee formation was a given year and 0 = otherwise; 
Δ ACIND = The change in the proportion of independent directors on the 
audit committee;  
Δ ACACCEXP = The change in the proportion of audit committee members 
with professional accounting qualifications; 
Δ ACLEGEXP = The change in the proportion of audit committee members 
with professional legal qualifications; 
Δ ACMEET = The change in the number of audit committee meetings;  
Δ ACSIZE = The change in the number of directors on the audit committee; 
Δ BDSIZE = The change in the number of directors on the board; 
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Δ BDIND = The change in the proportion of independent directors on the 
board; 
Δ BDACCEXP = The change in the proportion of board members with 
professional accounting qualifications; 
Δ BDLEGEXP = The change in the proportion of board members with 
professional legal qualifications; 
Δ BDMEET = The change in the number of board meetings; 
Δ AUDITOR: 1 = a company with a non-Big 5/6 audit firm has changed to a 
Big 5/6 audit firm; 0 = otherwise; 
LNΔSIZE = The natural log of the change in total assets; 
 Δ LEV = The change in the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
Some issues relating to equation (9) require further explanation. First, the 
model was run on the sub-sample of the original 208 company random sample for 
which company annual report data could be obtained in the year after audit committee 
formation. This sub-sample was 136 companies. Second, the change variables were 
calculated as the difference between the value of the variable in 2001 and its value in 
the year after audit committee formation. For those companies that formed their audit 
committees prior to 1 July 1993, 1993 was selected as the year of formation of their 
audit committee. Furthermore, some companies in the sample already had an audit 
committee when they listed on the ASX. Therefore, the year after listing was used as 
the year of audit committee formation.  
Finally, changes in the earnings quality variables were calculated based on the 
absolute values of the variables in the years after audit committee formation and 2001. 
This was done because the absolute values and not the signs of the variables were 
relevant in determining the extent of earnings quality. Furthermore, based on 
hypotheses 2b, 3b, 4b and 5b, it was predicted that there would be a negative 
association between the change in the audit committee characteristic variables and the 
change in the earnings quality variables. This arose because of the inverse relation 
between the values of the earnings quality change variables and the extent of earnings 
quality and therefore financial reporting quality. Lower values on the variables 
represented higher earnings quality and vice versa. 
There is a potential endogeneity issue, whereby the formation and 
characteristics of audit committees may not necessarily be independent of financial 
reporting quality. It is possible that firms with high quality financial reporting will 
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create high quality audit committees, rather than high quality audit committees 
leading to better financial reporting. In this regard, Engel (2005) argued that firms 
might use a high quality audit committee to signal the strength of their existing 
financial reporting system. The formation and changes tests discussed in this Chapter 
aimed to overcome these issues. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
This Chapter explains the method that was used to test the hypotheses 
developed in section 2.6 of Chapter 2. First, there is a justification for the use of 
archival data to perform the statistical tests and a discussion of why various 
alternative approaches to measuring financial reporting quality were not used. Second, 
the population from which the sample was selected is discussed, along with an 
explanation of the main sources of data used. Third, the measurement of the earnings 
quality variables from the modified cross-sectional Jones (1991) model and the 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model is explained. Fourth, there is an explanation of 
how the independent and control variables were measured. Finally, the main empirical 
tests undertaken in this research are outlined. Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the 
results obtained from these tests. 
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4 Analysis of Results 
4.1 Introduction 
This Chapter analyses the results from the statistical tests undertaken in this 
research and explained in Chapter 3. It does not draw conclusions from the results, 
nor suggest implications for theory, policy or practice. These issues are covered in 
Chapter 5. The current Chapter is organised as follows: section 4.2 provides details of 
the population from which the sample was drawn; section 4.3 outlines information 
about the samples used in the statistical tests; section 4.4 explains the results obtained 
from the tests examining the association between audit committee formation and 
financial reporting quality; section 4.5 discusses the results from the tests on the 
association between the characteristics of audit committees and financial reporting 
quality; section 4.6 details the test results on the association between the changes in 
these characteristics and the changes in financial reporting quality; and section 4.7 
concludes the Chapter by summarising its main themes. 
 
4.2 Population 
As explained in Chapter 3, the population from which the initial sample was 
drawn was the top 500 Australian companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX) with financial years ending during 2001. Section 3.3.2 of Chapter 3 outlines 
the process used to identify which of these companies did and did not have an audit 
committee in 2001. Trusts, foreign companies domiciled outside Australia and banks 
were excluded from the population prior to selecting the sample. Consequently, 463 
companies remained from the top 500. Of these, 422 (91.1%) companies had an audit 
committee, 37 (8%) companies did not have an audit committee and for 4 (0.9%) 
companies it could not be determined whether they had an audit committee. Table 4.1 
below summarises this data:
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Table 4.1 Top 500 ASX listed companies with and without an audit 
committee in 2001 
 
 Number of companies Percentage 
Companies with an audit 
committee 
422 91.1 
Companies without an 
audit committee 
37 8.0 
Could not be determined 4 0.9 
Total 463 100 
 
One of the major functions usually associated with an audit committee is to 
monitor and improve the quality of a company’s financial reports. For those top 500 
companies with an audit committee in 2001, the annual report disclosures regarding 
the committee’s functions were analysed. Of the 422 companies with an audit 
committee, 375 (88.8%) disclosed that part of their audit committee's functions was to 
improve the quality of the company's financial reports. For some companies this was 
explicitly stated, such as for Amalgamated Holdings Ltd:  
The committee also gives the Board additional assurance regarding the quality and reliability 
of financial information prepared for use by the Board in determining policies for inclusion in 
financial statements. 
Whereas for other companies, such as Futuris Corporation Ltd , this was more 
implicit: 
The terms of reference which have been adopted by the Audit Committee are: 
* Reviewing annual and half yearly reports and Australian Stock Exchange releases. 
If the companies chose not to establish an audit committee they were required 
under ASX listing rules to disclose the reasons for not establishing one. For the 37 
companies in 2001 without an audit committee, the reasons they disclosed in their 
annual reports were analysed. Twenty companies disclosed they had not yet formed a 
separate audit committee because the duties of the committee were being handled by 
the full board of directors. Sixteen companies disclosed that they did not believe that 
an audit committee was necessary because of their company's size, nature or structure. 
Table 4.2 summarises the reasons disclosed:
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Table 4.2 Reasons disclosed for not forming an audit committee by 37 
ASX listed companies in their 2001 annual reports 
 
Reason for no audit committee Number of companies 
Audit committee duties handled by the full board 20 
Not necessary due to company size, nature and/or 
structure  
16 
Other reasons 4 
Total 40 
(Note: some companies disclosed more than one reason)  
 
4.3 Samples used in empirical tests 
There were three main groups of tests used to test the hypotheses developed in 
section 2.6 of Chapter 2. The sample companies used for these tests were derived 
from the random sample of 208 top 500 ASX listed companies with an audit 
committee in 2001. The process used in selecting this sample was discussed in section 
3.3.2 of Chapter 3.  
The first group of tests examined the association between the formation of an 
audit committee and financial reporting quality. Companies whose audit committees 
were formed prior to 1993 and those companies that listed on the ASX with an audit 
committee were excluded from the sample of companies used in the audit committee 
formation tests. Therefore, this left a sample of 69 companies that formed their audit 
committees after 1993 or later and did not list on the ASX with an audit committee. 
From these companies, 11 were excluded because of the unavailability of their annual 
reports on the databases described in section 3.4 of Chapter 3. This meant that a final 
sample of 58 companies were included in the tests on the association between the 
formation of an audit committee and financial reporting quality. Table 4.3 summarises 
these details:
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Table 4.3 Sample companies used in tests on audit committee formation 
and financial reporting quality 
 
 Number of companies 
Initial random sample 208 
Companies excluded because their audit 
committees were formed pre 1993 or they 
listed on the ASX with an audit 
committee 
139 
Companies excluded due to unavailability 
of their annual reports 
11 
Final sample  58 
 
The second group of tests analysed the association between audit committee 
characteristics and financial reporting quality. These tests were conducted using 2001 
annual report data for the initial 208 company random sample. The selection of this 
sample is explained further in section 3.3.2.  
The third group of tests focussed on the association between changes in the 
audit committee characteristics and changes in financial reporting quality. These tests 
were based on the changes in their variables between the year after audit committee 
formation and 2001. The sample companies used for these tests were also derived 
from the random sample of 208 top 500 ASX listed companies with an audit 
committee in 2001. A final sample of 136 companies remained after excluding those 
companies whose annual reports could not be located for the year after audit 
committee formation.  
 
4.4 Audit committee formation and financial reporting quality 
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.4 provides the descriptive statistics for the three earnings quality 
variables in the year before and the year after the formation of the sample companies’ 
audit committees. As the table shows, there were reasonably high values for skewness 
and kurtosis for most of the variables. A total of six outliers were identified from an 
analysis of boxplots for each of the earnings quality variables. When these outliers 
were excluded and the descriptive statistics recalculated, the skewness values reduced 
to no more than 2.617 and the values for kurtosis reduced to no more than 8.442.  
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Table 4.4 Descriptive statistics for 58 ASX listed companies for earnings quality 
variables in years pre and post audit committee formation 
 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std 
Dev 
Skewness Kurtosis
EQJonespre 0.007995 2.220238 0.28627 0.34595 3.374 16.474
EQJonespost 0.000377 6.573586 0.30905 0.89015 6.437 44.864
EQDDpre 0.001275 0.501794 0.10248 0.12292 1.865 3.015
EQDDpost 0.001004 2.950057 0.13948 0.38793 6.914 50.556
EQDDadjpre 0.000356 0.613159 0.08567 0.11168 2.776 9.184
EQDDadjpost 0.000666 2.705745 0.13656 0.36339 6.495 45.673
 
EQJonespre = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from modified Jones (1991) model in year before 
audit committee formation (i.e., absolute value of abnormal accruals) 
EQJonespost = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from modified Jones (1991) model in year after 
audit committee formation (i.e., absolute value of abnormal accruals) 
EQDDpre = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) model in year 
before audit committee formation (i.e., absolute value of regression residuals) 
EQDDpost = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) model in year 
after audit committee formation (i.e., absolute value of regression residuals) 
EQDDadjpre = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) adjusted for 
Jones (1991) model variables in year before audit committee formation (i.e., absolute value of 
regression residuals) 
EQDDadjpost = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) adjusted for 
Jones (1991) model variables in year after audit committee formation (i.e., absolute value of 
regression residuals) 
 
Table 4.5 provides a breakdown of the numbers of audit committees formed in 
each year. This table excludes those companies that listed on the ASX with an audit 
committee and those for which annual reports were not available. For the 120 
companies reported in table 4.5, the majority of audit committees were formed before 
1993.
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Table 4.5 Number of audit committees formed each year by 120 ASX listed 
companies  
 
Year of audit committee formation Number of companies 
Pre 1993 62 
1993 6 
1994 11 
1995 11 
1996 10 
1997 7 
1998 8 
1999 5 
Total 120 
4.4.2 T-test results 
Table 4.6 shows the results of the parametric matched-pairs t-test performed 
to compare the earnings quality variables in the years before and after audit committee 
formation. For the purpose of these tests, the six outliers referred to above were 
excluded from the analysis, which reduced the sample for these tests to 52 companies. 
For the earnings quality variables derived from the modified Jones (1991) model, the 
mean for EQJonespost (0.16741) was less than the mean for EQJonespre (0.25202) 
and the difference in the means was significant at the 0.01 level. There is an inverse 
relation between the value of the earnings quality variables and the level of earnings 
quality. This result suggests that earnings quality calculated based on the Jones (1991) 
model was significantly higher in the year after the formation of the audit committees 
compared to the year before audit committee formation. Therefore, this supports H1.  
For the first set of earnings quality variables derived from the Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model, the mean for EQDDpost (0.08270) was less than the mean for 
EQDDpre (0.08948), but the difference in the means was not significant. For the 
second set of earnings quality variables derived from the Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model, the mean for EQDDadjpost (0.08257) was greater than the mean for 
EQDDadjpre (0.07603), but the difference in the means was not significant. These 
results suggest that there was no significant difference in earnings quality calculated 
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from the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model between the years before and after audit 
committee formation. This does not support H16. 
 
Table 4.6 T-tests comparing earnings quality variables in the years pre and post 
audit committee formation for 52 ASX listed companies 
 
Variable Mean  t  df Sig.*  
EQJonespre 0.25202 
EQJonespost  0.16741 
3.213 51 0.001 
EQDDpre  0.08948 
EQDDpost 0.08270 
0.348 51 0.365 
EQDDadjpre 0.07603 
EQDDadjpost 0.08257 
-0.385 51 0.702 
*p-values are one-tailed when direction is as predicted, otherwise two-tailed. 
EQJonespre = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from modified Jones (1991) model in year before 
audit committee formation (i.e., absolute value of abnormal accruals) 
EQJonespost = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from modified Jones (1991) model in year after 
audit committee formation (i.e., absolute value of abnormal accruals) 
EQDDpre = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) model in year 
before audit committee formation (i.e., absolute value of regression residuals) 
EQDDpost = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) model in year 
after audit committee formation (i.e., absolute value of regression residuals) 
EQDDadjpre = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) adjusted for 
Jones (1991) model variables in year before audit committee formation (i.e., absolute value of 
regression residuals) 
EQDDadjpost = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) adjusted for 
Jones (1991) model variables in year after audit committee formation (i.e., absolute value of 
regression residuals) 
4.4.3 Wilcoxon signed ranks test results 
Due to the high values for skewness and kurtosis for the earnings quality 
variables indicated in table 4.4, the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed ranks test was 
also used. As this type of test is not influenced by the existence of outliers, the full 
sample of 58 companies was used. Table 4.7 reports the results of the Wilcoxon tests 
undertaken. Negative ranks refer to situations where the earnings quality variables in 
the year after the formation of the audit committee were less than the year before 
formation. Positive ranks refer to the opposite where the earnings quality variables in 
the year after formation were greater than the year before formation.  
For the earnings quality variables derived from the modified Jones (1991) 
model (EQJonespre and EQJonespost), there were more negative ranks than positive 
ranks and the difference was significant at the 0.01 level. This suggests that earnings 
                                                 
6 When the six outliers were included, the difference between the means of EQJonespre and 
EQJonespost was not significant. Similar results were obtained for both of the EQDD variables. This 
supports the exclusion of the outliers from the t-test results reported in table 4.6. 
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quality based on the Jones (1991) model was significantly higher in the year after 
audit committee formation compared to the year before formation. For the first set of 
earnings quality variables from the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model (EQDDpre and 
EQDDpost), there were more positive ranks than negative ranks. However the 
difference is not significant. A similar result was obtained for the second set of 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) earnings quality variables (EQDDadjpre and 
EQDDadjpost). Overall, the results of the Wilcoxon signed ranks tests are consistent 
with the results of the t-tests reported in table 4.6. 
 
Table 4.7 Wilcoxon signed ranks tests comparing earnings quality variables in 
the years pre and post audit committee formation for 58 ASX listed companies 
 
Test Ranksg N  Z-score Sig.* 
EQJonespost – 
EQJonespre 
Negative ranks 
Positive ranks 
36a
22b
-2.443 0.008 
EQDDpost – 
EQDDpreabs 
Negative ranks 
Positive ranks 
27c
31d
-0.484 0.628 
EQDDadjpost – 
EQDDadjpre 
Negative ranks 
Positive ranks 
27e
31f
-0.879 0.380 
*p-values are one-tailed when direction is as predicted, otherwise two-tailed. 
a: EQJonespost < EQJonespre 
b: EQJonespost > EQJonespre 
c: EQDDpost < EQDDpreabs 
d: EQDDpost > EQDDpreabs  
e: EQDDadjpost < EQDDadjpre 
f: EQDDadjpost > EQDDadjpre 
g: Negative ranks = higher earnings quality in year after audit committee formation; Positive ranks = 
lower earnings quality in year after audit committee formation.  
  
EQJonespre = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from modified Jones (1991) model in year before 
audit committee formation (i.e., absolute value of abnormal accruals) 
EQJonespost = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from modified Jones (1991) model in year after 
audit committee formation (i.e., absolute value of abnormal accruals) 
EQDDpre = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) model in year 
before audit committee formation (i.e., absolute value of regression residuals) 
EQDDpost = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) model in year 
after audit committee formation (i.e., absolute value of regression residuals) 
EQDDadjpre = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) adjusted for 
Jones (1991) model variables in year before audit committee formation (i.e., absolute value of 
regression residuals) 
EQDDadjpost = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) adjusted for 
Jones (1991) model variables in year after audit committee formation (i.e., absolute value of 
regression residuals) 
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4.5 Audit committee characteristics and financial reporting quality 
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.8 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
models analysing the association between audit committee characteristics and 
financial reporting quality. Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for each of the 
continuous variables, while Panel B reports details of the dummy variable. 
Panel A indicates that each of the 3 dependent variables, i.e., EQJones, EQDD 
and EQDDadj, had reasonably high values for skewness and kurtosis. This suggested 
that these variables were not normally distributed. Therefore, several variable 
transformations were trialled in an attempt to improve the distributions. Of these, a 
reciprocal transformation was found to reduce the skewness and kurtosis statistics to 
the lowest level. The descriptive statistics for the transformed variables are also 
provided in table 4.8. The regression models were run using both the untransformed 
and reciprocal transformed dependent variables. These results are discussed further in 
section 4.5.3. 
The audit committee variables were: independence (ACIND) measured as the 
proportion of independent directors on the audit committee; accounting expertise 
(ACACCEXP) measured as the proportion of audit committee directors with 
accounting expertise; legal expertise (ACLEGEXP) measured as the proportion of 
directors on the audit committee with legal qualifications; meetings (ACMEET) 
measured as the number of audit committee meetings held during the year; size 
(ACSIZE) measured as the number of audit committee members; and tenure 
(ACTENURE) measured as the number of years since the audit committee was 
formed.  
Panel A of table 4.8 shows that the proportion of independent audit committee 
members ranged between 0 and 1, with the average being 0.5241. For the proportion 
of audit committee members with accounting expertise, there was a range of between 
0 and 1, with an average of 0.3226. For the proportion of audit committee members 
with legal expertise, there was a range of between 0 and 1, with an average of 0.1299. 
The audit committees met between 0 and 9 times during the year, with an average of 
approximately 3 meetings per year. The sizes of the audit committees ranged between 
2 and 7 members with an average of approximately 3 members. There was a range of 
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between 0 and 8 years since the audit committees were formed, with an average audit 
committee tenure of approximately 6 years.  
These descriptive statistics indicate that there was considerable variation in 
these audit committee variables for the sample companies. Prior US studies such as 
Yang and Krishnan (2005) provide evidence that audit committees in the United 
States have much higher proportions of independent directors, which reflects the 
greater degree of audit committee regulation. This further supports the use of 
Australian data in this research to avoid the confounding effect of regulation. 
The control variables used were a number of board variables, company size, 
leverage and auditor size. Panel A shows that, on average, the boards of the sample 
companies had: 0.4131 of members who were independent; 0.2263 of members with 
accounting expertise and 0.11 of members with legal expertise. The boards met an 
average of 11.5 times per year and had an average of 6 members. Company size, as 
measured by total assets, initially had very high values for skewness and kurtosis. 
Therefore, as is common in the literature, this variable was transformed using a 
natural log transformation. This transformation reduced the skewness and kurtosis 
statistics to 0.632 and 0.338 respectively. The leverage variable also had reasonably 
high statistics for skewness and kurtosis. This was dealt with by the identification and 
elimination of several multivariate outliers in the regression analysis. Panel B shows 
that 170 (81.7%) of the 208 companies in the sample had a Big 5 or 6 auditor and 38 
companies (18.3%) had a non-Big 5 or 6 auditor. 
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Table 4.8 Descriptive statistics for 208 randomly selected ASX listed companies 
in 2001 
 
Panel A Continuous variables 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
EQJones 0.000571 1.198636 0.141464 0.172656 2.767 9.612 
REQJones 0.45 1.00 0.8911 0.10179 -1.7178 3.034 
EQDD 0.000151 1.339401 0.098693 0.160222 5.022 30.834 
REQDD 0.43 1.00 0.9222 0.08633 -3.004 11.766 
EQDDadj 0.000382 1.284198 0.096257 0.156534 4.824 28.311 
REQDDadj 0.44 1.00 0.9240 0.08606 -2.983 11.320 
ACIND 0 1.00 0.5241 0.33585 -0.107 -1.055 
ACACCEXP 0 1.00 0.3226 0.29550 0.639 -0.388 
ACLEGEXP 0 1.00 0.1299 0.19521 1.448 1.827 
ACMEET 0 9 3.04 1.427 1.150 1.832 
ACSIZE 2 7 3.18 1.019 1.257 2.224 
ACTENURE 0 8 5.82 2.177 -0.625 -0.798 
BDIND 0 1.00 0.4131 0.25265 0.073 -0.848 
BDACCEXP 0 0.75 0.2263 0.17909 0.581 -0.159 
BDLEGEXP 0 0.50 0.1100 0.12981 1.049 0.409 
BDMEET 3 33 11.48 4.334 1.000 3.297 
BDSIZE 3 17 6.33 2.286 1.515 3.913 
SIZE 5650579 84961000000 1615996080 7273099264 8.830 89.928 
LNSIZE 15.54726 25.16545 19.13459 1.79745 0.632 0.338 
LEV 0.006833 2.52071 0.49303 0.27621 2.989 19.940 
Panel B Dichotomous variables 
Variable Frequency of 1s Frequency of 0s 
AUDITOR 170 (81.7%) 38 (18.3%) 
EQJones = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from modified Jones (1991) model (i.e., absolute 
value of abnormal accruals) 
REQJones = Reciprocal of EQJones 
EQDD = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) model (i.e., absolute 
value of regression residuals) 
REQDD = Reciprocal of EQDD 
EQDDadj = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) model adjusted 
for Jones (1991) model variables (i.e., absolute value of regression residuals) 
REQDDadj = Reciprocal of EQDDadj 
ACIND = Proportion of independent directors on audit committee 
ACACCEXP = Proportion of directors on audit committee with accounting qualifications  
ACLEGEXP = Proportion of directors on audit committee with legal qualifications  
ACMEET = Number of audit committee meetings 
ACSIZE = Number of audit committee members 
ACTENURE = Number of years since formation of audit committee 
BDIND = Proportion of independent directors on the board 
BDACCEXP = Proportion of directors on the board with accounting qualifications  
BDLEGEXP = Proportion of directors on the board with legal qualifications  
BDMEET = Number of board meetings 
BDSIZE = Number of board members 
SIZE = Total assets 
LNSIZE =Natural log of total assets 
LEV = Total liabilities divided by total assets 
AUDITOR: 1 = Big 5 or 6 auditor; 0 = Non-big 5 or 6 auditor 
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4.5.2 Correlations 
Table 4.9 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between all 
combinations of dependent and independent variables. The two dependent variables 
based on the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model (EQDD and EQDDadj) were 
significantly positively correlated with a coefficient of 0.973. This was not surprising 
considering the variables were based on the same earnings quality model. While there 
were positive correlations between EQDD, EQDDadj and the Jones (1991) model 
dependent variables (EQJones), the correlations were not significant. 
There were some significant correlations between the three dependent 
variables and several of the independent variables. The dependent variable based on 
the Jones (1991) model (EQJones), was significantly negatively correlated with the 
number of years since the formation of the audit committee (ACTENURE). 
Significant negative correlations existed between both EQDD and EQDDadj and 
board size (BDSIZE) and the natural log of total assets (LNSIZE). EQDD and 
EQDDadj were also significantly positively correlated with total liabilities divided by 
total assets (LEV). Due to the inverse relation between the value of the EQ variables 
and the level of earnings quality, this suggests that larger boards and larger companies 
are associated with higher quality earnings, while companies with higher leverage are 
associated with lower quality earnings. 
A number of significant correlations also existed between the various 
independent variables. The following associated audit committee and board variables 
were significantly positively correlated (Pearson correlation coefficients are shown in 
brackets): ACIND and BDIND (0.777); ACACCEXP and BDACCEXP (0.788); 
ACLEGEXP and BDLEGEXP (0.712); ACMEET and BDMEET (0.148); and 
ACSIZE and BDSIZE (0.353). These results were not surprising considering that the 
audit committee comprises members of the board of directors. Therefore, due to 
significant correlations between these associated independent variables, the board 
variables were excluded from the regression models with the audit committee 
variables. The natural log of total assets (LNSIZE) was significantly correlated with 
many of the variables. This confirms the need to control for company size in the 
multivariate tests. Another interesting result was that the two measures of audit 
committee expertise (ACACCEXP and ACLEGEXP) were significantly negatively 
correlated with each other. This suggests that the two forms of expertise are 
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substitutes for each other. Therefore, the directors on audit committees tend to have 
either accounting or legal expertise, but not both. 
Non-parametric Spearman correlations were also calculated because of 
possible violations of the normal distribution assumption as indicated in the 
descriptive statistics in table 4.8. Table 4.10 reports the Spearman correlation 
coefficients. As with the Pearson correlations in table 4.9, EQDD and EQDDadj were 
significantly positively correlated. These two variables were also positively correlated 
with EQJones. EQJones was negatively correlated with BDIND. EQDD was 
negatively correlated with ACIND, BDIND, BDSIZE and LNSIZE. EQDDadj was 
negatively correlated with ACSIZE, BDSIZE, AUDITOR and LNSIZE. These 
correlations suggest that higher proportions of independent directors on the audit 
committee and board, larger audit committees and boards, larger auditors and larger 
companies are associated with higher quality earnings. 
There were some differences between the Pearson and Spearman correlations, 
relating to independent variables significantly correlated with the earnings quality 
variables. These may be due to the higher skewness and kurtosis with the 
untransformed earnings quality variables as indicated in table 4.8.  
Similar to the Pearson correlations in table 4.9, table 4.10 highlights 
significant correlations between many of the independent variables. The same 
combinations of associated audit committee and board variables were positively 
correlated. The natural log of total assets (LNSIZE) was again significantly correlated 
with many of the variables. Furthermore, the two measures of audit committee 
expertise were also negatively correlated. 
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Table 4.9 Pearson correlations for 208 randomly selected ASX listed companies in 2001 
 EQJones 
 
EQDD EQDDadj ACIND ACACCEXP ACLEGEXP ACMEET ACSIZE ACTENURE BDIND BDACCEXP BDLEGEXP BDMEET BDSIZE AUDITOR LNSIZE LEV 
EQJones 
 
1                 
EQDD 0.081 
(0.242) 
1                
EQDDadj 0.114 
(0.102) 
0.973** 
(0.000) 
1               
ACIND -0.118 
(0.090) 
-0.102 
(0.144) 
-0.088 
(0.204) 
1              
ACACCEXP -0.020 
(0.770) 
-0.070 
(0.315) 
-0.088 
(0.204) 
-0.101 
(0.148) 
1             
ACLEGEXP -0.003 
(0.966) 
-0.094 
(0.175) 
-0.091 
(0.190) 
-0.067 
(0.336) 
-0.236** 
(0.001) 
1            
ACMEET -0.044 
(0.524) 
-0.052 
(0.456) 
-0.022 
(0.749) 
0.216** 
(0.002) 
-0.044 
(0.532) 
0.035 
(0.612) 
1           
ACSIZE 0.088 
(0.204) 
-0.118 
(0.090) 
-0.133 
(0.056) 
0.040 
(0.563) 
-0.086 
(0.214) 
-0.062 
(0.375) 
0.151* 
(0.029) 
1          
ACTENURE -0.137* 
(0.048) 
-0.003 
(0.966) 
-0.033 
(0.637) 
0.069 
(0.325) 
-0.056 
(0.426) 
0.029 
(0.675) 
0.086 
(0.216) 
-0.131 
(0.060) 
1         
BDIND -0.075 
(0.283) 
-0.058 
(0.404) 
-0.044 
(0.524) 
0.777** 
(0.000) 
-0.127 
(0.069) 
-0.127 
(0.068) 
0.239** 
(0.001) 
0.138* 
(0.047) 
0.102 
(0.143) 
1        
BDACCEXP 0.104 
(0.137) 
-0.077 
(0.269) 
-0.089 
(0.204) 
-0.110 
(0.112) 
0.788** 
(0.000) 
-0.205** 
(0.003) 
-0.038 
(0.582) 
0.027 
(0.704) 
-0.093 
(0.181) 
-0.129 
(0.063) 
1       
BDLEGEXP 0.009 
(0.901) 
0.031 
(0.658) 
0.027 
(0.702) 
-0.154* 
(0.026) 
-0.118 
(0.090) 
0.712** 
(0.000) 
0.066 
(0.346) 
-0.102 
(0.143) 
0.069 
(0.325) 
-0.146* 
(0.036) 
-0.189** 
(0.006) 
1      
BDMEET 0.063 
(0.369) 
-0.092 
(0.185) 
-0.087 
(0.212) 
-0.016 
(0.817) 
0.058 
(0.408) 
-0.080 
(0.253) 
0.148* 
(0.033) 
0.035 
(0.617) 
-0.031 
(0.655) 
0.006 
(0.933) 
0.122 
(0.079) 
-0.050 
(0.475) 
1     
BDSIZE -0.031 
(0.659) 
-0.199** 
(0.004) 
-0.180** 
(0.014) 
0.170* 
(0.014) 
-0.043 
(0.538) 
0.075 
(0.279) 
0.305** 
(0.000) 
0.353** 
(0.000) 
0.120 
(0.084) 
0.180** 
(0.009) 
-0.080 
(0.249) 
-0.023 
(0.742) 
-0.061 
(0.379) 
1    
AUDITOR 0.037 
(0.596) 
-0.108 
(0.120) 
-0.110 
(0.114) 
0.142* 
(0.041) 
-0.118 
(0.090) 
0.104 
(0.133) 
0.091 
(0.189) 
0.109 
(0.116) 
0.109 
(0.116) 
0.225** 
(0.001) 
-0.138* 
(0.047) 
0.017 
(0.802) 
0.049 
(0.481) 
0.281** 
(0.000) 
1   
LNSIZE -0.064 
(0.355) 
-0.295** 
(0.000) 
-0.284** 
(0.000) 
0.211** 
(0.002) 
-0.007 
(0.916) 
0.146* 
(0.036) 
0.356** 
(0.000) 
0.275** 
(0.000) 
0.307** 
(0.000) 
0.269** 
(0.000) 
-0.029 
(0.678) 
0.068 
(0.329) 
0.064 
(0.355) 
0.636** 
(0.000) 
0.357** 
(0.000) 
1  
LEV 0.097 
(0.163) 
0.338** 
(0.000) 
0.349** 
(0.000) 
-0.106 
(0.127) 
-0.043 
(0.539) 
-0.021 
(0.765) 
-0.022 
(0.755) 
0.019 
(0.783) 
0.166* 
(0.016) 
-0.084 
(0.230) 
-0.067 
(0.337) 
0.213** 
(0.002) 
-0.054 
(0.439) 
-0.012 
(0.866) 
-0.024 
(0.730) 
0.167* 
(0.016) 
1 
* significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
EQJones = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from modified Jones (1991) model (i.e., absolute value of abnormal accruals) 
EQDD = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) model (i.e., absolute value of regression residuals) 
EQDDadj = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) model adjusted for Jones (1991) model variables (i.e., absolute value of regression 
residuals) 
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ACIND = Proportion of independent directors on audit committee 
ACACCEXP = Proportion of directors on audit committee with accounting qualifications  
ACLEGEXP = Proportion of directors on audit committee with legal qualifications  
ACMEET = Number of audit committee meetings 
ACSIZE = Number of audit committee members 
ACTENURE = Number of years since formation of audit committee 
BDIND = Proportion of independent directors on the board 
BDACCEXP = Proportion of directors on the board with accounting qualifications  
BDLEGEXP = Proportion of directors on the board with legal qualifications  
BDMEET = Number of board meetings 
BDSIZE = Number of board members 
AUDITOR: 1 = Big 5 or 6 auditor; 0 = Non-big 5 or 6 auditor 
LNSIZE =Natural log of total assets 
LEV = Total liabilities divided by total assets 
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Table 4.10 Spearman correlations for 208 randomly selected ASX listed companies in 2001 
 EQJones 
 
EQDD EQDDadj ACIND ACACCEXP ACLEGEXP ACMEET ACSIZE ACTENURE BDIND BDACCEXP BDLEGEXP BDMEET BDSIZE AUDITOR LNSIZE LEV 
EQJones 
 
1                 
EQDD 0.151* 
(0.029) 
1                
EQDDadj 0.199** 
(0.004) 
0.713** 
(0.000) 
1               
ACIND -0.127 
(0.069) 
-0.161* 
(0.020) 
-0.114 
(0.101) 
1              
ACACCEXP 0.047 
(0.496) 
-0.025 
(0.725) 
-0.076 
(0.278) 
-0.126 
(0.069) 
1             
ACLEGEXP 0.053 
(0.451) 
-0.033 
(0.631) 
-0.035 
(0.620) 
-0.045 
(0.519) 
-0.179** 
(0.010) 
1            
ACMEET -0.079 
(0.259) 
-0.029 
(0.675) 
-0.026 
(0.706) 
0.220** 
(0.001) 
-0.031 
(0.660) 
0.106 
(0.127) 
1           
ACSIZE 0.012 
(0.866) 
-0.076 
(0.273) 
-0.171* 
(0.014) 
0.059 
(0.397) 
-0.038 
(0.581) 
0.044 
(0.531) 
0.198** 
(0.004) 
1          
ACTENURE -0.123 
(0.077) 
-0.063 
(0.364) 
-0.114 
(0.101) 
0.099 
(0.157) 
-0.087 
(0.210) 
0.067 
(0.338) 
0.165* 
(0.017) 
-0.070 
(0.316) 
1         
BDIND -0.154* 
(0.026) 
-0.159* 
(0.022) 
-0.115 
(0.099) 
0.778** 
(0.000) 
-0.133 
(0.055) 
-0.083 
(0.233) 
0.262** 
(0.000) 
0.147* 
(0.034) 
0.124 
(0.075) 
1        
BDACCEXP 0.092 
(0.186) 
0.016 
(0.818) 
-0.002 
(0.978) 
-0.114 
(0.100) 
0.800** 
(0.000) 
-0.155* 
(0.026) 
-0.013 
(0.851) 
0.083 
(0.236) 
-0.140* 
(0.044) 
-0.118 
(0.091) 
1       
BDLEGEXP 0.102 
(0.141) 
0.016 
(0.813) 
-0.036 
(0.602) 
-0.127 
(0.067) 
-0.105 
(0.131) 
0.700** 
(0.000) 
0.128 
(0.066) 
-0.054 
(0.441) 
0.096 
(0.166) 
-0.115 
(0.099) 
-0.162* 
(0.019) 
1      
BDMEET 0.014 
(0.837) 
-0.041 
(0.559) 
-0.058 
(0.406) 
0.030 
(0.667) 
0.062 
(0.377) 
-0.060 
(0.389) 
0.220** 
(0.001) 
0.046 
(0.509) 
-0.030 
(0.667) 
0.024 
(0.732) 
0.158* 
(0.023) 
-0.080 
(0.253) 
1     
BDSIZE -0.058 
(0.404) 
-0.215** 
(0.002) 
-0.251** 
(0.000) 
0.183** 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.956) 
0.142* 
(0.041) 
0.261** 
(0.000) 
0.423** 
(0.000) 
0.143* 
(0.040) 
0.187** 
(0.007) 
-0.033 
(0.632) 
0.041 
(0.555) 
-0.049 
(0.478) 
1    
AUDITOR 0.029 
(0.682) 
-0.117 
(0.094) 
-0.164* 
(0.018) 
0.138* 
(0.047) 
-0.106 
(0.128) 
0.156* 
(0.025) 
0.106 
(0.129) 
0.183** 
(0.008) 
0.134 
(0.053) 
0.217** 
(0.002) 
-0.104 
(0.134) 
0.076 
(0.272) 
0.068 
(0.326) 
0.303** 
(0.000) 
1   
LNSIZE -0.119 
(0.088) 
-0.275** 
(0.000) 
-0.290** 
(0.000) 
0.197** 
(0.004) 
0.015 
(0.833) 
0.209** 
(0.002) 
0.378** 
(0.000) 
0.306** 
(0.000) 
0.343** 
(0.000) 
0.265** 
(0.000) 
0.006 
(0.929) 
0.127 
(0.068) 
0.099 
(0.157) 
0.581** 
(0.000) 
0.355** 
(0.000) 
1  
LEV 0.032 
(0.650) 
0.023 
(0.739) 
0.056 
(0.418) 
-0.109 
(0.116) 
0.014 
(0.837) 
0.107 
(0.123) 
0.028 
(0.685) 
0.122 
(0.080) 
0.178** 
(0.010) 
-0.056 
(0.418) 
0.036 
(0.607) 
0.181** 
(0.009) 
0.089 
(0.200) 
0.082 
(0.240) 
0.113 
(0.103) 
0.364** 
(0.000) 
1 
* significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
EQJones = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from modified Jones (1991) model (i.e., absolute value of abnormal accruals) 
EQDD = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) model (i.e., absolute value of regression residuals) 
EQDDadj = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) model adjusted for Jones (1991) model variables (i.e., absolute value of regression 
residuals) 
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ACIND = Proportion of independent directors on audit committee 
ACACCEXP = Proportion of directors on audit committee with accounting qualifications  
ACLEGEXP = Proportion of directors on audit committee with legal qualifications  
ACMEET = Number of audit committee meetings 
ACSIZE = Number of audit committee members 
ACTENURE = Number of years since formation of audit committee 
BDIND = Proportion of independent directors on the board 
BDACCEXP = Proportion of directors on the board with accounting qualifications  
BDLEGEXP = Proportion of directors on the board with legal qualifications  
BDMEET = Number of board meetings 
BDSIZE = Number of board members 
AUDITOR: 1 = Big 5 or 6 auditor; 0 = Non-big 5 or 6 auditor 
LNSIZE =Natural log of total assets 
LEV = Total liabilities divided by total assets
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4.5.3 Regression results 
This section discusses the results obtained from regressing the three earnings 
quality variables on the various independent variables. The first regression is based on 
a modified Jones (1991) model of discretionary accruals and the other two are based 
on the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual estimation error model. As highlighted in 
tables 4.9 and 4.10, there were significant positive correlations between the audit 
committee variables and the associated board variables. Therefore, each of the 
regressions was initially run including the board variables. Then they were run 
excluding the three most highly correlated board variables (i.e., BDIND, BDACCEXP 
and BDLEGEXP). Finally, all board variables were excluded and only the audit 
committee variables were included in the regressions, along with the other control 
variables. Furthermore, an analysis of the Mahalanobis distance values for each of the 
models identified five cases as multivariate outliers. The Mahalanobis distance 
measures the distance of the values for the independent variables from the average 
value (Tabachnick and Fidell 1989).  A large Mahalanobis distance identifies a case 
as having extreme values on one or more of the independent variables (SPSS Inc 
2004). The five outlier cases were excluded from the sample for the purpose of 
reporting the regression results. 
4.5.3.1 Modified Jones (1991) model 
Table 4.11 shows the results from the regression using the earnings quality 
variable derived from the Jones (1991) model (EQJones): Model 1 included all board 
variables; Model 2 excluded BDIND, BDACCEXP and BDLEGEXP; and Model 3 
excluded all board variables. Model 1 had an adjusted R2 of 0.377, an F statistic of 
5.695 and a p-value of 0.000. ACACCEXP was significant at the 0.05 level with the 
predicted sign, however BDACCEXP was significant at the 0.01 level but with the 
incorrect sign. This result was likely to be influenced by the significant positive 
correlation between these two variables. None of the other audit committee or board 
variables was significant. A similar result was found for Model 2. 
Model 3 had an adjusted R2 of 0.328, an F statistic of 5.685 and a p-value of 
0.000. The coefficients for ACIND and ACTENURE had the predicted sign, however, 
these and the other audit committee variables were not significant at the 0.05 or 0.01 
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levels7. Therefore, these results do not support hypotheses 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a or 6. The 
natural log of total assets (LNSIZE) was significant at the 0.01 level with a negative 
coefficient. Due to the inverse relation between EQJones and the level of earnings 
quality, this suggests that larger companies have higher quality earnings. Company 
size was also significant in Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau (2004), Van der Zahn and 
Tower (2004), Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2005) and Yang and Krishnan 
(2005). The insignificance of the audit committee variables could be partly explained 
by the significant positive correlations between most of them and LNSIZE as 
indicated by tables 4.9 and 4.10. Furthermore, several of the industry dummy 
variables were significant, which suggests that earnings quality varies across 
industries. Similar regression results were obtained when a reciprocal transformed 
EQJones variable was used.
                                                 
7 EQJones was also split into two subgroups representing companies with income increasing and 
income decreasing accruals. When regressions were run separately on these two subgroups, none of the 
audit committee variables were significant. 
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Table 4.11 Regression estimates of EQJones on audit committee and control 
variables for 203 randomly selected ASX listed companies in 2001 
unstandardised coefficient (t-statistic) 
 
Variable Predicted 
sign 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept  0.361 
(2.671)** 
0.323 
(2.382)* 
0.467 
(3.771)** 
ACIND - -0.076 
(-1.578) 
-0.044 
(-1.386) 
-0.043 
(1.395) 
ACACCEXP - -0.116 
(-2.015)* 
0.004 
(0.117) 
0.004 
(0.115) 
ACLEGEXP - 0.166 
(1.947) 
0.080 
(1.408) 
0.064 
(1.115) 
ACMEET - 0.008 
(0.997) 
0.006 
(0.762) 
0.002 
(0.296) 
ACSIZE - 0.003 
(0.251) 
0.010 
(0.924) 
0.003 
(0.319) 
ACTENURE - -0.001 
(-0.230) 
-0.002 
(-0.301) 
-0.001 
(-0.135) 
BDIND 
 
- 0.059 
(0.381) 
  
BDACCEXP 
 
- 0.268 
(2.857)** 
  
BDLEGEXP 
 
- -0.141 
(-1.137) 
  
BDMEET 
 
- 0.002 
(0.931) 
0.003 
(1.088) 
 
BDSIZE 
 
- -0.001 
(-0.101) 
-0.002 
(-0.392) 
 
AUDITOR - 0.023 
(0.801) 
0.023 
(0.819) 
0.034 
(1.209) 
LNSIZE ? -0.018 
(-2.067)* 
-0.015 
(-1.669) 
-0.021 
(-2.720)** 
LEV ? 0.088 
(2.127)* 
0.064 
(1.630) 
0.076 
(1.384) 
Capital goods ? -0.078 
(-2.106)* 
-0.068 
(-1.809) 
-0.070 
(-1.975)* 
Commercial, services 
and supplies 
? -0.066 
(-1.431) 
-0.061 
(-1.311) 
-0.068 
(-1.470) 
Energy ? -0.017 
(-0.379) 
-0.006 
(-0.134) 
-0.007 
(-0.165) 
Food, beverage and 
tobacco 
? -0.061 
(-1.701) 
-0.070 
(-1.913) 
-0.069 
(-1.972)* 
Healthcare 
equipment and 
services 
? -0.033 
(-0.685) 
-0.050 
(-1.031) 
-0.044 
(-0.946) 
Hotels, restaurants 
and leisure 
? -0.035 
(-0.713) 
-0.053 
(-1.067) 
-0.058 
(-1.217) 
Materials ? -0.046 
(-0.845) 
-0.037 
(-0.745) 
-0.012 
(-0.356) 
Media ? 0.249 
(5.962)** 
0.232 
(5.487)** 
0.229 
(5.678)** 
Pharmaceuticals and 
biotechnology 
? 0.000 
(-0.006) 
-0.011 
(-0.177) 
-0.026 
(-0.455) 
Retailing ? -0.059 
(-1.375) 
-0.161 
(-1.391) 
-0.062 
(-1.492) 
Software and services ? 0.088 0.099 0.104 
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(1.915) (2.115) (2.303)* 
Technology hardware 
and equipment 
? -0.078 
(-1.263) 
-0.076 
(-1.196) 
-0.109 
(-1.662) 
Telecommunication 
services 
? 0.389 
(6.191)** 
0.392 
(6.126)** 
0.308 
(4.615)** 
Adjusted R2  0.377 0.347 0.328 
F statistic  5.695 5.677 5.685 
p-value  0.000 0.000 0.000 
* significant at the 0.05 level  
** significant at the 0.01 level  
(p-values are one-tailed when direction is as predicted, otherwise two-tailed) 
 
EQJones = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from modified Jones (1991) model (i.e., absolute 
value of abnormal accruals) 
ACIND = Proportion of independent directors on audit committee 
ACACCEXP = Proportion of directors on audit committee with accounting qualifications  
ACLEGEXP = Proportion of directors on audit committee with legal qualifications  
ACMEET = Number of audit committee meetings 
ACSIZE = Number of audit committee members 
ACTENURE = Number of years since formation of audit committee 
BDIND = Proportion of independent directors on the board 
BDACCEXP = Proportion of directors on the board with accounting qualifications  
BDLEGEXP = Proportion of directors on the board with legal qualifications  
BDMEET = Number of board meetings 
BDSIZE = Number of board members 
AUDITOR: 1 = Big 5 or 6 auditor; 0 = otherwise 
LNSIZE =Natural log of total assets 
LEV = Total liabilities divided by total assets 
Capital goods: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise 
Commercial, services and supplies: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise 
Energy: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Food, beverage and tobacco: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Healthcare equipment and services: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Hotels, restaurants and leisure: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Materials: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Media: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Pharmaceuticals and biotechnology: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Retailing: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Software and services: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Technology hardware and equipment: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Telecommunication services: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise
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4.5.3.2 Dechow and Dichev (2002) models 
Table 4.12 reports the regression results using the first earnings quality 
variable derived from Dechow and Dichev (2002) (EQDD) and table 4.13 reports the 
results for the second Dechow and Dichev (2002) model variable (EQDDadj). As with 
table 4.11, for both tables, Model 1 included all board variables; Model 2 excluded 
BDIND, BDACCEXP and BDLEGEXP; and Model 3 excluded all board variables. In 
Models 1 and 2 for both EQDD and EQDDadj, none of the audit committee or board 
variables were significant.  
In Model 3 on tables 4.12 and 4.13, when all board variables were excluded, 
the adjusted R2s were 0.067 (EQDD) and 0.074 (EQDDadj). The EQDD model had 
an F statistic of 1.688 and a p-value of 0.036 and the EQDDadj model had an F 
statistic of 1.769 with a p-value of 0.025.  The explanatory power of these models was 
not as high as the EQJones model as indicated in table 4.11. Regarding the 
independent variables, similar to the EQJones model, none of the audit committee 
variables were significant but LNSIZE was significant with a negative coefficient. 
Consequently, there is no multivariate support for hypotheses 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a or 6. Only 
the Software and services industry variable was significant, indicating lower quality 
earnings for this industry. Very similar results were obtained when the reciprocal 
transformed EQDD and EQDDadj variables were used. 
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Table 4.12 Regression estimates of EQDD on audit committee and control 
variables for 203 randomly selected ASX listed companies in 2001 
unstandardised coefficient (t-statistic) 
Variable Predicted 
sign 
EQDD 
(Model 1) 
EQDD 
(Model 2) 
EQDD 
(Model 3) 
Intercept  0.608 
(4.384)** 
0.573 
(4.208)** 
0.413 
(3.579)** 
ACIND - -0.070 
(-1.416) 
-0.017 
(-0.536) 
-0.015 
(-0.519) 
ACACCEXP - 0.022 
(0.379) 
-0.016 
(-0.434) 
0.001 
(0.030) 
ACLEGEXP - 0.045 
(0.514) 
-0.032 
(-0.554) 
-0.025 
(-0.473) 
ACMEET - 0.007 
(0.846) 
0.007 
(0.826) 
0.003 
(0.392) 
ACSIZE - -0.006 
(-0.559) 
-0.005 
(-0.459) 
-0.001 
(-0.120) 
ACTENURE - 0.006 
(1.029) 
0.006 
(1.033) 
0.005 
(1.099) 
BDIND 
 
- 0.091 
(1.302) 
  
BDACCEXP 
 
- -0.062 
(-0.647) 
  
BDLEGEXP 
 
- -0.125 
(-0.979) 
  
BDMEET 
 
- -0.002 
(-0.840) 
-0.002 
(-0.970) 
 
BDSIZE 
 
- 0.003 
(0.513) 
0.003 
(0.494) 
 
AUDITOR - 0.012 
(0.406) 
0.018 
(0.642) 
0.042 
(1.587) 
LNSIZE ? -0.035 
(-3.823)** 
-0.032 
(-3.645)** 
-0.022 
(-3.060)** 
LEV ? 0.271 
(6.394)** 
0.255 
(6.468)** 
0.055 
(1.072) 
Capital goods ? -0.064 
(-1.690) 
-0.061 
(-1.614) 
-0.035 
(-1.058) 
Commercial, 
services and supplies 
? -0.002 
(-0.040) 
0.002 
(0.046) 
0.020 
(0.461) 
Energy ? -0.004 
(-0.079) 
-0.003 
(-0.063) 
-0.007 
(-0.172) 
Food, beverage and 
tobacco 
? -0.020 
(-0.547) 
-0.022 
(-0.610) 
-0.002 
(-0.071) 
Healthcare 
equipment and 
services 
? 0.008 
(0.173) 
0.002 
(0.048) 
0.019 
(0.449) 
Hotels, restaurants 
and leisure 
? -0.044 
(-0.857) 
-0.045 
(-0.896) 
-0.033 
(-0.748) 
Materials ? -0.023 
(-0.512) 
-0.024 
(-0.525) 
-0.025 
(-0.534) 
Media ? -0.045 
(-1.055) 
-0.053 
(-1.249) 
-0.023 
(-0.625) 
Pharmaceuticals and 
biotechnology 
? 0.106 
(1.694) 
0.102 
(1.673) 
0.090 
(1.679) 
Retailing ? -0.005 
(-0.117) 
-0.010 
(-0.221) 
0.011 
(0.294) 
Software and ? 0.113 0.108 0.114 
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services (2.385)* (2.296)* (2.720)** 
Technology 
hardware and 
equipment 
? -0.020 
(-0.311) 
-0.016 
(-0.258) 
0.012 
(0.190) 
Telecommunication 
services 
? 0.008 
(0.119) 
0.008 
(0.124) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
Adjusted R2  0.237 0.238 0.067 
F statistic  3.408 3.737 1.688 
p-value  0.000 0.000 0.036 
* significant at the 0.05 level  
** significant at the 0.01 level  
(p-values are one-tailed when direction is as predicted, otherwise two-tailed) 
EQDD = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) model (i.e., absolute 
value of regression residuals) 
EQDDadj = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) model adjusted 
for Jones (1991) model variables (i.e., absolute value of regression residuals) 
ACIND = Proportion of independent directors on audit committee 
ACACCEXP = Proportion of directors on audit committee with accounting qualifications  
ACLEGEXP = Proportion of directors on audit committee with legal qualifications  
ACMEET = Number of audit committee meetings 
ACSIZE = Number of audit committee members 
ACTENURE = Number of years since formation of audit committee 
BDIND = Proportion of independent directors on the board 
BDACCEXP = Proportion of directors on the board with accounting qualifications  
BDLEGEXP = Proportion of directors on the board with legal qualifications  
BDMEET = Number of board meetings 
BDSIZE = Number of board members 
AUDITOR: 1 = Big 5 or 6 auditor; 0 = otherwise 
LNSIZE =Natural log of total assets 
LEV = Total liabilities divided by total assets 
Capital goods: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise 
Commercial, services and supplies: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise 
Energy: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Food, beverage and tobacco: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Healthcare equipment and services: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Hotels, restaurants and leisure: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Materials: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Media: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Pharmaceuticals and biotechnology: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Retailing: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Software and services: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Technology hardware and equipment: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Telecommunication services: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise 
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Table 4.13 Regression estimates of EQDDadj on audit committee and control 
variables for 203 randomly selected ASX listed companies in 2001 
unstandardised coefficient (t-statistic) 
Variable Predicted 
sign 
EQDDadj 
(Model 1) 
EQDDadj 
(Model 2) 
EQDDadj 
(Model 3) 
Intercept  0.595 
(4.437)** 
0.559 
(4.237)** 
0.406 
(3.641)** 
ACIND - -0.065 
(-1.365) 
-0.011 
(-0.347) 
-0.010 
(-0.379) 
ACACCEXP - 0.008 
(0.135) 
-0.029 
(-0.832) 
-0.013 
(-0.414) 
ACLEGEXP - 0.043 
(0.507) 
-0.039 
(-0.699) 
-0.034 
(-0.652) 
ACMEET - 0.010 
(1.265) 
0.010 
(1.240) 
0.004 
(0.580) 
ACSIZE - -0.013 
(-1.146) 
-0.011 
(-1.044) 
-0.009 
(-0.908) 
ACTENURE - 0.003 
(0.546) 
0.003 
(0.543) 
0.003 
(0.598) 
BDIND 
 
- 0.093 
(1.387) 
  
BDACCEXP 
 
- -0.059 
(-0.632) 
  
BDLEGEXP 
 
- -0.133 
(-1.082) 
  
BDMEET 
 
- -0.002 
(-0.792) 
-0.002 
(-0.926) 
 
BDSIZE 
 
- 0.005 
(0.823) 
0.005 
(0.806) 
 
AUDITOR - 0.008 
(0.298) 
0.015 
(0.547) 
0.040 
(1.584) 
LNSIZE ? -0.033 
(-3.801)** 
-0.031 
(-3.595)** 
-0.020 
(-2.857)** 
LEV ? 0.276 
(6.749)** 
0.260 
(6.798)** 
0.065 
(1.321) 
Capital goods ? -0.053 
(-1.440) 
-0.050 
(-1.349) 
-0.027 
(-0.859) 
Commercial, services 
and supplies 
? 0.000 
(-0.008) 
0.004 
(0.085) 
0.019 
(0.463) 
Energy ? -0.001 
(-0.024) 
-0.000 
(-0.002) 
-0.004 
(-0.112) 
Food, beverage and 
tobacco 
? -0.042 
(-1.171) 
-0.044 
(-1.243) 
-0.026 
(-0.831) 
Healthcare 
equipment and 
services 
? -0.005 
(-0.100) 
-0.012 
(-0.247) 
0.004 
(0.106) 
Hotels, restaurants 
and leisure 
? -0.037 
(-0.748) 
-0.039 
(-0.796) 
-0.029 
(-0.681) 
Materials ? -0.026 
(-0.587) 
-0.027 
(-0.598) 
-0.022 
(-0.417) 
Media ? -0.044 
(-1.065) 
-0.052 
(-1.278) 
-0.025 
(-0.683) 
Pharmaceuticals and 
biotechnology 
? 0.077 
(1.267) 
0.072 
(1.221) 
0.059 
(1.145) 
Retailing ? -0.000 
(-0.002) 
-0.005 
(-0.112) 
0.016 
(0.423) 
Software and ? 0.118 0.114 0.119 
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services (2.589)** (2.496)* (2.952)** 
Technology 
hardware and 
equipment 
? -0.018 
(0.289) 
-0.014 
(-0.233) 
-0.002 
(-0.033) 
Telecommunication 
services 
? 0.031 
(0.459) 
0.031 
(0.498) 
0.002 
(0.026) 
Adjusted R2  0.253 0.253 0.074 
F statistic  3.636 3.973 1.769 
p-value  0.000 0.000 0.025 
* significant at the 0.05 level  
** significant at the 0.01 level  
(p-values are one-tailed when direction is as predicted, otherwise two-tailed) 
EQDD = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) model (i.e., absolute 
value of regression residuals) 
EQDDadj = Cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) model adjusted 
for Jones (1991) model variables (i.e., absolute value of regression residuals) 
ACIND = Proportion of independent directors on audit committee 
ACACCEXP = Proportion of directors on audit committee with accounting qualifications  
ACLEGEXP = Proportion of directors on audit committee with legal qualifications  
ACMEET = Number of audit committee meetings 
ACSIZE = Number of audit committee members 
ACTENURE = Number of years since formation of audit committee 
BDIND = Proportion of independent directors on the board 
BDACCEXP = Proportion of directors on the board with accounting qualifications  
BDLEGEXP = Proportion of directors on the board with legal qualifications  
BDMEET = Number of board meetings 
BDSIZE = Number of board members 
AUDITOR: 1 = Big 5 or 6 auditor; 0 = otherwise 
LNSIZE =Natural log of total assets 
LEV = Total liabilities divided by total assets 
Capital goods: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise 
Commercial, services and supplies: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise 
Energy: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Food, beverage and tobacco: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Healthcare equipment and services: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Hotels, restaurants and leisure: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Materials: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Media: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Pharmaceuticals and biotechnology: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Retailing: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Software and services: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Technology hardware and equipment: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Telecommunication services: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise
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4.5.4 Additional analysis 
Several alternative measures for the audit committee variables were used. 
First, for each of the variables, a dichotomous measure was calculated. An 
independence dummy variable (ACIND_DUMMY) was measured as 1 if 50% or 
greater of the audit committee members were independent and 0 otherwise. Similar 
alternative measures were also used in several prior studies (Klein 2002a; Bedard, 
Chtourou and Courteau 2004; Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 2005). Two 
expertise dummy variables (ACACCEXP_DUMMY and ACLEGEXP_DUMMY) 
were measured as 1 if at least one audit committee member had professional 
accounting or legal qualifications and 0 otherwise. Prior studies such as Bedard, 
Chtourou and Courteau (2004), Choi, Jeon and Park (2004), Van der Zahn and Tower 
(2004), Yang and Krishnan (2005), Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi (2006) and Rahman 
and Ali (2006) used similar alternative measures. An alternative activity variable 
(ACMEET_DUMMY) was measured as 1 if there were at least three audit committee 
meetings held during the year and 0 otherwise. Prior studies that used a similar 
measure were Choi, Jeon and Park (2004) and Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi (2006). 
An alternative size variable (ACSIZE_DUMMY) was measured as 1 if there were at 
least three members on the audit committee and 0 otherwise. Bedard, Chtourou and 
Courteau (2004), Choi, Jeon and Park (2004) and Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi 
(2006) used a similar alternative measure. For the tenure of the audit committee, an 
alternative variable (ACTENURE_DUMMY) was measured as 1 if there were 6 or 
more years between the year after audit committee formation and 2001, and 0 
otherwise. Six years was chosen as the cut-off as it was the median for this variable. 
The significance of these dummy variables was initially tested using a 
parametric t-test and a non-parametric Mann-Whitney test. Several of these variables 
(ACIND_DUMMY, ACSIZE_DUMMY and ACTENURE_DUMMY) were 
significant in relation to one or more of the earnings quality variables (i.e., EQJones, 
EQDD and EQDDadj). However, when the dummy variables were substituted for the 
continuous audit committee variables in the regression models, none of them were 
significant. This supports the results for the audit committee variables reported in 
section 4.5.3. 
Second, similar to Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi (2006), a summary measure 
of the overall strength of the sample companies' audit committees was calculated. 
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This variable (AC_GOV_SCORE) was calculated as the sum of each of the audit 
committee dummy variables discussed above (i.e., ACIND_DUMMY, 
ACACCEXP_DUMMY, ACLEGEXP_DUMMY, ACMEET_DUMMY, 
ACSIZE_DUMMY, and ACTENURE_DUMMY). Furthermore, a dichotomous 
variable (AC_GOV_SCORE_DUMMY) was calculated as 1 if the 
AC_GOV_SCORE was 4 or greater and 0 otherwise. There were significant negative 
correlations between AC_GOV_SCORE and the two earnings quality variables 
derived from the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model (i.e., EQDD and EQDDadj). 
However, when AC_GOV_SCORE was substituted for each of the audit committee 
variables in the regression models, it was not found to be significant. A similar result 
was found when AC_GOV_SCORE_DUMMY was used. 
Finally, a number of additional variables were calculated to test the interaction 
between several of the audit committee variables. These variables measured the 
interactions between: independence (ACIND) and accounting expertise 
(ACACCEXP); independence (ACIND) and legal expertise (ACLEGEXP); 
accounting expertise (ACACCEXP) and legal expertise (ACLEGEXP); independence 
(ACIND) and activity (ACMEET); and accounting expertise (ACACCEXP) and 
activity (ACMEET). Each of these interaction variables were included separately in 
the regression models with all of the other variables. None of the interaction variables 
were found to be significantly associated with the earnings quality measures. 
 
4.6 Changes in audit committee characteristics and financial 
reporting quality 
4.6.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.14 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the models 
analysing the association between changes in audit committee characteristics and 
changes in financial reporting quality. The change variables were calculated as the 
difference between the variables in the year after audit committee formation and 2001. 
Panel A provides the descriptive statistics for changes in each of the continuous 
variables, while Panel B reports details of changes in the auditor variable. 
Panel A indicates that changes in each of the 3 dependent variables, i.e., 
ΔEQJones, ΔEQDD and ΔEQDDadj, had relatively high values for skewness and 
kurtosis. This suggested that these variables were not normally distributed. First, 
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natural log and reciprocal variable transformations were used to attempt to improve 
the distribution of these variables. However, the skewness and kurtosis statistics were 
higher for these transformed variables compared to the untransformed variables. 
Therefore, the untransformed variables were used in the regression models. Boxplots 
of these variables were examined to determine the existence of univariate outliers. 
Consequently, two outliers were identified for ΔEQJones and one outlier was 
identified for ΔEQDD and ΔEQDDadj. After these outliers were excluded, the 
skewness and kurtosis statistics for ΔEQJones were -1.404 and 5.949. The skewness 
and kurtosis statistics for ΔEQDD were -0.262 and 1.669 and for ΔEQDDadj the 
statistics were -1.170 and 5.015. The regression models in section 4.6.3 were run 
without these outliers.  
For the changes in the audit committee variables, Panel A shows that there 
was a change in the proportion of independent audit committee members of between  
-1 and 1, with an average of 0.0625. This indicates that, between the year after 
formation and 2001, some audit committees went from having no independent 
members to have all independent members and vice versa. The change in the 
proportion of members with accounting expertise was between -1 and 0.6667, with an 
average of 0.0113. The change in the proportion of members with legal expertise 
ranged from -0.6667 to 0.6667 and the average was -0.008. There was a change in the 
number of audit committee meetings of between -7 and 4, with an average of 0.17. 
The change in the size of the audit committees ranged from -4 to 4 and the average 
was 0.07.  
The control variables used were changes in several board variables, company 
size, leverage and auditor. Panel A shows that, on average, the boards of the sample 
companies had: a 0.067 change in the proportion of members who were independent; 
a 0.021 change in the proportion of members with accounting expertise and a -0.008 
change in the proportion of members with legal expertise. The average change in the 
number of board meetings was -0.76 and the average change in board size was -0.04. 
Due to the very high skewness and kurtosis statistics for the change in company size, 
this variable was transformed by a natural log transformation. The skewness and 
kurtosis statistics were reduced to 2.539 and 13.683 respectively. The average change 
in leverage was 0.032. Panel B shows that only 26 (19.1%) of companies in the 
sample changed from a non-Big 5/6 auditor to a Big 5/6 auditor. The remainder had 
no change in their auditor between the year after audit committee formation and 2001.
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Table 4.14 Descriptive statistics for 136 ASX listed companies for changes 
in earnings quality variables and changes in audit committee and control 
variables 
 
Panel A Continuous variables 
Variable Min Max Mean Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
ΔEQJones -3.64900 1.1213 -0.13753 0.524681 -3.663 20.195
ΔEQDD -0.73721 0.3646 -0.01661 0.142157 -1.078 5.139
ΔEQDDadj -0.73994 0.3953 -0.01510 0.154777 -1.582 6.229
ΔACIND -1 1 0.06257 0.340612 0.039 1.133
ΔACACCEXP -1 0.6667 0.01132 0.275345 -0.434 1.641
ΔACLEGEXP -0.66667 0.6667 -0.00803 0.179807 -0.183 3.171
ΔACMEET -7 4 0.17 1.473 -0.678 3.867
ΔACSIZE -4 4 0.07 0.994 -0.011 3.783
ΔBDIND -0.55 0.80 0.06770 0.241330 0.519 0.708
ΔBDACCEXP -0.33333 0.50 0.02156 0.155955 0.378 0.118
ΔBDLEGEXP -0.40 0.40 -0.00870 0.114493 0.076 2.302
ΔBDMEET -24 26 -0.76 5.518 0.275 5.994
ΔBDSIZE -9 6 -0.04 1.966 -0.953 5.156
ΔLEV -0.59764 0.6761 0.03240 0.182649 0.222 2.316
LNΔSIZE 18.37 24.79 20.551 0.65054 2.539 13.683
Panel B Dichotomous variables 
Variable Frequency of 1s Frequency of 0s 
ΔAUDITOR 26 110 
 
ΔEQJones = Change in cross sectional earnings quality proxy from modified Jones (1991) model (i.e., 
absolute value of abnormal accruals) 
ΔEQDD = Change in cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) model 
(i.e., absolute value of regression residuals) 
ΔEQDDadj = Change in cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
adjusted for Jones (1991) model variables (i.e., absolute value of regression residuals) 
ΔACIND = Change in proportion of independent directors on the audit committee 
ΔACACCEXP = Change in proportion of directors on the audit committee with accounting 
qualifications  
ΔACLEGEXP = Change in proportion of directors on the audit committee with legal qualifications  
ΔACMEET = Change in number of audit committee meetings 
ΔACSIZE = Change in number of audit committee members 
ΔBDIND = Change in proportion of independent directors on the board 
ΔBDACCEXP = Change in proportion of directors on the board with accounting qualifications  
ΔBDLEGEXP = Change in proportion of directors on the board with legal qualifications  
ΔBDMEET = Change in number of board meetings 
ΔBDSIZE = Change in number of board members 
ΔLEV = Change in leverage (as measured by total liabilities divided by total assets) 
LNΔSIZE = Natural log of change in company size (as measured by total assets) 
ΔAUDITOR: 1 = a company with a non-Big 5/6 auditor changed to a Big 5/6 auditor; and 0 = 
otherwise
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4.6.2 Correlations 
Table 4.15 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between all 
combinations of dependent and independent variables. As expected, the two 
dependent variables based on the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model (ΔEQDD and 
ΔEQDDadj) were significantly positively correlated with each other with a coefficient 
of 0.861. However, ΔEQDD and ΔEQDDadj were not significantly correlated with 
the Jones (1991) model variable (ΔEQJones).  ΔEQDD was significantly positively 
correlated with the change in the number of board meetings (ΔBDMEET). This result 
suggests that companies with increased numbers of board meetings are associated 
with lower quality earnings. None of the audit committee variables were significantly 
correlated with any of the earnings quality variables. 
Table 4.15 also shows that several significant correlations existed between the 
various independent variables. The following associated audit committee and board 
variables were significantly positively correlated: ΔACIND and ΔBDIND; 
ΔACACCEXP and ΔBDACCEXP; ΔACLEGEXP and ΔBDLEGEXP; and ΔACSIZE 
and BDSIZE. These results were not surprising considering that the audit committee 
members are drawn from the board of directors. Similar significant correlations were 
found in table 4.9 between the same variables for 2001. As with the cross sectional 
regressions in section 4.5.3, due to potential problems with multicollinearity, the 
change in the board variables were not included in the regression models with the 
changes in the audit committee variables. Other significant correlations were between: 
ΔACACCEXP and ΔACLEGEXP (negative); ΔACACCEXP and ΔACSIZE 
(negative); and ΔBDMEET and ΔLEV (positive).  
Non-parametric Spearman correlations were also calculated due to possible 
violations of the normal distribution assumption for some of the variables, as 
indicated by the skewness and kurtosis statistics in table 4.14. Table 4.16 reports the 
Spearman correlation coefficients. Similar to the Pearson correlations in table 4.15, 
ΔEQDD and ΔEQDDadj were significantly positively correlated with each other, but 
not with ΔEQJones. The change in the Jones (1991) model variable (ΔEQJones) was 
significantly positively correlated with ΔACACCEXP and significantly negatively 
correlated with ΔBDMEET. Therefore, there are some differences between the 
Pearson and Spearman correlations for the changes in the independent variables and 
 112
the changes in the earnings quality variables. This may be due to the higher values for 
skewness and kurtosis shown in table 4.14. 
Table 4.16 also highlights some significant correlations between the 
independent variables. As with the Pearson correlations, ΔACIND and ΔBDIND; 
ΔACACCEXP and ΔBDACCEXP; ΔACLEGEXP and ΔBDLEGEXP; and ΔACSIZE 
and BDSIZE were significantly positively correlated. The only other significant 
correlation was between ΔACLEGEXP and ΔBDIND (negative). 
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Table 4.15 Pearson correlations for 136 ASX listed companies for changes in earnings quality variables and changes in audit committee 
and control variables 
 
 ΔEQJones ΔEQDD ΔEQDDadj ΔACIND ΔACACCEXP ΔACLEGEXP ΔACMEET ΔACSIZE ΔBDIND ΔBDACCEXP ΔBDLEGEXP ΔBDMEET ΔBDSIZE ΔAUDITOR ΔLEV LNΔSIZE 
ΔEQJones 
 
1                
ΔEQDD 0.069 
(0.427) 
1               
ΔEQDDadj 0.045 
(0.599) 
0.861** 
(0.000) 
1              
ΔACIND -0.115 
(0.182) 
-0.077 
(0.371) 
-0.097 
(0.260) 
1             
ΔACACCEXP 0.063 
(0.465) 
0.002 
(0.980) 
-0.061 
(0.480) 
-0.009 
(0.916) 
1            
ΔACLEGEXP 0.076 
(0.380) 
0.032 
(0.709) 
0.145 
(0.092) 
0.063 
(0.463) 
-0.217* 
(0.011) 
1           
ΔACMEET -0.006 
(0.945) 
0.004 
(0.962) 
0.039 
(0.656) 
0.057 
(0.511) 
-0.049 
(0.569) 
-0.013 
(0.878) 
1          
ΔACSIZE 0.014 
(0.871) 
0.023 
(0.790) 
0.019 
(0.823) 
-0.090 
(0.297) 
-0.179* 
(0.037) 
0.124 
(0.150) 
0.052 
(0.546) 
1         
ΔBDIND -0.150 
(0.082) 
-0.143 
(0.097) 
-0.155 
(0.071) 
0.728** 
(0.000) 
0.049 
(0.575) 
-0.141 
(0.101) 
0.029 
(0.737) 
-0.021 
(0.804) 
1        
ΔBDACCEXP 0.058 
(0.499) 
-0.007 
(0.936) 
-0.017 
(0.846) 
-0.036 
(0.680) 
0.680** 
(0.000) 
0.041 
(0.635) 
0.007 
(0.936) 
0.070 
(0.417) 
-0.057 
(0.508) 
1       
ΔBDLEGEXP 0.025 
(0.776) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.053 
(0.543) 
-0.079 
(0.362) 
-0.053 
(0.541) 
0.472** 
(0.000) 
0.018 
(0.837) 
-0.010 
(0.910) 
-0.144 
(0.094) 
-0.050 
(0.565) 
1      
ΔBDMEET -0.052 
(0.549) 
0.197* 
(0.021) 
0.109 
(0.207) 
0.107 
(0.216) 
0.020 
(0.815) 
0.028 
(0.747) 
0.116 
(0.178) 
-0.013 
(0.883) 
0.041 
(0.637) 
0.034 
(0.692) 
-0.120 
(0.163) 
1     
ΔBDSIZE 0.016 
(0.858) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.045 
(0.606) 
0.065 
(0.449) 
0.017 
(0.841) 
0.076 
(0.379) 
-0.008 
(0.930) 
0.248** 
(0.004) 
0.096 
(0.269) 
0.066 
(0.447) 
-0.030 
(0.733) 
-0.054 
(0.530) 
1    
ΔAUDITOR 0.046 
(0.598) 
-0.044 
(0.609) 
-0.028 
(0.743) 
-0.030 
(0.731) 
0.028 
(0.749) 
-0.063 
(0.464) 
-0.052 
(0.550) 
0.008 
(0.931) 
0.029 
(0.738) 
-0.035 
(0.682) 
0.085 
(0.325) 
0.085 
(0.326) 
-0.123 
(0.153) 
1   
ΔLEV 0.125 
(0.148) 
0.131 
(0.130) 
0.089 
(0.301) 
-0.001 
(0.994) 
-0.101 
(0.241) 
-0.059 
(0.496) 
0.076 
(0.378) 
-0.137 
(0.111) 
0.066 
(0.448) 
-0.085 
(0.323) 
-0.106 
(0.222) 
0.189* 
(0.027) 
0.042 
(0.627) 
-0.089 
(0.301) 
1  
LNΔSIZE -0.108 
(0.209) 
-0.057 
(0.510) 
0.002 
(0.980) 
0.071 
(0.414) 
-0.043 
(0.617) 
0.086 
(0.319) 
0.122 
(0.156) 
-0.008 
(0.929) 
0.043 
(0.623) 
-0.045 
(0.601) 
0.049 
(0.569) 
0.070 
(0.421) 
0.057 
(0.507) 
-0.041 
(0.635) 
0.020 
(0.818) 
1 
* significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
ΔEQJones = Change in cross sectional earnings quality proxy from modified Jones (1991) model (i.e., absolute value of abnormal accruals) 
ΔEQDD = Change in cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) model (i.e., absolute value of regression residuals) 
ΔEQDDadj = Change in cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) adjusted for Jones (1991) model variables (i.e., absolute value of regression 
residuals) 
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ΔACIND = Change in proportion of independent directors on the audit committee 
ΔACACCEXP = Change in proportion of directors on the audit committee with accounting qualifications  
ΔACLEGEXP = Change in proportion of directors on the audit committee with legal qualifications  
ΔACMEET = Change in number of audit committee meetings 
ΔACSIZE = Change in number of audit committee members 
ΔBDIND = Change in proportion of independent directors on the board 
ΔBDACCEXP = Change in proportion of directors on the board with accounting qualifications  
ΔBDLEGEXP = Change in proportion of directors on the board with legal qualifications  
ΔBDMEET = Change in number of board meetings 
ΔBDSIZE = Change in number of board members 
ΔAUDITOR: 1 = a company with a non-Big 5/6 auditor changed to a Big 5/6 auditor; and 0 = otherwise 
ΔLEV = Change in leverage (as measured by total liabilities divided by total assets) 
LNΔSIZE = Natural log of change in company size (as measured by total assets) 
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Table 4.16 Spearman correlations for 136 ASX listed companies for changes in earnings quality variables and changes in audit 
committee and control variables 
 
 ΔEQJones ΔEQDD ΔEQDDadj ΔACIND ΔACACCEXP ΔACLEGEXP ΔACMEET ΔACSIZE ΔBDIND ΔBDACCEXP ΔBDLEGEXP ΔBDMEET ΔBDSIZE ΔAUDITOR ΔLEV LNΔSIZE 
ΔEQJones 
 
1                
ΔEQDD -0.001 
(0.989) 
1               
ΔEQDDadj -0.078 
(0.368) 
0.754** 
(0.000) 
1              
ΔACIND -0.035 
(0.689) 
-0.015 
(0.855) 
-0.069 
(0.427) 
1             
ΔACACCEXP 0.196* 
(0.022) 
-0.006 
(0.942) 
-0.043 
(0.619) 
0.023 
(0.791) 
1            
ΔACLEGEXP -0.093 
(0.280) 
-0.018 
(0.835) 
0.072 
(0.404) 
-0.016 
(0.852) 
-0.149 
(0.083) 
1           
ΔACMEET -0.158 
(0.067) 
0.034 
(0.696) 
0.089 
(0.301) 
0.072 
(0.406) 
-0.048 
(0.581) 
-0.080 
(0.354) 
1          
ΔACSIZE 0.139 
(0.106) 
-0.079 
(0.359) 
-0.030 
(0.728) 
-0.138 
(0.108) 
-0.157 
(0.068) 
0.064 
(0.460) 
0.081 
(0.347) 
1         
ΔBDIND -0.022 
(0.797) 
-0.088 
(0.310) 
-0.125 
(0.148) 
0.647** 
(0.000) 
0.108 
(0.212) 
-0.169* 
(0.049) 
0.047 
(0.587) 
0.034 
(0.692) 
1        
ΔBDACCEXP 0.159 
(0.064) 
-0.041 
(0.632) 
-0.029 
(0.737) 
-0.032 
(0.708) 
0.683** 
(0.000) 
0.047 
(0.585) 
-0.039 
(0.650) 
0.079 
(0.362) 
-0.021 
(0.807) 
1       
ΔBDLEGEXP -0.055 
(0.524) 
-0.032 
(0.715) 
0.032 
(0.711) 
-0.049 
(0.571) 
-0.096 
(0.268) 
0.455** 
(0.000) 
-0.053 
(0.537) 
0.003 
(0.974) 
-0.113 
(0.190) 
-0.024 
(0.780) 
1      
ΔBDMEET -0.216* 
(0.012) 
0.143 
(0.098) 
0.068 
(0.432) 
0.097 
(0.262) 
-0.038 
(0.663) 
0.019 
(0.829) 
0.151 
(0.079) 
-0.028 
(0.744) 
0.072 
(0.403) 
-0.033 
(0.702) 
-0.136 
(0.115) 
1     
ΔBDSIZE 0.091 
(0.292) 
-0.029 
(0.734) 
0.023 
(0.792) 
0.069 
(0.425) 
0.052 
(0.548) 
0.063 
(0.465) 
-0.032 
(0.713) 
0.289** 
(0.001) 
0.083 
(0.337) 
0.152 
(0.077) 
-0.041 
(0.635) 
0.015 
(0.862) 
1    
ΔAUDITOR 0.013 
(0.881) 
-0.120 
(0.165) 
-0.079 
(0.361) 
0.016 
(0.852) 
0.030 
(0.727) 
-0.076 
(0.379) 
-0.011 
(0.901) 
0.036 
(0.673) 
0.073 
(0.398) 
-0.036 
(0.675) 
0.126 
(0.144) 
0.084 
(0.334) 
-0.143 
(0.097) 
1   
ΔLEV 0.048 
(0.577) 
0.080 
(0.354) 
0.040 
(0.643) 
0.045 
(0.599) 
-0.108 
(0.210) 
-0.024 
(0.783) 
0.087 
(0.311) 
-0.074 
(0.391) 
0.049 
(0.569) 
-0.099 
(0.251) 
-0.053 
(0.543) 
0.158 
(0.066) 
-0.058 
(0.506) 
-0.039 
(0.648) 
1  
LNΔSIZE -0.147 
(0.089) 
-0.145 
(0.093) 
-0.044 
(0.609) 
0.163 
(0.058) 
-0.008 
(0.924) 
0.115 
(0.181) 
0.065 
(0.455) 
-0.024 
(0.785) 
0.110 
(0.203) 
-0.043 
(0.620) 
0.127 
(0.140) 
0.087 
(0.315) 
0.019 
(0.825) 
0.042 
(0.625) 
0.137 
(0.110) 
1 
* significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
ΔEQJones = Change in cross sectional earnings quality proxy from modified Jones (1991) model (i.e., absolute value of abnormal accruals) 
ΔEQDD = Change in cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) model (i.e., absolute value of regression residuals) 
ΔEQDDadj = Change in cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) adjusted for Jones (1991) model variables (i.e., absolute value of regression 
residuals) 
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ΔACIND = Change in proportion of independent directors on the audit committee 
ΔACACCEXP = Change in proportion of directors on the audit committee with accounting qualifications  
ΔACLEGEXP = Change in proportion of directors on the audit committee with legal qualifications  
ΔACMEET = Change in number of audit committee meetings 
ΔACSIZE = Change in number of audit committee members 
ΔBDIND = Change in proportion of independent directors on the board 
ΔBDACCEXP = Change in proportion of directors on the board with accounting qualifications  
ΔBDLEGEXP = Change in proportion of directors on the board with legal qualifications  
ΔBDMEET = Change in number of board meetings 
ΔBDSIZE = Change in number of board members 
ΔAUDITOR: 1 = a company with a non-Big 5/6 auditor changed to a Big 5/6 auditor; and 0 = otherwise 
ΔLEV = Change in leverage (as measured by total liabilities divided by total assets) 
LNΔSIZE = Natural log of change in company size (as measured by total assets)
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4.6.3 Regression results 
This section describes the results obtained from regressing the changes in the 
three earnings quality variables on the changes in the various independent variables. 
Tables 4.15 and 4.16 showed that there were significant positive correlations between 
the audit committee variables and the associated board variables. Therefore, each of 
the regressions was initially run including the board variables. Then they were run 
excluding the three most highly correlated board variables (i.e., ΔBDIND, 
ΔBDACCEXP and ΔBDLEGEXP). Finally, all board variables were excluded from 
the regressions to avoid problems with multicollinearity.  
The regression models in this section were run without the two univariate 
outliers for ΔEQJones and the one univariate outlier for ΔEQDD and ΔEQDDadj. An 
examination of the Mahalanobis distance values for each of the sample companies 
identified eight multivariate outliers. Therefore, these eight companies were also 
excluded from the results reported in tables 4.17, 4.18 and 4.19. For ΔEQJones, one 
of the multivariate outliers was also a univariate outlier. Therefore, a total of nine 
outliers were excluded from the results reported for each of the dependent variables. 
4.6.3.1 Modified Jones (1991) model 
The results from the regression model for ΔEQJones are shown in table 4.17: 
Model 1 included the change in all board variables; Model 2 excluded the change in 
BDIND, BDACCEXP and BDLEGEXP; and Model 3 excluded the change in all 
board variables. In both Models 1 and 2, none of the audit committee or board 
variables were significant. 
After excluding all board variables, Model 3 had an adjusted R2 of 0.180 with 
an F statistic of 2.106 with a p-value of 0.005. While the coefficients for 
ΔACACCEXP, ΔACLEGEXP and ΔACMEET had the predicted sign, none of the 
audit committee variables were significant at the 0.05 or 0.01 levels. Therefore, there 
is no support for hypotheses 2b, 3b, 4b or 5b. Similarly, none of the year dummy 
variables were significant. The only significant variables were several of the industry 
control variables.
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Table 4.17 Regression estimates of ΔEQJones on changes in audit committee and 
control variables for 127 ASX listed companies 
unstandardised coefficient (t-statistic) 
 
Variable Predicted 
sign 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept  1.316 
(1.080) 
1.397 
(1.171) 
1.398 
(1.189) 
ΔACIND - 0.021 
(0.145) 
0.040 
(0.424) 
0.024 
(0.255) 
ΔACACCEXP - 0.034 
(0.193) 
-0.001 
(-0.006) 
-0.014 
(-0.115) 
ΔACLEGEXP - -0.013 
(-0.055) 
-0.143 
(-0.752) 
-0.166 
(-0.868) 
ΔACMEET - -0.009 
(-0.420) 
-0.012 
(-0.575) 
-0.015 
(-0.716) 
ΔACSIZE - 0.006 
(0.180) 
0.008 
(0.247) 
0.008 
(0.254) 
ΔBDIND 
 
- 0.011 
(0.052) 
  
ΔBDACCEXP 
 
- -0.086 
(-0.280) 
  
ΔBDLEGEXP 
 
- -0.338 
(-1.077) 
  
ΔBDMEET 
 
- -0.010 
(-1.777) 
-0.009 
(-1.691) 
 
ΔBDSIZE 
 
- -0.003 
(-0.158) 
-0.001 
(-0.070) 
 
ΔAUDITOR - 0.159 
(1.161) 
0.150 
(1.108) 
0.116 
(0.865) 
LNΔSIZE ? -0.082 
(-1.450) 
-0.086 
(-1.539) 
-0.086 
(-1.563) 
ΔLEV ? -0.015 
(-0.080) 
-0.003 
(-0.017) 
-0.064 
(-0.368) 
AC1993 ? 0.180 
(0.876) 
0.185 
(0.896) 
0.179 
(0.865) 
AC1994 ? 0.227 
(1.296) 
0.223 
(1.316) 
0.207 
(1.237) 
AC1995 ? 0.110 
(0.880) 
0.092 
(0.804) 
0.090 
(0.780) 
AC1996 ? 0.170 
(1.335) 
0.159 
(1.325) 
0.159 
(1.323) 
AC1997 ? 0.004 
(0.030) 
-0.008 
(-0.066) 
0.030 
(0.242) 
AC1998 ? 0.151 
(1.054) 
0.145 
(1.086) 
0.153 
(1.154) 
AC1999 ? 0.007 
(0.053) 
-0.003 
(-0.025) 
-0.013 
(-0.102) 
AC2000 ? 0.075 
(0.514) 
0.074 
(0.518) 
0.085 
(0.608) 
Capital goods ? 0.314 
(2.709)** 
0.301 
(2.654)** 
0.301 
(2.694)** 
Commercial, services 
and supplies 
? 0.138 
(0.950) 
0.134 
(0.940) 
0.140 
(0.984) 
Energy ? 0.111 
(0.934) 
0.127 
(1.092) 
0.143 
(1.236) 
Food, beverage and 
tobacco 
? 0.159 
(1.422) 
0.178 
(1.623) 
0.193 
(1.761) 
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Healthcare 
equipment and 
services 
? 0.233 
(1.676) 
0.225 
(1.654) 
0.252 
(1.873) 
Hotels, restaurants 
and leisure 
? 0.231 
(1.462) 
0.212 
(1.366) 
0.250 
(1.640) 
Materials ? 0.300 
(0.412) 
0.315 
(0.456) 
0.250 
(0.379) 
Media ? 0.603 
(5.090)** 
0.591 
(5.230)** 
0.599 
(5.284)** 
Retailing ? 0.266 
(1.974) 
0.279 
(2.158)* 
0.283 
(2.192)* 
Software and services ? 0.304 
(2.431)* 
0.297 
(2.459)* 
0.318 
(2.593)* 
Telecommunication 
services 
? -0.301 
(-1.372) 
-0.300 
(-1.401) 
-0.295 
(-1.383) 
Adjusted R2  0.172 0.187 0.180 
F statistic  1.871 2.074 2.106 
p-value  0.012 0.005 0.005 
     
* significant at the 0.05 level  
** significant at the 0.01 level  
(p-values are one-tailed when direction is as predicted, otherwise two-tailed) 
 
ΔEQJones = Change in cross sectional earnings quality proxy from modified Jones (1991) model (i.e., 
absolute value of abnormal accruals) 
ΔACIND = Change in proportion of independent directors on the audit committee 
ΔACACCEXP = Change in proportion of directors on the audit committee with accounting 
qualifications  
ΔACLEGEXP = Change in proportion of directors on the audit committee with legal qualifications  
ΔACMEET = Change in number of audit committee meetings 
ΔACSIZE = Change in number of audit committee members 
ΔBDIND = Change in proportion of independent directors on the board 
ΔBDACCEXP = Change in proportion of directors on the board with accounting qualifications  
ΔBDLEGEXP = Change in proportion of directors on the board with legal qualifications  
ΔBDMEET = Change in number of board meetings 
ΔBDSIZE = Change in number of board members 
ΔAUDITOR: 1 = a company with a non-Big 5/6 auditor changed to a Big 5/6 auditor; and 0 = 
otherwise 
LNΔSIZE = Natural log of change in company size (as measured by total assets) 
ΔLEV = Change in leverage (as measured by total liabilities divided by total assets) 
AC1993: 1 = year after formation is 1993; 0 = otherwise 
AC1994: 1 = year after formation is 1994; 0 = otherwise 
AC1995: 1 = year after formation is 1995; 0 = otherwise 
AC1996: 1 = year after formation is 1996; 0 = otherwise 
AC1997: 1 = year after formation is 1997; 0 = otherwise 
AC1998: 1 = year after formation is 1998; 0 = otherwise 
AC1999: 1 = year after formation is 1999; 0 = otherwise 
AC2000: 1 = year after formation is 2000; 0 = otherwise 
Capital goods: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise 
Commercial, services and supplies: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise 
Energy: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Food, beverage and tobacco: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Healthcare equipment and services: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Hotels, restaurants and leisure: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Materials: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Media: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Retailing: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Software and services: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Telecommunication services: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise
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4.6.3.2 Dechow and Dichev (2002) models 
Tables 4.18 and 4.19 provide the results obtained from the regressions using 
the two earnings quality variables derived from the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model 
(ΔEQDD and ΔEQDDadj). As with table 4.17, for both tables: Model 1 included the 
change in all board variables; Model 2 excluded the change in BDIND, BDACCEXP 
and BDLEGEXP; and Model 3 excluded the change in all board variables. None of 
the audit committee variables were significant in Models 1 or 2. 
When the changes in all variables were excluded, the model 3s in tables 4.18 
and 4.19 had adjusted R2s of -0.112 (ΔEQDD) and 0.012 (ΔEQDDadj). The ΔEQDD 
model had an F statistic of 0.494 with a p-value of 0.977 and the ΔEQDDadj model 
had an F statistic of 1.059 with a p-value of 0.403.  For the independent variables, 
similar to the ΔEQJones model, none of the audit committee variables were 
significant. These results do not provide support for hypotheses 2b, 3b, 4b or 5b. The 
only independent variables that were significant were AC1999 and the Software and 
services industry variable in the ΔEQDDadj model.
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Table 4.18 Regression estimates of ΔEQDD on changes in audit committee and 
control variables for 127 ASX listed companies 
 unstandardised coefficient (t-statistic) 
Variable Predicted 
sign 
ΔEQDD 
(Model 1) 
ΔEQDD 
(Model 2) 
ΔEQDD 
(Model 3) 
Intercept  0.524 
(0.935) 
0.436 
(0.795) 
0.315 
(0.653) 
ΔACIND - 0.024 
(0.366) 
-0.028 
(-0.659) 
-0.022 
(-0.578) 
ΔACACCEXP - 0.013 
(0.169) 
0.006 
(0.117) 
0.014 
(0.277) 
ΔACLEGEXP - -0.030 
(-0.274) 
0.022 
(0.248) 
0.022 
(0.280) 
ΔACMEET - -0.003 
(-0.249) 
-0.001 
(-0.150) 
-0.004 
(-0.469) 
ΔACSIZE - 0.003 
(0.192) 
0.001 
(0.052) 
0.000 
(0.030) 
ΔBDIND 
 
- -0.097 
(-0.986) 
  
ΔBDACCEXP 
 
- 0.008 
(0.057) 
  
ΔBDLEGEXP 
 
- 0.078 
(0.541) 
  
ΔBDMEET 
 
- 0.005 
(1.934) 
0.005 
(2.095)* 
 
ΔBDSIZE 
 
- 0.003 
(0.333) 
0.001 
(0.152) 
 
ΔAUDITOR - -0.042 
(-0.665) 
-0.044 
(-0.710) 
-0.042 
(-0.767) 
LNΔSIZE ? -0.025 
(-0.947) 
-0.021 
(-0.827) 
-0.015 
(-0.678) 
ΔLEV ? 0.054 
(0.644) 
0.039 
(0.475) 
0.072 
(1.004) 
AC1993 ? 0.030 
(0.389) 
0.035 
(0.412) 
0.025 
(0.354) 
AC1994 ? -0.003 
(-0.039) 
0.003 
(0.034) 
0.019 
(0.277) 
AC1995 ? -0.010 
(-0.181) 
0.006 
(0.105) 
0.010 
(0.204) 
AC1996 ? -0.038 
(-0.640) 
-0.023 
(-0.415) 
-0.039 
(-0.787) 
AC1997 ? -0.028 
(-0.461) 
-0.018 
(-0.313) 
-0.033 
(-0.662) 
AC1998 ? -0.032 
(-0.480) 
-0.013 
(-0.207) 
-0.016 
(-0.299) 
AC1999 ? -0.053 
(-0.868) 
-0.050 
(-0.857) 
-0.055 
(-1.042) 
AC2000 ? -0.096 
(-1.419) 
-0.087 
(-1.333) 
-0.024 
(-0.400) 
Capital goods ? 0.006 
(0.114) 
0.010 
(0.198) 
0.019 
(0.407) 
Commercial, 
services and supplies 
? 0.011 
(0.167) 
0.005 
(0.083) 
0.016 
(0.278) 
Energy ? 0.037 
(0.674) 
0.037 
(0.703) 
0.024 
(0.518) 
Food, beverage and 
tobacco 
? 0.020 
(0.390) 
0.015 
(0.299) 
0.012 
(0.267) 
Healthcare ? -0.034 -0.024 0.064 
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equipment and 
services 
(-0.530) (-0.377) (1.099) 
Hotels, restaurants 
and leisure 
? -0.039 
(-0.541) 
-0.032 
(-0.450) 
-0.044 
(-0.710) 
Materials ? 0.056 
(0.578) 
0.065 
(0.645) 
0.047 
(0.546) 
Media ? -0.029 
(-0.533) 
-0.013 
(-0.254) 
-0.034 
(-0.727) 
Retailing ? 0.057 
(0.926) 
0.062 
(1.038) 
0.060 
(1.139) 
Software and 
services 
? 0.090 
(1.565) 
0.099 
(1.748) 
0.074 
(1.466) 
Telecommunication 
services 
? 0.066 
(0.657) 
0.078 
(0.796) 
0.082 
(0.940) 
Adjusted R2  -0.109 -0.090 -0.112 
F statistic  0.587 0.616 0.494 
p-value  0.951 0.925 0.977 
* significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
(p-values are one-tailed when direction is as predicted, otherwise two-tailed) 
 
ΔEQDD = Change in cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) model 
(i.e., absolute value of regression residuals) 
ΔEQDDadj = Change in cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
adjusted for Jones (1991) model variables (i.e., absolute value of regression residuals) 
ΔACIND = Change in proportion of independent directors on the audit committee 
ΔACACCEXP = Change in proportion of directors on the audit committee with accounting 
qualifications  
ΔACLEGEXP = Change in proportion of directors on the audit committee with legal qualifications  
ΔACMEET = Change in number of audit committee meetings 
ΔACSIZE = Change in number of audit committee members 
ΔBDIND = Change in proportion of independent directors on the board 
ΔBDACCEXP = Change in proportion of directors on the board with accounting qualifications  
ΔBDLEGEXP = Change in proportion of directors on the board with legal qualifications  
ΔBDMEET = Change in number of board meetings 
ΔBDSIZE = Change in number of board members 
ΔAUDITOR: 1 = a company with a non-Big 5/6 auditor changed to a Big 5/6 auditor; and 0 = 
otherwise 
LNΔSIZE = Natural log of change in company size (as measured by total assets) 
ΔLEV = Change in leverage (as measured by total liabilities divided by total assets) 
AC1993: 1 = year after formation is 1993; 0 = otherwise 
AC1994: 1 = year after formation is 1994; 0 = otherwise 
AC1995: 1 = year after formation is 1995; 0 = otherwise 
AC1996: 1 = year after formation is 1996; 0 = otherwise 
AC1997: 1 = year after formation is 1997; 0 = otherwise 
AC1998: 1 = year after formation is 1998; 0 = otherwise 
AC1999: 1 = year after formation is 1999; 0 = otherwise 
AC2000: 1 = year after formation is 2000; 0 = otherwise 
Capital goods: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise 
Commercial, services and supplies: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise 
Energy: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Food, beverage and tobacco: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Healthcare equipment and services: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Hotels, restaurants and leisure: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Materials: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Media: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Retailing: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Software and services: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Telecommunication services: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
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Table 4.19 Regression estimates of ΔEQDDadj on changes in audit committee 
and control variables for 127 ASX listed companies 
 unstandardised coefficient (t-statistic) 
Variable Predicted 
sign 
ΔEQDDadj
(Model 1) 
ΔEQDDadj 
(Model 2) 
ΔEQDDadj 
(Model 3) 
Intercept  0.341 
(0.581) 
0.264 
(0.460) 
0.081 
(0.158) 
ΔACIND - 0.018 
(0.251) 
-0.031 
(-0.688) 
-0.026 
(-0.640) 
ΔACACCEXP - -0.026 
(-0.306) 
-0.028 
(-0.489) 
-0.022 
(-0.414) 
ΔACLEGEXP - 0.046 
(0.407) 
0.075 
(0.823) 
0.072 
(0.873) 
ΔACMEET - -0.003 
(-0.311) 
-0.003 
(-0.244) 
-0.005 
(-0.577) 
ΔACSIZE - -0.003 
(-0.184) 
-0.004 
(-0.270) 
-0.003 
(-0.181) 
ΔBDIND 
 
- -0.092 
(-0.900) 
  
ΔBDACCEXP 
 
- 0.019 
(0.130) 
  
ΔBDLEGEXP 
 
- 0.012 
(0.082) 
  
ΔBDMEET 
 
- 0.003 
(1.190) 
0.004 
(1.378) 
 
ΔBDSIZE 
 
- 0.007 
(0.815) 
0.006 
(0.690) 
 
ΔAUDITOR - -0.025 
(-0.380) 
-0.029 
(-0.444) 
-0.034 
(-0.585) 
LNΔSIZE ? -0.015 
(-0.559) 
-0.012 
(-0.455) 
-0.004 
(-0.153) 
ΔLEV ? -0.002 
(-0.018) 
-0.014 
(-0.166) 
0.015 
(0.201) 
AC1993 ? 0.048 
(0.512) 
0.039 
(0.468) 
0.036 
(0.418) 
AC1994 ? -0.013 
(-0.154) 
-0.005 
(-0.058) 
0.017 
(0.232) 
AC1995 ? 0.002 
(0.030) 
0.017 
(0.313) 
0.019 
(0.386) 
AC1996 ? -0.046 
(-0.752) 
-0.031 
(-0.543) 
-0.044 
(-0.839) 
AC1997 ? -0.031 
(-0.484) 
-0.021 
(-0.349) 
-0.020 
(-0.386) 
AC1998 ? -0.072 
(-1.054) 
-0.053 
(-0.827) 
-0.049 
(-0.859) 
AC1999 ? -0.115 
(-1.791) 
-0.111 
(-1.809) 
-0.116 
(-2.085)* 
AC2000 ? -0.096 
(-1.361) 
-0.086 
(-1.260) 
-0.017 
(-0.265) 
Capital goods ? 0.042 
(0.750) 
0.045 
(0.822) 
0.060 
(1.242) 
Commercial, services 
and supplies 
? 0.042 
(0.600) 
0.037 
(0.540) 
0.049 
(0.784) 
Energy ? 0.012 
(0.217) 
0.17 
(0.302) 
0.010 
(0.202) 
Food, beverage and 
tobacco 
? 0.008 
(0.153) 
0.006 
(0.122) 
0.004 
(0.086) 
Healthcare ? -0.090 -0.082 0.010 
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equipment and 
services 
(-1.347) (-1.255) (0.169) 
Hotels, restaurants 
and leisure 
? 0.013 
(0.176) 
0.017 
(0.226) 
0.018 
(0.277) 
Materials ? 0.068 
(0.714) 
0.065 
(0.689) 
0.059 
(0.678) 
Media ? -0.085 
(-1.486) 
-0.071 
(-1.307) 
-0.089 
(-1.808) 
Retailing ? 0.054 
(0.824) 
0.058 
(0.928) 
0.061 
(1.100) 
Software and 
services 
? 0.162 
(2.693)** 
0.170 
(2.879)** 
0.150 
(2.834)** 
Telecommunication 
services 
? 0.120 
(1.135) 
0.129 
(1.258) 
0.141 
(1.523) 
Adjusted R2  -0.010 0.012 0.012 
F statistic  0.958 1.055 1.059 
p-value  0.537 0.408 0.403 
* significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
(p-values are one-tailed when direction is as predicted, otherwise two-tailed) 
 
ΔEQDD = Change in cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) model 
(i.e., absolute value of regression residuals) 
ΔEQDDadj = Change in cross sectional earnings quality proxy from Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
adjusted for Jones (1991) model variables (i.e., absolute value of regression residuals) 
ΔACIND = Change in proportion of independent directors on the audit committee 
ΔACACCEXP = Change in proportion of directors on the audit committee with accounting 
qualifications  
ΔACLEGEXP = Change in proportion of directors on the audit committee with legal qualifications  
ΔACMEET = Change in number of audit committee meetings 
ΔACSIZE = Change in number of audit committee members 
ΔBDIND = Change in proportion of independent directors on the board 
ΔBDACCEXP = Change in proportion of directors on the board with accounting qualifications  
ΔBDLEGEXP = Change in proportion of directors on the board with legal qualifications  
ΔBDMEET = Change in number of board meetings 
ΔBDSIZE = Change in number of board members 
ΔAUDITOR: 1 = a company with a non-Big 5/6 auditor changed to a Big 5/6 auditor; and 0 = 
otherwise 
LNΔSIZE = Natural log of change in company size (as measured by total assets) 
ΔLEV = Change in leverage (as measured by total liabilities divided by total assets) 
AC1993: 1 = year after formation is 1993; 0 = otherwise 
AC1994: 1 = year after formation is 1994; 0 = otherwise 
AC1995: 1 = year after formation is 1995; 0 = otherwise 
AC1996: 1 = year after formation is 1996; 0 = otherwise 
AC1997: 1 = year after formation is 1997; 0 = otherwise 
AC1998: 1 = year after formation is 1998; 0 = otherwise 
AC1999: 1 = year after formation is 1999; 0 = otherwise 
AC2000: 1 = year after formation is 2000; 0 = otherwise 
Capital goods: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise 
Commercial, services and supplies: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise 
Energy: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Food, beverage and tobacco: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Healthcare equipment and services: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Hotels, restaurants and leisure: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Materials: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Media: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Retailing: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Software and services: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise  
Telecommunication services: 1 = company is from that industry; 0 = otherwise
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4.6.4 Additional analysis 
The calculation of the AC_GOV_SCORE variable was discussed in section 
4.5.4. The change in this variable was substituted for the change in each of the 
individual audit committee variables and the regressions reported in tables 4.16 and 
4.17 were rerun. The regressions were first rerun including the change in each of the 
board variables and then excluding the change in BDIND, BDACCEXP and 
BDLEGEXP. These were the variables that were most highly correlated with the 
related audit committee variables, as reported in tables 4.14 and 4.15. The change in 
AC_GOV_SCORE was not significant in any of the regressions that were rerun.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This Chapter presents the results obtained from the statistical tests undertaken 
in this research. First, there is a discussion of the population from which the sample 
was drawn, followed by an explanation of the samples used in the three groups of 
tests.  Second, the results obtained from the tests that examined the association 
between audit committee formation and financial reporting quality are analysed. 
Third, there is a discussion of the results from the tests on the association between the 
characteristics of audit committees and financial reporting quality. The final section 
details the test results on the association between the changes in the audit committee 
characteristics and changes in financial reporting quality. Chapter 5 provides the 
conclusions drawn from these results about the hypotheses and research questions and 
discusses the implications of this research for theory, policy and practice. 
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5 Conclusions and Implications 
5.1 Introduction 
This Chapter draws together the discussion in the previous Chapters and 
provides conclusions and implications from the results discussed in Chapter 4. The 
Chapter is organised as follows: section 5.2 draws conclusions about the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter 2; section 5.3 draws conclusions about the two research 
questions identified in Chapter 1; section 5.4 provides several implications for theory; 
section 5.5 identifies a number of implications for policy and practice; section 5.6 
discusses several limitations of this research; and section 5.7 highlights a number of 
avenues for future research. 
 
5.2 Conclusions about hypotheses 
5.2.1 Audit committee formation 
In the context of agency theory, there are incentives for companies to establish 
corporate governance controls, such as audit committees, due to the inability of 
shareholders to directly observe management's actions (Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Dellaportas et al. 2005). Furthermore, audit committees have been widely 
recommended in Australia and overseas as an important means of improving the 
quality of corporate financial reporting practices (e.g., Blue Ribbon Committee 1999; 
AARF, IIAA and AICD 2001; Ramsay 2001; ASX Corporate Governance Council 
2003). Therefore, it was proposed that: 
 
H1: The formation of an audit committee is positively associated with an 
increase in financial reporting quality. 
 
The parametric t-test found that the difference between the means of the 
earnings quality variables derived from the modified Jones (1991) model was 
significant at the 0.01 level. The mean for the variable in the year after audit 
committee formation was less than the mean for the variable in the year before 
formation. This result suggests that earnings quality, calculated from the modified 
Jones (1991) model, significantly increased following the formation of the audit 
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committee. This is because there is an inverse relation between the value of the 
earnings quality variables and the level of earnings quality, i.e., the lower the value of 
the variables, the higher the quality of earnings and vice versa. The non-parametric 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test provided support for this result. As section 2.4.2 noted, 
earnings quality is one means of measuring financial reporting quality. Consequently, 
there is some support for hypothesis 1 that the formation of an audit committee is 
positively associated with an increase in financial reporting quality.  
The significant result for the modified Jones (1991) model variable was not 
supported in the tests involving the two earnings quality measures derived from the 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. For these two measures, the t-test showed that 
there was no significant difference in the means of the earnings quality variables in 
the years before and after audit committee formation. Similar results were obtained 
from the Wilcoxon signed ranks test. This insignificant result could be partly because 
the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model does not separate intentional and unintentional 
accrual estimation errors because they both imply low-quality accruals and earnings. 
Audit committees may only be effective at influencing the intentional errors, which 
are better captured by the Jones (1991) model.  
While several studies have examined factors associated with audit committee 
formation (Eichenseher and Shields 1985; Pincus, Rusbarsky and Wong 1989; 
Bradbury 1990; Collier 1993; Adams 1997; Carson 2002; Chau and Leung 2006), few 
have analysed the link between audit committee formation and financial reporting 
quality. Wild (1994) and Jeon, Choi and Park (2004) are the only known published 
papers that have directly examined this issue. Wild (1994) examined the extent of 
reaction to the release of earnings reports before and after audit committee formation. 
The results indicated a significant increase in the market reaction to earnings reports 
released after the formation of the audit committee. Jeon, Choi and Park (2004) 
operationalised financial reporting quality by using a modified Jones (1991) model to 
develop a measure for earnings management for a sample of Korean companies. The 
findings indicated that there was no significant decrease in earnings management, 
compared to the period before establishment, for firms that established audit 
committees. Conversely, the earnings quality of the sample companies had not 
improved following the establishment of the audit committees. 
Therefore, while Wild (1994) provides some support for the results of this 
research, there is a conflict between the results of Jeon, Choi and Park (2004) and the 
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results of this research involving the modified Jones (1991) model variables. A reason 
for this inconsistency may be the different legal environments between Korea and 
Australia. The sample companies analysed by Jeon, Choi and Park (2004) included a 
majority that were required by Korean government law to establish an audit 
committee. The period of study for this research was prior to the mandatory 
requirement for audit committee formation by large Australian listed companies, 
which came into effect on 1 January 2003. Audit committees that are formed 
voluntarily, not because of a government requirement, may be more effective at 
constraining earnings management and therefore improving earnings quality. This is 
because they have other incentives to ensure their audit committees operate 
effectively, which drove the decision to voluntarily form an audit committee. 
5.2.2 Audit committee characteristics 
The hypotheses related to various audit committee characteristics are restated 
below: 
 
H2a: The independence of an audit committee is positively associated with 
financial reporting quality; 
 
H3a: The expertise of an audit committee is positively associated with 
financial reporting quality; 
 
H4a: The activity of an audit committee is positively associated with financial 
reporting quality; 
 
H5a: The size of an audit committee is positively associated with financial 
reporting quality; 
 
H6: The tenure of an audit committee is positively associated with financial 
reporting quality. 
 
From the univariate results reported in section 4.5.2, there is some limited 
evidence of a positive association between earnings quality and the proportion of 
independent audit committee members, audit committee size and the number of years 
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since the formation of the audit committee. This provides some support for 
hypotheses 2a, 5a and 6. However, these results do not hold in a multivariate context. 
For the regression model that used the dependent variable derived from the modified 
Jones (1991) model, none of the coefficients for the audit committee variables were 
significant at the 0.01 or 0.05 levels. A similar result was obtained for the regression 
models that used the two Dechow and Dichev (2002) model dependent variables. 
These results suggest that none of the audit committee characteristics were positively 
associated with earnings quality and financial reporting quality for the sample 
companies after controlling for correlated variables. Therefore, no support was found 
for hypotheses 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a or 6 in the multivariate tests. 
Several prior studies have also found that some audit committee characteristics 
were not significantly associated with earnings management and, therefore, earnings 
quality. Choi, Jeon and Park (2004), Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau (2004) and 
Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2005) each found that audit committee 
activity was not significantly associated with earnings management. Bedard, 
Chtourou and Courteau (2004),  Vafeas (2005) and Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart and 
Kent (2005) each found a similar result in relation to audit committee size. The results 
of Van der Zahn and Tower (2004) failed to show an association between the 
magnitude of earnings management and the audit committee's financial expertise 
amongst the independent directors. Yang and Krishnan (2005) found no significant 
association between either audit committee independence or financial expertise and 
quarterly discretionary accruals. A similar result regarding audit committee 
independence was found in Rahman and Ali (2006). 
However, there are some inconsistencies between the results of this research 
and several prior studies. The following audit committee characteristics have been 
found to be significantly associated with measures of earnings management or 
earnings quality: independence (Klein 2002a; Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau 2004; 
Choi, Jeon and Park 2004; Van der Zahn and Tower 2004; Davidson, Goodwin-
Stewart and Kent 2005; Vafeas 2005); expertise (Xie, Davidson and DaDalt 2003a; 
Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau 2004; Choi, Jeon and Park 2004; Dhaliwal, Naiker 
and Navissi 2006); activity (Xie, Davidson and DaDalt 2003a; Van der Zahn and 
Tower 2004; Vafeas 2005); and size (Choi, Jeon and Park 2004; Yang and Krishnan 
2005). Therefore, there have been mixed results in the literature about the association 
 130
between certain audit committee characteristics, earnings management and earnings 
quality. 
There could be a number of reasons for the differences between the results of 
this research and the prior studies referred to in the previous paragraph. First, many of 
the prior studies were conducted in the United States where audit committees have 
been more highly regulated than in Australia. Therefore, US companies have been 
given more guidance from regulators about areas such as the composition and size of 
their audit committee, which could potentially make the committees more effective. 
Furthermore, the audit committees of many companies in the United States have been 
in existence since 1978, which means they have more experience in carrying out their 
duties than most audit committees in Australia. The use of Australian data in this 
research avoided the confounding effect of audit committee regulation existing in the 
United States. Therefore, Australia provided a superior empirical setting for the 
examination of the association between audit committees and financial reporting 
quality. 
Second, the more litigious legal environment in the United States may create 
greater incentives for company directors sitting on audit committees to work towards 
reducing earnings management, thereby improving their companies' financial 
reporting quality. Third, there were differences between some of the specific 
measurements used for the dependent and independent variables. For example, 
Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2005) used non-executive directors to develop 
their measures of audit committee independence, instead of independent directors that 
were used in this research. When non-executive directors with related party 
transactions were excluded, one of their measures of audit committee independence 
was not significant (Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 2005). 
 
5.2.3 Changes in audit committee characteristics 
The hypotheses on the association between changes in the audit committee 
characteristics and changes in financial reporting quality are restated below:  
 
H2b: An increase in the independence of an audit committee is positively 
associated with an increase in financial reporting quality; 
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H3b: An increase in the expertise of an audit committee is positively 
associated with an increase in financial reporting quality; 
 
H4b: An increase in the activity of an audit committee is positively associated 
with an increase in financial reporting quality; 
 
H5b: An increase in the size of an audit committee is positively associated 
with an increase in financial reporting quality. 
 
These hypotheses were tested by regressing changes in the earnings quality 
variables between the year after audit committee formation and 2001, on changes in 
the audit committee and control variables over the same period. For the change in the 
dependent variable derived from the modified Jones (1991) model, the regression 
results show that the changes in the audit committee variables were not significant. 
The regression models that used the changes in the two Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model dependent variables yielded similar results. These results suggest that increases 
in each of the audit committee variables were not positively associated with increases 
in earnings quality and financial reporting quality. Therefore, support was not found 
for hypotheses 2b, 3b, 4b or 5b.  
Most of the similar prior studies used only cross sectional tests to analyse the 
association between audit committee characteristics and financial reporting quality. 
Such tests suffer from the potential problem of omitted variables. This research has 
extended the prior literature by also analysing this association over time. The results 
from this analysis provide support for the results from the cross sectional tests.  
Furthermore, this research used two models to develop three proxy measures 
for financial reporting quality. These models were derived from Jones (1991) and 
Dechow and Dichev (2002). Most of the prior studies only used variations of the 
original Jones (1991) model. Similar results were obtained when both of these models 
were used. This provides additional support for the lack of a significant association 
between audit committee characteristics and financial reporting quality for the sample 
of Australian companies used in this research. Most of the prior studies used US data, 
where audit committees have been more strictly regulated. Therefore, Australia 
represented a superior empirical setting. 
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5.3 Conclusions about research questions 
The two research questions investigated in this research are restated below: 
 
Is the formation of audit committees associated with improved 
financial reporting quality? 
 
Are certain audit committee characteristics associated with improved 
financial reporting quality? 
 
From the discussion on the hypotheses, several conclusions can be drawn 
about these research questions in relation to the companies included in the sample. 
For the first research question, there was some evidence to support a positive 
association between the formation of audit committees and improved financial 
reporting quality. This conclusion arises from the significant difference in the means 
of the modified Jones (1991) model earnings quality variables between the years 
before and after audit committee formation. However, a significant result was not 
found for the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model variables. A possible reason for this 
inconsistent result is that audit committees are only effective at influencing intentional 
accrual estimation errors, which are not separated out by the Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model.  
For the second research question, there was only limited univariate support for 
the association between certain audit committee characteristics and improved 
financial reporting quality. None of the characteristics tested were significantly 
positively associated with the earnings quality variables in the multivariate tests. It is, 
therefore, concluded that the audit committee characteristics investigated in this 
research are not associated with improved financial reporting quality. 
 
5.4 Implications for theory 
The conclusions from this research have several theoretical implications. First, 
agency theory predicts that corporate governance controls, such as audit committees, 
are implemented to align managers' and shareholders' incentives, thus limiting the 
ability of managers to act opportunistically (Dellaportas et al. 2005). These 
opportunistic activities can include the management of the company's earnings "…to 
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either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying performance of the company 
or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers" 
(Healy and Wahlen 1999, p. 368). Earnings management has a negative impact on the 
quality of earnings and, therefore, the financial reports produced by companies. This 
research illustrated that the formation of audit committees significantly reduced the 
level of earnings management, thereby improving overall financial reporting quality. 
Second, the prior literature suggests that several characteristics of audit 
committees can enhance their ability to monitor the financial reporting process. These 
characteristics include the committees' independence, expertise, activity, size and 
tenure. However, this research found that these characteristics were not significantly 
associated with improved financial reporting quality. Therefore, this suggests that, 
once audit committees are established, variations in their characteristics do not make a 
significant difference to financial reporting quality. 
Finally, this research used two empirical models to develop proxy measures of 
financial reporting quality. The Jones (1991) model has been widely used in studies 
where the focus has been on opportunistic earnings management, whereas the 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model is relatively newer and develops an earnings 
quality proxy that includes both intentional and unintentional estimation errors in 
accruals. These models yielded different results in the tests that examined the 
association between audit committee formation and financial reporting quality. The 
results were significant for the modified Jones (1991) model variables, but not for the 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model variables. This suggests that audit committees are 
more effective at reducing opportunistic earnings management, rather than 
unintentional accrual estimation errors that also have a negative impact on earnings 
quality. 
 
5.5 Implications for policy and practice 
There are several implications of this research for policy and practice. The 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) will find the results useful in assessing the 
usefulness of some of the new audit committee listing rules that came into effect from 
1 January 2003. The new rules mandated that all entities in the S & P All Ordinaries 
Index must have an audit committee. This requirement is supported by the results of 
this research showing that the formation of an audit committee is significantly 
 134
associated with improved financial reporting quality. Therefore, there are benefits 
from companies forming an audit committee in compliance with the new mandatory 
requirement.  
The new listing rules also require all entities in the top 300 of the S & P All 
Ordinaries Index to comply with the ASX Corporate Governance Council’s best 
practice recommendations regarding the composition, operation and responsibility of 
the audit committee (Australian Stock Exchange 2006b). The ASX Corporate 
Governance Council recently announced a review of its Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance and Best Practice Recommendations (Australian Stock Exchange 2006a). 
Recommendation 4.3 (ASX Corporate Governance Council 2003) stated that the audit 
committee should consist of:  
• only non-executive directors;  
• a majority of independent directors;  
• an independent chairperson who is not the board chairperson; and  
• at least three members.  
This research found that audit committee characteristics including 
independence and size were not significantly associated with improved financial 
reporting quality. So, while it is apparent that benefits exist from forming an audit 
committee, the same benefits do not accrue to companies that, e.g., increase the 
proportion of independent audit committee members or increase the size of their audit 
committee. Therefore, there are doubts over the usefulness of several aspects of 
recommendation 4.3. The ASX should consider reassessing the new listing rules in 
light of the results of this research and other similar research studies. 
 
5.6 Limitations 
While this research has several strengths, a number of limitations require 
mention. First, the focus of this research was on top 500 Australian listed companies. 
The reason for this was the wider availability of annual report data for these 
companies in the databases that were used. Therefore, it is not possible to generalise 
the results of this research to non-top 500 listed companies. Second, this research 
relied on company annual reports for the data necessary to test the hypotheses. 
Consequently, it was not possible to develop a detailed knowledge of the inner 
workings of audit committees. Third, data on auditor changes and changes in board 
 135
characteristics between the years before and after audit committee formation was not 
collected, which meant it was not possible to test for the influence of these variables 
on changes in earnings quality. Fourth, the changes tests discussed in section 3.7.3 
were based on changes in the variables between the year after audit committee 
formation and 2001. As the time window for some companies was up to 8 years (i.e., 
1994 to 2001), this reduced the ability to attribute changes in earnings quality to 
changes in audit committee characteristics. Fifth, despite the use of the formation and 
changes tests, potential endogeneity issues may still remain regarding the 
interdependence of audit committees and financial reporting quality. Sixth, data on 
the tenure of individual audit committee members was not collected, which meant it 
was not possible to test the association between this variable and earnings quality. 
Seventh, it is possible that the insignificance of the audit committee characteristics 
may be attributable to the power of the tests, given the reduced sample size. 
Finally, this research used the original Dechow and Dichev (2002) model to 
develop two measures of overall earnings quality. The model was not adjusted to 
separate the intentional and unintentional components of accrual estimation errors, 
because both types of errors imply lower quality accruals and earnings (Dechow and 
Dichev 2002). However, the results for the tests on audit committee formation suggest 
that audit committees may have a greater influence on intentional errors, which more 
closely reflect opportunistic earnings management. This conclusion arises from the 
difference in the results between the Jones (1991) and Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
models. 
While these limitations are acknowledged, they do not detract from the 
strengths of this research and the importance of its findings.  The limitations merely 
provide platforms for future research, some of which are discussed in the next section. 
 
5.7 Further research 
There are several avenues for future research that arise from the limitations 
addressed in the previous section. First, the data collection could be extended to 
include non-top 500 Australian listed companies. This would help to determine if the 
results from this research also hold for smaller companies. Second, a number of case 
studies of audit committees in Australian companies could be undertaken to obtain a 
more detailed understanding of the inner workings of the committees. This could 
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involve attending audit committee meetings and conducting interviews with 
committee members. Such case studies would require obtaining agreement from 
company management, which may be difficult to obtain.  
Finally, the original Dechow and Dichev (2002) model could be extended to 
attempt to isolate the intentional or discretionary component of accrual estimation 
errors, which audit committees may have a greater ability to influence. A similar 
approach to Francis et al. (2004) and Francis et al. (2005a) could be used. These 
studies incorporated in their models the five factors considered by Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) to explain accruals or earnings quality. The five factors were firm size, 
cash flow variability, sales variability, length of operating cycle and incidence of 
negative earnings.   
Some prior studies suggest that audit committees are an effective corporate 
governance mechanism, which can improve the quality of companies' financial 
reporting practices. This research found some support for this notion in terms of audit 
committee formation, however this did not extend to the analysis of audit committee 
characteristics. Therefore, the association between audit committees and financial 
reporting quality appears simpler than the literature suggests and foundations have 
been set for further research about this association. 
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